Search results

AbstractScholarship in international political economy (IPE) has noted the rise of resource nationalism in since the early 2000s. Despite the increased presence of state regulation in the resource sector, resource nationalism has not been incompatible with foreign investment. This article contributes to better understand resource nationalist policies that emerged in recent years and offers new theoretical insights to explain state-IOC relations by integrating obsolescing bargaining theories and constructivist approaches. Drawing on the case of Venezuela, this article explains how the Chávez regime pursued a hybrid model of control and welcoming of investments in the oil sector. The article argues that both bargaining insights and ideational considerations are important in explaining this model. In the context of high oil prices and sunk investments, it is unsurprising that a leftist government would seek to renegotiate contracts to seek better deals from extractive companies. Yet, focusing exclusively on those incentives misses important ideational drivers for the government to keep investors in the country. For Chávez's government, effecting changes in the oil policy was possible after waging an intense battle with its NOC, PDVSA, over control. Association with foreign investment became crucial to build its socialist model and to control its own company.

The proposal of a Banco del Sur began to be discussed in 2007 and generated important debates about the need to establish a new regional financial architecture. These discussions resulted in consensus about the importance of financing development at the regional level. An analysis of the positions and development visions of four key states—Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, and Ecuador— in the negotiations for the establishment of the Banco del Sur and their implications for its design reveals important differences about its purpose—whether it should be the center of an institutional network aimed at the construction of a new regional financial architecture or simply a development bank. La posibilidad de un Banco del Sur se comenzó a discutir en 2007 y generó importantes debates sobre la necesidad de establecer una nueva arquitectura financiera regional. Estas discusiones dieron lugar a un consenso sobre la importancia de financiar el desarrollo a nivel regional. Un análisis de las posiciones y visiones de desarrollo de cuatro naciones clave (Argentina, Brasil, Venezuela y Ecuador) en las negociaciones para el establecimiento del Banco del Sur y sus implicaciones en dicho proyecto revelan importantes divergencias sobre su presunto propósito: ¿debe ser el centro de una red institucional destinada a la construcción de una nueva arquitectura financiera regional o simplemente un banco de desarrollo?

<p>El proceso de globalización neoliberal ha implicado la propagación de las finanzas internacionales como un mecanismo de acumulación ya no auxiliar a la economía real-productiva, sino como un negocio en sí mismo. La financiarización ha elevado los riesgos y vulnerabilidades de la economía mundial, cada vez más sujetas a crisis. Asimismo, la Arquitectura Financiera Internacional (AFI) se encuentra bajo escrutinio por su cuestionada capacidad para enfrentar tales crisis. Este artículo analiza los debates actuales sobre la reforma de la afi en el contexto de las crisis financieras de la última década. De la crisis asiática de finales del siglo xx a la crisis inmobiliaria de finales de 2000, el G-20 surge como principal foro político para el avance de reformas y, por otro lado, emergen áreas de influencia regional bajo el liderazgo de potencias emergentes.</p>

Venezuela has historically been one of the world's largest oil producers and has the largest crude reserves. However, the country has experienced a dramatic political and economic crisis over the past decade that has decimated its oil industry. Venezuela's production shrunk sharply in the past six years, oil exports have declined and the country is now a marginal producer in global markets. This crisis has taken place amid a process of autocratic political consolidation and the establishment of a predatory political economy. This article focuses on this crisis and interrogates to what extent it can pave the way to a sustainable move away from oil dependence in dialogue with recent debates on sustainable transition processes. Building on the intersections of Global Political Economy and environmental politics, we highlight the importance of interconnecting links across state, society and international actors in viable sustainability transitions, such as proposals for Green New Deal(s) in different national contexts. Our analysis of the Venezuelan case subsequently highlights the absence of these capacities. We argue that contemporary Venezuela underscores the risks and costs of post-oil energy transitions in rentier states. Contemporary Venezuela is thus a cautionary tale for resource-dependent economies that may also undergo post-oil transitions in the future due to shifting global conditions but likewise lack the necessary state capacity to respond and adapt.

After a deterioration of democratic conditions in Venezuela, in 2017 the United States intensified its sanctions imposed on the regime of Nicolás Maduro. The sanctions failed to topple the regime, but they accelerated the transformation of the Venezuelan economy. To counter the sanctions, Maduro carried out substantive economic policy changes, resulting in the emergence of a neo-patrimonial and authoritarian form of capitalism. In this new model, private ownership is the rule, and economic agents operate for profit. Yet there is frequent state intervention that denies individuals' fundamental political and economic rights, and the purpose of laws and regulations is ensuring regime survival.