Bargaining in mergers and termination fees
In: Discussion paper series 6210
In: Financial economics and industrial organization
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In: Discussion paper series 6210
In: Financial economics and industrial organization
Central banks have become increasingly communicative. An important reason is that democratic societies expect more transparency from public institutions. Central bankers, based on empirical research, also believe that sharing information has economic benefits. Communication is seen as a way to improve the predictability of monetary policy, thereby lowering financial market volatility and contributing to a more stable economy. However, a potential side-effect of providing costless public information is that market participants may be less inclined to invest in private information. Theoretical results suggest that this can hamper the ability of markets to predict future monetary policy. We test this in a laboratory asset market. Crowding out of information acquisition does indeed take place, but only where it is most pronounced does the predictive ability of the market deteriorate. Notable features of the experiment include a complex setup based directly on the theoretical model and the calibration of experimental parameters using empirical measurements.
BASE
In: Economica, Band 78, Heft 310, S. 317-329
In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Band 117, Heft 520, S. 637-653
ISSN: 1468-0297
In: Economica, Band 74, Heft 296, S. 573-585
ISSN: 1468-0335
The fact that, according to the celebrated Coase Theorem, rational parties always try to exploit all gains from trade is usually taken as an argument against the necessity of government intervention through Pigouvian taxation in order to correct externalities. However, we show that the hold‐up problem, which occurs if non‐verifiable investments have external effects and parties cannot be prevented from always exploiting ex post gains from trade through Coasean bargaining, may be solved by government intervention. In this sense, the impossibility of ruling out Coasean bargaining (after investments are sunk) may in fact justify Pigouvian taxation.
The fact that according to the celebrated Coase Theorem rational parties always try to exploit all gains from trade is usually taken as an argument against the necessity of government intervention through Pigouvian taxation in order to correct externalities. However, we show that the hold-up problem, which occurs if non-verifiable investments have external effects and parties cannot be prevented from always exploiting ex post gains from trade through Coasean bargaining, may be solved by government intervention. In this sense, the impossibility to rule out Coasean bargaining (after investments are sunk) may in fact justify Pigouvian taxation.
BASE
In: Public choice, Band 113, Heft 3, S. 491-494
ISSN: 0048-5829
In: Public choice, Band 113, Heft 3-4, S. 491-495
ISSN: 0048-5829
SSRN
In: Journal of Economic Psychology, Band 73
SSRN
Working paper
In: Journal of economics, Band 96, Heft 3, S. 193-222
ISSN: 1617-7134
SSRN
In: Journal of public economics, Band 234, S. 105113
ISSN: 1879-2316
In: Journal of economic dynamics & control, Band 127, S. 104116
ISSN: 0165-1889
SSRN
Working paper