Suchergebnisse

AbstractThe European Union (EU) is now discussing a legislation proposal to ban illegal timber from the EU market. We use the ICES model to estimate the reallocation of global demand and timber imports following the EU legislation. We aim to assess the economic impacts and measure the potential emission reduction resulting from the introduction of this policy. Results show that an EU ban targeting only log imports is not effective in reducing illegal logging, but its main effect is the removal of illegal logs from international markets. Additionally, the unilateral EU ban increases secondary wood production in illegal logging countries as their exports become relatively more competitive. Through this mechanism, part of the banned illegal timber will re-enter international trade flows 'hidden' as processed wood. Extending the ban to timber processed products eliminates this effect and reinforces direct carbon emissions reduction from logging activities.

Illegal logging is widely recognized as a major economic problem and one of the causes of environmental degradation. Increasing awareness of its negative effects has fostered a wide range of proposals to combat it by major international conservation groups and political organizations. Following the 2008 US legislation which prohibits the import of illegally harvested wood and wood products, the European Union (EU) is now discussing a legislation proposal which would ban illegal timber from the EU market. In this study we use the ICES computable general equilibrium model to estimate the reallocation of global demand and timber imports following the pending EU legislation. With this exercise our final objective is to assess the economic impacts and measure the potential emission reduction resulting from the introduction of this type of policy. Results show that while the EU ban does not seem particularly effective in reducing illegal logging activities, its main effect will be the removal of illegal logs from the international markets. In addition, the unilateral EU ban on illegal logs increases secondary wood production in illegal logging countries as their exports become relatively more competitive. Through this mechanism, part of the banned, illegal timber will re-enter the international trade flows, but it will be 'hidden' as processed wood. This effect is, however, limited. Finally, given the limited effect on overall economic activity, effects on GHG emissions are also limited. Direct carbon emissions from logging activities can decrease from 2.5 to 0.6 million tons per year.

Deforestation is a major source of CO2 emissions, accounting for around 17% of total annual anthropogenic carbon release. While the cost estimates of reducing deforestation rates vary considerably depending on model assumptions, it is widely accepted that emissions reductions from avoided deforestation consist of a relatively low cost mitigation option. Halting deforestation is therefore not only a major ecological challenge, but also a great opportunity to cost effectively reduce climate change negative impacts. In this paper we analyze the impact of introducing avoided deforestation credits into the European carbon market using a multiregional Computable General Equilibrium model - the ICES model (Inter-temporal Computable Equilibrium System). Taking into account political concerns over a possible 'flooding' of REDD credits, various limits to the number of REDD allowances entering the carbon market are considered. Finally, unlike previous studies, we account for both direct and indirect effects occurring on land and timber markets resulting from lower deforestation rates. We conclude that avoided deforestation notably reduces climate change policy costs - by approximately 80% with unlimited availability of REDD credits - and may drastically reduce carbon prices. Policy makers may, however, effectively control for these imposing limits to avoided deforestation credits use. Moreover, avoided deforestation has the additional positive effect of reducing carbon leakage of a unilateral European climate change policy. This is good news for the EU, but not necessarily for REDD regions. Indeed we show that REDD revenues are not sufficient to compensate REDD regions for a less leakage-affected and more competitive EU in international markets. In fact, REDD regions would prefer to free ride on the EU unilateral mitigation policy.