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Terrorist violence has recently led several states to grant extraordinary powers to the executive. Yet scholars have only recently begun to examine whether the provision of such emergency powers influences the probability of future terrorist attacks. I argue that when democratic states grant emergency powers to the executive, domestic incentives can push leaders to take overly aggressive actions that are counterproductive for reducing future terrorist violence. However, these domestic incentives vary depending on the in-group or out-group nature of the terrorist group. I test this hypothesis using data on emergency power strength, states of emergency, and the frequency of terrorist violence. In a global sample of democratic states, I find that while emergency powers increase future attacks from out-group terror arising from separatist groups, they have no effect on terror from groups that reflect extreme positions within the political order. These results express the conditional nature of executive freedom in combatting terrorism.

This article discusses the content and causes of emergency powers in democratic states. It makes two main contributions. First, it introduces the Democratic Emergency Powers dataset, which codifies formal rules of institutional change during periods of emergency for all democracies from 1800 to 2012. These data are important because often state institutions in times of emergency differ dramatically from those in times of relative peace, and this influences government decision-making during times of crisis. I discuss the collection process and develop a measure of the latent strength in each of these emergency provisions. Second, this article examines the determinants of emergency power strength in democratic nations cross nationally. I find that previous and current conflict experience influence emergency power provision and strength, but also that domestic determinants have an impact on the types of instruments states institutionalize for times of emergency.

Scholars argue that institutions in democracies constrain leaders and prevent international conflict. However, many democracies specify rules of governance in times of emergency that divert substantial power to the head of state. The manipulation of these "emergency powers" provides a rational motivation for conflict. Using a novel data set of emergency provisions within democracies, I test the relationship between emergency power strength and conflict propensity using several steps to achieve causal inference, including an instrumental variable analysis that exploits the specificity of the state's constitution as a plausibly exogenous determinant of emergency power strength. I find that emergency power strength is a strong predictor of conflict onset in democracies in each test and that states with strong emergency powers are substantially more likely to enact a state of emergency due to an international conflict. I conclude with a discussion of my findings and avenues of future research using these data.

Scholars argue that institutions in democracies constrain leaders and prevent international conflict. However, many democracies specify rules of governance in times of emergency that divert substantial power to the head of state. The manipulation of these "emergency powers" provides a rational motivation for conflict. Using a novel data set of emergency provisions within democracies, I test the relationship between emergency power strength and conflict propensity using several steps to achieve causal inference, including an instrumental variable analysis that exploits the specificity of the state's constitution as a plausibly exogenous determinant of emergency power strength. I find that emergency power strength is a strong predictor of conflict onset in democracies in each test and that states with strong emergency powers are substantially more likely to enact a state of emergency due to an international conflict. I conclude with a discussion of my findings and avenues of future research using these data.

Scholars increasingly emphasize personal biographical characteristics of leaders in explaining patterns of foreign policy behavior. This article extends insights from this agenda to study how (dis)similarities in the background characteristics of leaders at the dyadic level shape international conflict outcomes. Trust and uncertainty are central to explaining conflict via their connections to commitment- and information-related causes of war. Psychological research provides evidence that perceived similarities between individuals and groups can foment trust and cooperation. We hypothesize that leaders who share more similar backgrounds and life experiences form stronger social bonds and are more trusting of one another. As such, leaders who have more in common with one another should be able to better manage diplomatic disputes and avoid conflict. We test this hypothesis using a new measure of dyadic-leader-level similarity created with the Leader Experience and Attribute Descriptions (LEAD) dataset and data on international conflict onset in politically relevant dyads throughout the period 1946–2004. We find that pairs of leaders with more similar backgrounds are significantly less likely to experience militarized interstate disputes at all levels of hostility even after accounting for a variety of observable and unobservable determinants of conflict. The findings contribute to our understanding of the determinants of international conflict and help advance research on linkages between psychological and rationalist approaches to studying conflict.

