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The constructivist research programme on international norms has demonstrated convincingly that, how, and why norms matter. Norms have been shown to constitute the identity of actors, to guide their behaviour into desired directions, and, altogether, to generate the normative basis of the international system. In the course of this intensive debate, its main concepts, such as the question of what constitutes a norm or different norm types, became fuzzy. Also, while the focus on the intended effects of norms certainly encompasses an essential part of the phenomenon, their unintended effects have been largely neglected. Motivated by these shortcomings, the article presents a new systematisation of effects of norms. The typology developed here discerns two types of intended effects, namely prohibitive and obligative effects, as well as two corresponding types of unintended effects, namely permissive and omissive effects.

Die Coronakrise ist auch eine Normenkrise, die sich auf verschiedenen Ebenen – auf der individuellen, der gesellschaftlichen, der innerstaatlichen und auf der internationalen – abspielt. Während sich das wissenschaftliche Interesse an Fragen zu Normen in der Covid-19-Pandemie bislang auf die individuelle und gesellschaftliche Ebene (etwa Hygieneregeln und Normen des öffentlichen Gesundheitsschutzes) konzentriert, nehme ich in diesem Beitrag das staatliche Handeln und die internationale Ebene in den Blick. Ausgehend von der Diagnose einer suboptimalen Pandemiebekämpfung in westlichen Demokratien entwickle ich die These, dass das Ausmaß und die Dauer der Krise auch dem schwachen internationalen Normengefüge im Bereich der Pandemiebekämpfung geschuldet sind, welches das unsichere, bisweilen gar orientierungslose Handeln von Staaten zumindest in Teilen erklärt. Zum Schluss leite ich aus dieser Analyse Handlungsempfehlungen für den Pandemievertrag ab. Der Beitrag illustriert damit an einem Beispiel, wie die Normenforschung in den Internationalen Beziehungen zum Verständnis bestimmter Aspekte globaler Krisen beitragen kann.

Elvira Rosert geht der Frage nach, was normativen Fortschritt im internationalen System ermöglicht und was ihn verhindert. Während die konstruktivistische Normenforschung für den Erfolg von Normsetzungsprozessen zahlreiche Erklärungen bietet, analysiert die Autorin deren Misserfolg. Sie entwickelt eine Theorie der Nicht-Entstehung internationaler Normen und formuliert eine kontraintuitive These: Anders als bisher angenommen, profitieren Normen nicht nur voneinander, sondern blockieren sich gegenseitig. Wie solche Blockadeprozesse vonstatten gehen, erfasst die Autorin mit dem Modell der permissiven Effekte. Dessen Erklärungskraft demonstrieren detaillierte empirische Fallstudien zur internationalen Regulierung von Brandwaffen, Landminen und Streumunition. Der Inhalt • Das humanitäre Völkerrecht und die Norm gegen Streumunition • Normenforschung in den Internationalen Beziehungen • Permissive Effekte und die Nicht-Entstehung von Normen • Theorie, Empirie und Praxis der Entstehung und Nicht-Entstehung von Normen des Waffeneinsatzes Die Zielgruppen • Dozierende und Studierende der Politikwissenschaft, Rechtswissenschaft • Entscheidungsträgerinnen und -träger und Campaigner im Bereich des humanitären Völkerrechts und der Rüstungskontrolle Die Autorin Prof. Dr. Elvira Rosert ist Juniorprofessorin für Politikwissenschaft an der Universität Hamburg und am Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik (IFSH)

The research on international norms offers several models of their evolution; however, a convincing model specifically depicting the phase of norm emergence is still lacking. Macro models (e.g. the norm life cycle) focus on the overall evolution of norms and distinguish the emergence phase as one among others, but they remain too rough. Meso models focus on a specific phase, but on phases other than norm emergence, such as diffusion (e.g. the signalling model) or enforcement (e.g. the spiral model). If they do focus on emergence, this focus remains case-specific and lacks theorisation. Micro models (e.g. the persuasion model or the funnelling model) focus on specific sequences within a phase. In this article, I develop one model of norm emergence by conceptualising it as the diffusion of a problem through different agendas and the discursive transformation of a problem into a (problem-solving) norm. The model distinguishes four sequences of norm emergence: problem adoption by norm entrepreneurs; issue creation in the public sphere; candidate norm creation in the institutional-deliberative sphere; and norm creation in multilateral negotiations. I illustrate the utility of this model by tracing the emergence of the norm against cluster munitions.

This article theorises salience – defined as the amount of attention granted to an issue – as an explanatory factor for the emergence and non-emergence of norms, and shows how salience affects existing explanations such as issue adoption by norm entrepreneurs, mobilisation, social pressure, and framing. The relevance of salience is demonstrated by exploring the question of why the norm against incendiary weapons was adopted in the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) in 1980, and why the norm against cluster munitions was not, even though both weapons were deemed particularly inhumane and thus, put on the agenda when the CCW negotiations started in 1978. Drawing on secondary sources and on original data from public and institutional discourses, I study the influence of salience on the emergence of the anti-napalm norm and the non-emergence of the anti-cluster munitions norm in the period of 1945–80. The results demonstrate that and how the discrepancy in salience of the napalm and the cluster munitions issues mattered for the outcomes of the two norm-setting processes.

AbstractThis article theorises salience – defined as the amount of attention granted to an issue – as an explanatory factor for the emergence and non-emergence of norms, and shows how salience affects existing explanations such as issue adoption by norm entrepreneurs, mobilisation, social pressure, and framing. The relevance of salience is demonstrated by exploring the question of why the norm against incendiary weapons was adopted in the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) in 1980, and why the norm against cluster munitions was not, even though both weapons were deemed particularly inhumane and thus, put on the agenda when the CCW negotiations started in 1978. Drawing on secondary sources and on original data from public and institutional discourses, I study the influence of salience on the emergence of the anti-napalm norm and the non-emergence of the anti-cluster munitions norm in the period of 1945–80. The results demonstrate that and how the discrepancy in salience of the napalm and the cluster munitions issues mattered for the outcomes of the two norm-setting processes.