Suchergebnisse
Filter
33 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
State Minimum Wage Laws as a Response to Federal Inaction
In: State and Local Government Review, Band 52, Heft 4, S. 277-286
ISSN: 1943-3409
This article analyzes state legislative and ballot measure activity related to the minimum wage between 2003 and 2020. The analysis distinguishes proposals to raise the minimum wage from those to index it to the annual rate of inflation, and examines the proposed dollar amount, the process used (legislation vs. ballot measure), and the measure's success or failure. The analysis suggests that state activity tends to increase when the minimum wage rises on the federal policy agenda, and that partisanship and ideology also play a central role in efforts to raise and index state minimum wages.
Conservative Innovators: How States Are Challenging Federal Power. By Ben Merriman. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2019. 232p. $105.00 cloth, $32.50 paper
In: Perspectives on politics, Band 17, Heft 4, S. 1188-1189
ISSN: 1541-0986
State Legislatures as National Actors
In: PS: political science & politics, Band 52, Heft 3, S. 436-439
ISSN: 1537-5935
Opting In, Opting Out: The Politics of State Medicaid Expansion
In: The Forum: a journal of applied research in contemporary politics, Band 13, Heft 1, S. 63-82
ISSN: 1540-8884
Abstract
As the list of Republican-led states participating in the Medicaid expansion grows, it is becoming increasingly clear that partisanship and ideology alone cannot fully explain states' choices. This paper examines the political and practical dynamics influencing state Medicaid expansion decisions. Whereas resources and history have served to reinforce the effects of partisanship and ideology, several countervailing forces – including public opinion, interest group pressure, budgetary considerations, and need – are pushing even the reddest states toward expansion. The relative force of these competing pressures within a state can help explain not only whether or not the state expands Medicaid, but also the manner in which it does so, such as through a waiver or executive action. I present five case studies – Nevada, Arizona, Ohio, Arkansas, and Tennessee – to illustrate how these various dynamics are shaping states' decisions.
Medicaid's Remarkable Resilience
In: Public administration review: PAR, Band 74, Heft 3, S. 423-424
ISSN: 1540-6210
Medicaid's Remarkable Resilience
In: Public administration review: PAR, Band 74, Heft 3, S. 423-424
ISSN: 0033-3352
Health Care Reform and American Politics: What Everyone Needs to Know by Lawrence R. Jacobs and Theda Skocpol
In: Political science quarterly: a nonpartisan journal devoted to the study and analysis of government, politics and international affairs ; PSQ, Band 126, Heft 3, S. 509-510
ISSN: 1538-165X
Health Care Reform and American Politics: What Everyone Needs to Know
In: Political science quarterly: PSQ ; the journal public and international affairs, Band 126, Heft 3, S. 509-511
ISSN: 0032-3195
The Political Manipulation of U.S. State Rainy Day Funds Under Rules Versus Discretion
In: State politics & policy quarterly: the official journal of the State Politics and Policy section of the American Political Science Association, Band 8, Heft 2, S. 150-176
ISSN: 1946-1607
AbstractAnecdotal evidence suggests that U.S. state politicians manipulate rainy day funds for political purposes, but such claims remain untested in the literature. This article finds that lawmakers withdraw nearly three times more funds in response to a deficit shock of a given size if it occurs in an election year rather than in a non-election year; this occurs despite the fact that the magnitude of shocks does not vary over the electoral cycle. This effect is stronger when incumbents are eligible for re-election than when they are term-limited. When it comes to preventing political manipulation of funds, rainy day fund rules that increase the number of veto players who must approve of withdrawals seem to be more effective than rules that specify the economic conditions under which funds may be withdrawn.
The Political Manipulation of U.S. State Rainy Day Funds under Rules Versus Discretion
In: State politics & policy quarterly: the official journal of the State Politics and Policy Section of the American Political Science Association, Band 8, Heft 2, S. 150-176
ISSN: 1532-4400
Anecdotal evidence suggests that U.S. state politicians manipulate rainy day funds for political purposes, but such claims remain untested in the literature. This article finds that lawmakers withdraw nearly three times more funds in response to a deficit shock of a given size if it occurs in an election year rather than in a non-election year, this occurs despite the fact that the magnitude of shocks does not vary over the electoral cycle. This effect is stronger when incumbents are eligible for re-election than when they are term-limited. When it comes to preventing political manipulation of funds, rainy day fund rules that increase the number of veto players who must approve of withdrawals seem to be more effective than rules that specify the economic conditions under which funds may be withdrawn. Adapted from the source document.
Do fiscal rules dampen the political business cycle?
In: Public choice, Band 128, Heft 3-4, S. 407-431
ISSN: 1573-7101
Do fiscal rules dampen the political business cycle?
In: Public choice, Band 128, Heft 3, S. 407-432
ISSN: 0048-5829
The Policy State: An American Predicament. By Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017. 272p. $26.50 cloth, $17.95 paper
In: Perspectives on politics, Band 18, Heft 3, S. 900-902
ISSN: 1541-0986
Response to Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek's Review of Responsive States: Federalism and American Public Policy
In: Perspectives on politics, Band 18, Heft 3, S. 899-900
ISSN: 1541-0986