States of emergency grant chief executives the power to bypass democratic constraints in order to combat existential threats. As such, they are ideal tools to erode democratic institutions while maintaining the illusion of constitutional legitimacy. Therefore, states of emergency should be associated with a heightened risk of autocratization – a decline in a regime's democratic attributes. Despite this theoretical link and the contemporary relevance of both autocratization and states of emergency, no prior study has empirically tested this relationship. This article tests this relationship using data on sixty democracies for 1974 to 2016. We find that democracies are 75 percent more likely to erode under a state of emergency. This evidence strongly suggests that states of emergency circumvent democratic processes in ways that might promote democratic decline.

Recent studies demonstrate that turnover in domestic political leadership is associated with change in states' foreign policies. While domestic changes matter even after controlling for international factors, many argue that international factors should overwhelm the effects of domestic turnover on foreign policy change. Yet existing studies tend to focus on other domestic-level variables (e.g., regime type) as constraints on domestic turnover. We consider how three sets of international factors that scholars have argued might outweigh the influence of domestic changes—security environment, socialization, and economic dependence—moderate the effects of domestic coalition changes on variance in voting patterns in the United Nations. To do this, we interact a measure of domestic coalition turnover with various proxies for international context in a statistical model of voting consistency. We find that many international factors are associated with greater consistency in voting behavior. Yet the effects of domestic change on foreign policy are remarkably resilient. We find only limited evidence that the effect of domestic change attenuates as states face more international constraints. The results reinforce the importance of understanding the role of both domestic political factors and international context in shaping foreign policy.

AbstractRecent studies demonstrate that turnover in domestic political leadership is associated with change in states' foreign policies. While domestic changes matter even after controlling for international factors, many argue that international factors should overwhelm the effects of domestic turnover on foreign policy change. Yet existing studies tend to focus on other domestic-level variables (e.g., regime type) as constraints on domestic turnover. We consider how three sets of international factors that scholars have argued might outweigh the influence of domestic changes—security environment, socialization, and economic dependence—moderate the effects of domestic coalition changes on variance in voting patterns in the United Nations. To do this, we interact a measure of domestic coalition turnover with various proxies for international context in a statistical model of voting consistency. We find that many international factors are associated with greater consistency in voting behavior. Yet the effects of domestic change on foreign policy are remarkably resilient. We find only limited evidence that the effect of domestic change attenuates as states face more international constraints. The results reinforce the importance of understanding the role of both domestic political factors and international context in shaping foreign policy.

AbstractStates that grant their leaders extraordinary powers in times of emergency do so to protect the nation against dramatic shocks. Implicit in this choice is the assumption that the government will better retain its capacity when confronted with an emergency situation if the leader can invoke emergency powers. This remains an untested proposition. In this article, we challenge this assumption and argue that the relationship between emergency powers and political capacity depends on both the nature of the emergency itself and the type of capacity in question. We find that emergency powers better allow the government to extract resources from the public during periods of emergency. However, it is only in national political emergencies where these resources are well allocated. After extra‐territorial emergencies, increased emergency power strength leads to inefficient government allocation. This suggests that emergency powers are not a panacea guarding against the ills of crisis.

Uncertainty about resolve is a well-established rationalist explanation for war. In addition to estimating the resolve of immediate rivals, leaders choose their actions in a crisis based on expectations about how third parties will respond. We argue that leaders will become more likely to develop inconsistent estimates of rivals' relative capabilities and resolve – and thus will become more likely to fight – when domestic political changes occur in states that are allied with an opponent. We also consider how the relationship between conflict in rivalries and third-party domestic change depends on domestic political institutions in the third party. We argue that this effect should only hold when a challenger does not also share an alliance with the third party, and that the effect should be strongest when the third party is a non-democratic state. We test our theory using a dataset of changes in leaders' domestic supporting coalitions and data on militarized interstate disputes from 1920 to 2001. Consistent with our hypotheses, we find that the likelihood of conflict increases in rivalries only when domestic coalition changes occur in states that share an alliance with only one member of a rivalry, and that this effect is strongest and most consistent for non-democratic third parties.