Unarmed fortresses: the army and the PKI's rival struggles for hegemony during guided democracy -- Mental operations: the army's propaganda after October 1, 1965 -- Tortured words: interrogations and the production of truth -- Surprise attacks: the destruction of the PKI in Surakarta -- Vanishing points: disappearances in Bali -- Invisible worlds: the Kapal massacre in Bali -- Dead labor: disappearances in Sumatra.
In the early morning hours of October 1, 1965, a group calling itself the September 30th Movement kidnapped and executed six generals of the Indonesian army, including its highest commander. The group claimed that it was attempting to preempt a coup, but it was quickly defeated as the senior surviving general, Haji Mohammad Suharto, drove the movements partisans out of Jakarta. Riding the crest of mass violence, Suharto blamed the Communist Party of Indonesia for masterminding the movement and used the emergency as a pretext for gradually eroding President Sukarnos powers and installing himself as a ruler. Imprisoning and killing hundreds of thousands of alleged communists over the next year, Suharto remade the events of October 1, 1965 into the central event of modern Indonesian history and the cornerstone of his thirty-two-year dictatorship. Despite its importance as a trigger for one of the twentieth centurys worst cases of mass violence, the September 30th Movement has remained shrouded in uncertainty. Who actually masterminded it? What did they hope to achieve? Why did they fail so miserably? And what was the movements connection to international Cold War politics? InPretext for Mass Murder, John Roosa draws on a wealth of new primary source material to suggest a solution to the mystery behind the movement and the enabling myth of Suhartos repressive regime. His book is a remarkable feat of historical investigation. Finalist, Social Sciences Book Award, the International Convention of Asian Scholars.
An introduction to a special issue on, "East Timor's Truth Commission," points out the tenaciousness of the East Timor resistance against incorporation attempts by the Indonesian government. Although 78.5 percent of the East Timor electorate voted for independence in an August 1999 United Nations-administered referendum, the small nation-state was left virtually impoverished. Special attention is given to the truth & reconciliation commission (2002-05) that dealt with human rights violations committed during the 24-year Indonesian occupation. The commission's final report includes a section for each type of violation, from a war of aggression to the practice of torture. Advantages & disadvantages of the absence of the main perpetrators are explored, along with the openness of the East Timorese government to investigations of offenses committed by their own organizations. Unfortunately, the commission's efforts were largely futile in light of the political crisis that began in May 2006 & resulted in the displacement of over 150,000 people. Challenges facing attempts to build East Timor into an independent nation-state are discussed. J. Lindroth