Extreme idealism and equilibrium in the Hotelling–Downs model of political competition
In: Public choice, Band 176, Heft 3-4, S. 389-403
ISSN: 1573-7101
3 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: Public choice, Band 176, Heft 3-4, S. 389-403
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Band 132, Heft 642, S. 741-766
ISSN: 1468-0297
Abstract
We study strategic interactions in markets in which firms sell to consumers both directly and via a competitive channel, such as a price comparison website or marketplace, where multiple sellers' offers are visible at once. We ask how a competitive channel's size influences market outcomes when some consumers have limited price information. A bigger competitive channel means that more consumers compare prices, increasing within-channel competition. However, we show that such seemingly pro-competitive developments can raise prices and harm consumers by weakening between-channel competition.
In: CESifo Working Paper No. 10963
SSRN