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In this fascinating interdisciplinary book, Shawn W. Rosenberg challenges two basic assumptions that orient much contemporary social scientific thinking. Offering theory and empirical research, he rejects the classic liberal view that people share a basic "common sense" or rationality. At the same time, he questions the view of contemporary social theory that meaning is simply an intersubjective or cultural product.Through in-depth interviews, Rosenberg explores the underlying logic of cognition. Rather than discovering a common sense or rationality, he finds that people reason in fundamentally different ways, and these differences affect the kind of understandings they craft and the evaluations they make. As a result, people actively reconstruct culturally prevalent meanings and norms in their own subjective terms. Rosenberg provides a comprehensive description of three types of socio-political reasoning and the full text of three exemplary interviews.Rosenberg's findings help explain such puzzling social phenomena as why people do not learn even when it is to their advantage to do so, or why they fail to adapt to changed social conditions even when they have clear information and motivation. The author argues that this kind of failure is commonplace and discusses examples ranging from the crisis of modernity to the classroom performance of university students. Building on the ideas of Jean Piaget, George Herbert Mead, and Jurgen Habermas, Rosenberg offers a new orienting vision, structural pragmatics, to account for these social phenomena and his own research in cognition. In the concluding chapter, he discusses the implications of his work for the study of social cognition, political behavior, and democratic theory

Offering theory and empirical research, Rosenberg rejects the liberal view that people share a basic 'common sense' or rationality. He also denies that meaning is simply an intersubjective or cultural product.

Following more than a decade of theorizing and widespread practical application, political scientists have begun empirical research on democratic deliberation. For the most part, this research has focused on individual or collective outcomes of deliberation, paying relatively little attention to the deliberative processes themselves. Here an attempt is made to study these processes themselves. First, a typology of the different ways people talk to one another is offered. Four types of discourse are defined: (1) proto-discourse, (2) conventional, (3) cooperative, and (4) collaborative. The last two types are of the kind presumed by deliberative democratic theory, with more liberal versions assuming that deliberations are cooperative and rational and more critical versions assuming that deliberation are collaborative and transformative. Research is then reported on two deliberative groups of parents who met seven times to consider improvements in the delivery of K-12 education in their area. An analysis of their deliberations indicates that their interaction was overwhelmingly conventional or proto-discursive. The participants rarely engaged one another in the way assumed by liberal democratic theory and never engaged one another in a more critical or emancipatory manner. The paper concludes with a discussion of the impact of different types of discursive interaction on the construction of democratic citizenship. At issue here is how different kinds of discourses enable participants to be different kinds of political actors in those situations.

Following more than a decade of theorizing and widespread practical application, political scientists have begun empirical research on democratic deliberation. For the most part, this research has focused on individual or collective outcomes of deliberation, paying relatively little attention to the deliberative processes themselves. Here an attempt is made to study these processes themselves. First, a typology of the different ways people talk to one another is offered. Four types of discourse are defined: (1) proto-discourse, (2) conventional, (3) cooperative, and (4) collaborative. The last two types are of the kind presumed by deliberative democratic theory, with more liberal versions assuming that deliberations are cooperative and rational and more critical versions assuming that deliberation are collaborative and transformative. Research is then reported on two deliberative groups of parents who met seven times to consider improvements in the delivery of K-12 education in their area. An analysis of their deliberations indicates that their interaction was overwhelmingly conventional or proto-discursive. The participants rarely engaged one another in the way assumed by liberal democratic theory and never engaged one another in a more critical or emancipatory manner. The paper concludes with a discussion of the impact of different types of discursive interaction on the construction of democratic citizenship. At issue here is how different kinds of discourses enable participants to be different kinds of political actors in those situations.

Deliberative democracy has emerged as a leading concern of political theory and its principles have guided over a 1000 experiments in citizen participation in local governance. Despite its importance, very little systematic empirical research has been conducted. Here an attempt is made to enumerate the key questions that should guide empirical research on the deliberative capacities of ordinary citizens, the qualities of the deliberative processes in which they participate and the effects of deliberation on collective outcomes and on individual participants. The paper closes with a discussion of the likely results of this research and their implications for a possible reconstruction of the theory and practice of deliberative democracy.

Although democracy is a contested concept, much of this contest begins with substantial agreement. Theorizing is anchored by a focus on the nature of the individual citizen. There follows a normative consideration of personal rights, namely autonomy and its social corollary, equality. The problem of democratic governance is conceived accordingly. It is one of crafting institutions that facilitate collective decision-making in a manner consistent with these fundamental values and thus with the common good. Beyond this quite general orientation, significant divergence emerges over how individuals are conceptualized and consequently over how autonomy and equality should be defined. Division over how best to institutionalize democratic governance follows. This paper focuses on the recent contribution to this theoretical debate made by the advocates of deliberative democracy. It briefly sketches the deliberative position, and then critically considers the adequacy of its conception of the individual and offer an alternative view of cognition, emotion and communication. I conclude by presenting the implications of this alternative for the understanding of the democratic values of autonomy and equality and for the conception of democratic procedure.

At the beginning of the 21st century, the field of political psychology; like the social sciences more generally, is being challenged. New theoretical direction is being demanded from within and a greater epistemological sophistication and ethical relevance is being demanded from without. In response, direction for a reconstructed political psychology is offered here. To begin, a theoretical framework for a truly integrative political psychology is sketched. This is done in light of the apparent limits of cross-disciplinary or multidisciplinary inquiry. In the attempt to transcend these limits, the theoretical approach offered directly addresses the dually structured quality of social life as the singular product of both organizing social structures and defining discourse communities on the one hand and motivated, thinking individuals on the other. To further this theoretical effort, meta-theoretical considerations are addressed. The modernist-postmodernist debate regarding the status of truth and value is used as a point of departure for constructing the epistemological foundation for a truly political psychology. In this light, structural pragmatic guidelines for theory construction, empirical research and normative inquiry are presented.