Machine generated contents note: 1.The Third Category of Death -- 2.Collateral Damage and the Question of Legal Responsibility -- 3.Collateral Damage and Compensation -- 4.Lifting the Fog of War and Collateral Damage -- 5.How Bad Can Be Good -- 6.A Death Without Sacrifice -- 7.Collateral Damage or Accident? -- 8.A Private Call for Collateral Damage? -- 9.With or Without a Centre -- 10.A Place Between it All
AbstractThis article introduces the concept of the dark side of cultural heritage protection. It points out how the many and mostly honorable efforts to protect cultural heritage against the harms of war and conflict sometimes contribute to make cultural heritage vulnerable or even to cause its destruction. The more we talk about cultural heritage and its value and the importance of protecting it, the more interesting it becomes for some groups to target it. This article argues that states, international organizations, and the heritage community need to recognize these negative side effects and make sure to consider them in future action.
Counterinsurgency strategies employed by the US military in Afghanistan have led to the US military embarking on civil governance reform. This has created new forms of civil—military relations with Afghan and international counterparts. These relations appear less dramatic than 'conventional' civil—military relations, in that they do not create the same visible alignment on the ground between military and non-military identities. In addition, the increased merging of civil and military work areas creates a new complexity that stems from semantic confusion. This complexity is mostly about norms and principles, in that the core puzzle is the more general question of what kinds of tasks the military should and should not do, rather than about violent consequences to civilians and questions of neutrality. This article proposes the term 'third-generation civil—military relations' to capture and examine the conceptual challenges that stem from the merging of military and civil work areas in Afghanistan's reconstruction.
The encounter with insurgency violence in Iraq and Afghanistan has pressed the US Department of Defense to improve the US military's ability to conduct counterinsurgency. It has been argued that this shift may constitute a turning point in the history of the US military, which until now has focused its attention and resources on conventional warfare. The analysis is that the US military is currently in the process of 'learning counterinsurgency', but that it is still unclear whether this process will make counterinsurgency a US military priority. This working paper contributes to this discussion by looking at a particular aspect of the ambitious stabilization work that the US Department of Defense has commenced in Afghanistan, in which the US mili-tary is carrying out holistic civil governance reform projects. Whether such work will become a part of the US military's standard repertoire depends on the degree of success and possible entrenchment of the current innovations. However, as will be argued, this expansion of the functions of the military organization into civil governance is historical, and it might bring about pro-found changes to the US military, perhaps even transforming the notion of military more generally.
Today, in what has been described as a re-emergence of privately organized extraterritorial force, the private military and security industry supplies the major military powers with a range of core services. This article asks how such a development came about, and why it has become politically uncomplicated to outsource such intimate state functions as the executive branches of foreign policy programmes. How did certain states arrive at a situation where it is unclear whether core military and security affairs are run by public or private agencies? The article answers these questions by presenting and commenting on general explanations as to why the private military industry has grown so much in post-invasion Iraq. It adds new perspectives to existing scholarly work by suggesting that the reappearance of private extraterritorial force could not have occurred on such a scale without a restructuring of neutrality in international relations. It is suggested that this change in neutrality might constitute the sine qua non of the re-emergence of private extraterritorial force.
