Themistius on Concept Formation
In: Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, Volume 103, Issue 4, p. 670-703
ISSN: 1613-0650
AbstractThis paper reconstructs the account of concept formation developed in the 4thCentury A.D. by Themistius in the most ancient extant commentary on Aristotle'sPosterior Analytics. Themistius' account can be contrasted with two widespread modern interpretations of Aristotle. Unlike psychological empiricists, Themistius ascribes an active role in concept formation to our innate capacity of understanding (νοῦς). Unlike intuitionists, he would not be satisfied by saying that νοῦς "intuits" or "spots" concepts. Rather, the question is what makes our νοῦς capable of "finding" and "recognizing" concepts in experience, and this can only be an understanding prior to all experience. Themistius seems to be responding here to Platonist arguments against Aristotle's epistemology: postulating a "potential νοῦς" is not enough, for one can apply Meno's dilemma toitand ask how it can recognize that it has found what it was looking for. But, contrary to the judgment of some modern scholars, Themistius never embraced the theory of recollection either (he rejects it decisively). He argued that both empiricism and Platonist innatism are wrong and developed a middle path marked by a strong interdependence between the perceptive and the rational capacity. This holds for all rational learning, and concept formation is its first stage: to form a concept means tolearnsomething genuinely new, but also torecognizeit as falling, e. g., under one of the ten categories. While being presented as a mere "paraphrasis" of Aristotle's words, Themistius' account is a well-advised and original response to the epistemological debates of his time.