Suchergebnisse

Existing theories of election-related violence often assume that if elites instigate violence, they must benefit electorally from doing so. With a focus on Kenya, this book employs a wide array of data and empirical methods to demonstrate that - contrary to conventional wisdom - violence can be a costly strategy resulting in significant voter backlash. The book argues that politicians often fail to perceive these costs and thus employ violence as an electoral tactic even when its efficacy is doubtful. Election-related violence can therefore be explained not solely by the electoral benefits it provides, but by politicians' misperceptions about its effectiveness as an electoral tactic. The book also shows that violence in founding elections - the first elections held under a new multiparty regime - has long-lasting effects on politicians (mis)perceptions about its usefulness, explaining why some countries' elections suffer from recurrent bouts of violence while others do not.

Research in political science and other social sciences often relies on survey data to study a range of questions about politics in the developing world. This study identifies systematic measurement error in some of the most frequently used datasets with respect to one commonly employed variable: respondent's age. It shows evidence of substantial measurement error that is correlated with observable characteristics, and discusses and illustrates the implications for empirical analysis with an example from a recently published study. In doing so, it demonstrates tools for identifying and diagnosing systematic measurement error in survey data, as well as for investigating the robustness of one's findings when the problem arises.

Research in political science and other social sciences often relies on survey data to study a range of questions about politics in the developing world. This study identifies systematic measurement error in some of the most frequently used datasets with respect to one commonly employed variable: respondent's age. It shows evidence of substantial measurement error that is correlated with observable characteristics, and discusses and illustrates the implications for empirical analysis with an example from a recently published study. In doing so, it demonstrates tools for identifying and diagnosing systematic measurement error in survey data, as well as for investigating the robustness of one's findings when the problem arises. ; https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/20531680211044068 ; Published version

Does electoral competition improve public goods provision in dominant-party regimes? In such regimes, localized electoral competition does not threaten dominant parties' hold on power. Still, I argue that competition can promote improved local public goods provision because of the ruling party's desire to generate overwhelming governing majorities. Studying Tanzanian districts, I show that greater local electoral competition leads to substantially greater access to local public goods. Moreover, at least one important mechanism linking electoral competition to public goods outcomes is the dominant party's propensity to target more competitive districts with greater government resources. The findings demonstrate that, even in a country with imperfect elections characterized by single-party dominance, greater electoral competition can generate better public goods outcomes. [Copyright Elsevier Ltd.]