In: Peace and conflict: journal of peace psychology ; the journal of the Society for the Study of Peace, Conflict, and Violence, Peace Psychology Division of the American Psychological Association, Band 28, Heft 4, S. 557-558
Abstract The focal point of this essay is the duration of intractable conflicts. The mere passage of time has no magical effect on conflicting notions of justice. On the contrary, a succession of crises and tensions accentuates entrenched positions concerning historical grievances. First, we present the processes through which parties defend a particular notion of justice on behalf of previous generations as rational games that depend, to a large extent, on parties' interests. Second, we examine these processes from a moral perspective. Rather than emphasizing strategic dynamics that are based on political interpretations of the past, we focus on ethical quandaries related to the "paradoxical absence" of those who remain at the center of the justice claims. Third, we go beyond rational and moral dimensions to focus on the emotional weight of traumatic events and their long-lasting impacts on victims' descendants.
Abstract This article questions the role of historical analogies in reaching – or not – effective and durable agreements. It compares two emblematic cases, the Israeli-Palestinian case and the Franco-Algerian case, and focuses on the tension that exists between the weight of the past and the need to move forward. The purpose of the article is not to reduce the hardest cases to their historical dimension. It is rather to show that the ways in which the memories of past events are interpreted, misinterpreted, or even manipulated create the context that shapes peace processes. The analysis is structured on the three main functions attributed to historical analogies: representing the unfamiliar, assigning social roles, and framing action. The examination of these functions helps us to better understand how negotiators and mediators can try to live with the memories rather than without them or against them.
In: Peace and conflict: journal of peace psychology ; the journal of the Society for the Study of Peace, Conflict, and Violence, Peace Psychology Division of the American Psychological Association, Band 23, Heft 1, S. 97-97
The purpose of this article is to question some basic assumptions regarding reconciliation after wars and mass atrocities. Indeed, how can numerous policy-makers, practitioners, and scholars contend that reconciliation is necessary while it is often distrusted and rejected by victims? Are there not cases where calls for reconciliation would prove to be fruitless and even detrimental for peace and/or democracy? To answer these questions, it is worth looking at the interactions between reconciliation and negotiation. Beyond a theoretical interest, this question has a direct impact for practitioners; a better understanding of the issue is actually a sine qua non condition for more efficient interventions. In terms of methodology, this study refers to various examples as illustrative cases (Afghanistan, Rwanda, South-Africa, and the Franco-German case). Its objective is not to capture the complexity of each case study but to determine to what extent reconciliation can be considered as negotiable. Adapted from the source document.
This article examines the scope and limits of the figure of the righteous individual in Rwanda. To what extent does reference to such a figure promote national reconstruction? My reflections on this question are divided into three parts. The first examines the role played by the international community (non-governmental organisations, journalists, overseas academics) in the emergence of this figure. The second section attempts to delineate the figure's social depth, in its contradictory representations. What is the relationship between the public representation and living memory of the phenomenon? How do survivors, in particular, perceive this 'figure of reconciliation'? The third and final section identifies a number of political uses for this figure. How do Rwanda's official representatives refer to those who perhaps personified Rwanda at the moment of its conflagration? My analysis shows that, far from eliciting even the slightest consensus from the population, this type of commemoration reveals the enduring rifts. Twelve years after the genocide, references to the past, whatever their nature, continue to cause divisions. Adapted from the source document.
Some consider that Europe is not a recent political invention, but the result of a centuries-old process. Thus, numerous official representatives regularly refer to the European memory. There is much at stake in that discussion since one important component of collective identity lies in the interpretation of the past. Experience shows that identities are forged through the ages with adopted, kept alive, lost, or even sometimes repressed memories. Therefore the organization of what is to be remembered & forgotten appears to be a decisive condition of what European identity may be. This issue raises various questions: how can European Union representatives alleviate diverging & sometimes contradictory interpretations of the past? How can they elaborate a common language able to establish a connection between national histories? Does the emphasis on common memories necessarily imply a complete homogenization of the representations of the past? The purpose of this article is to analyze the strengths & the limitations of any politics of memory. This analysis is divided into two parts. First, it is argued that accentuating a common past pursues a double finality in a European Union seeking legitimacy & power. Second, the article shows that the notion of European memory constitutes a political project rather than a sociological reality. To demonstrate it, it examines three limitations of an official representation that risks loosing the population's adherence if it becomes simplistic, homogeneous, or fixed once & for all. Adapted from the source document.
Belgium's humanistic new approach to international relations focuses on active, volunteerist policies, &, as second semester 2001 president of the European Union (EU), is making an effort to encourage the rest of the EU to follow its example. The policies undertaken by Belgium under this new approach are discussed, as is its modest success at encouraging the rest of the EU to adopt a more humanistic, "softer" stance, in contrast to the harder approach taken by the US. Although Belgium is not responsible for being the curator of humanity's interests, it may indeed provide inspiration for the rest of Europe. D. Weibel