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Although estimates of the size of the illicit cigarette market in Kenya vary, the government sees it as a problem and has been trying to address the issue since the early 2000's. Between 2003 and 2013 the Kenyan government experimented with numerous measures designed to reduce tobacco tax evasion with varying degrees of success. In the end, it decided to implement a tracking and tracing system for cigarettes (and alcohol products) and joined a small but growing number of countries addressing illicit tobacco trade via a technological solution. The introduction of the new system required a systematic approach, participation of all stakeholders, and an initial investment into infrastructure and enforcement. Preliminary results indicate that the new system, accompanied by an electronic cargo monitoring system, has reduced the size of the illicit cigarette market and substantially increased tax revenue for the Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA). The experience of Kenya highlights the importance of political will, consistency, and comprehensiveness of the system addressing tax evasion, because piecemeal measures have only short-term effects.

The Thailand Tobacco Monopoly (TTM) controlled the country's tobacco industry from its formation in the 1940s, until the government dropped restrictions on imported cigarettes in the late 1980s in response to pressure from the United States. The TTM has since competed with transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) in a semi-monopoly market in which TTCs have steadily increased their market share. Coupled with a decline in national smoking prevalence, the result of Thailand's stringent tobacco control agenda, the TTM now accounts for a diminishing share of a contracting market. In response, the monopoly has looked to regional trade liberalisation, and proximity to markets with some of the world's highest smoking rates to expand its operations. Expansion strategies have gone largely unrealised however, and the TTM effectively remains a domestic operation. Using TTM publications, market and trade reports, industry publications, tobacco industry documents and other resources, this paper analyses TTM expansion strategies, and the limited extent to which they have been achieved. This inability to expand its operations has left the monopoly potentially vulnerable to global strategies of its transnational competitors. This article is part of the special issue 'The Emergence of Asian Tobacco Companies: Implications for Global Health Governance'.

Introduction: Effective tobacco tax increases reduce tobacco consumption, threatening the profitability of the tobacco industry. In response, the tobacco industry employs strategies to negate or minimize the full effects of tobacco tax increases. Knowledge of these strategies can assist governments in setting effective policies to collect the full amount of tax revenue and to curb tobacco use. Methods: Country level data on excise tax rates and revenue, retail prices, volume of cigarette removals and sales were obtained from governments and statistical offices, non-governmental organizations and academic departments. Results: Seven common strategies are identified: stockpiling, changing product attributes or production processes, lowering prices, over-shifting prices, under-shifting prices, timing of price increases, and engaging in price discrimination and/or offering promotions. Each strategy is described in terms of the motivation for their employment, the consequences for tobacco use and tax revenue, and measures to counter them. County case studies illustrate the successful execution of the strategies and possible government responses. Conclusion: The tobacco industry, left unchecked, employs strategies that reduce the impact of tobacco tax increases on its profit, undermining tobacco control efforts and government revenue. Many of the Tobacco industry's responses to tobacco tax increases are predictable, since they are being employed systematically across countries. Governments can and should adopt appropriate measures to eliminate or reduce tobacco industry manipulation. This requires systematic data collection in order to monitor tobacco industry behavior.

To address the illicit cigarette trade, the European Union (EU) has signed agreements with the four major Transnational Tobacco Companies (TTCs) that involve establishing extensive systems of cooperation. All agreements foresee two types of payments: annual payments (totalling US$ 1.9 billion over 20 years) and supplementary seizure payments, equivalent to 100% of the evaded taxes in the event of seizures of their products. While limited by the fundamental lack of transparency in this area, our analysis suggests that these agreements have served largely to secure the TTCs' interests and are threatening progress in tobacco control. The seizure payments are paltry and a wholly inadequate deterrent to TTC involvement in illicit trade. Despite the agreements, growing evidence indicates the TTCs remain involved in the illicit trade or are at best failing to secure their supply chains as required by the agreements. The intention of the seizure-based payments to deter the tobacco industry from further involvement in the illicit cigarette trade has failed because the agreements contain too many loopholes that provide TTCs with both the incentive and opportunity to classify seized cigarettes as counterfeit. In addition, the shifting nature of cigarette smuggling from larger to smaller consignments often results in seizures that are too small to qualify for the payments. Consequently, the seizure payments represent a tiny fraction of the revenue lost from cigarette smuggling, between 2004 and 2012, 0.08% of the estimated losses due to illicit cigarette trade in the EU. Our evidence suggests the EU should end these agreements.

Background: The Czech Republic has one of the poorest tobacco control records in Europe. This paper examines transnational tobacco companies' (TTCs') efforts to influence policy there, paying particular attention to excise policies, as high taxes are one of the most effective means of reducing tobacco consumption, and tax structures are an important aspect of TTC competitiveness. Methods and Findings: TTC documents dating from 1989 to 2004/5 were retrieved from the Legacy Tobacco Documents Library website, analysed using a socio-historical approach, and triangulated with key informant interviews and secondary data. The documents demonstrate significant industry influence over tobacco control policy. Philip Morris (PM) ignored, overturned, and weakened various attempts to restrict tobacco advertising, promoting voluntary approaches as an alternative to binding legislation. PM and British American Tobacco (BAT) lobbied separately on tobacco tax structures, each seeking to implement the structure that benefitted its own brand portfolio over that of its competitors, and enjoying success in turn. On excise levels, the different companies took a far more collaborative approach, seeking to keep tobacco taxes low and specifically to prevent any large tax increases. Collective lobbying, using a variety of arguments, was successful in delaying the tax increases required via European Union accession. Contrary to industry arguments, data show that cigarettes became more affordable post-accession and that TTCs have taken advantage of low excise duties by raising prices. Interview data suggest that TTCs enjoy high-level political support and continue to actively attempt to influence policy. Conclusion: There is clear evidence of past and ongoing TTC influence over tobacco advertising and excise policy. We conclude that this helps explain the country's weak tobacco control record. The findings suggest there is significant scope for tobacco tax increases in the Czech Republic and that large (rather than small, incremental) increases are most effective in reducing smoking. Please see later in the article for the Editors' Summary.

Background: The Czech Republic has one of the poorest tobacco control records in Europe. This paper examines transnational tobacco companies' (TTCs') efforts to influence policy there, paying particular attention to excise policies, as high taxes are one of the most effective means of reducing tobacco consumption, and tax structures are an important aspect of TTC competitiveness. Methods and Findings: TTC documents dating from 1989 to 2004/5 were retrieved from the Legacy Tobacco Documents Library website, analysed using a socio-historical approach, and triangulated with key informant interviews and secondary data. The documents demonstrate significant industry influence over tobacco control policy. Philip Morris (PM) ignored, overturned, and weakened various attempts to restrict tobacco advertising, promoting voluntary approaches as an alternative to binding legislation. PM and British American Tobacco (BAT) lobbied separately on tobacco tax structures, each seeking to implement the structure that benefitted its own brand portfolio over that of its competitors, and enjoying success in turn. On excise levels, the different companies took a far more collaborative approach, seeking to keep tobacco taxes low and specifically to prevent any large tax increases. Collective lobbying, using a variety of arguments, was successful in delaying the tax increases required via European Union accession. Contrary to industry arguments, data show that cigarettes became more affordable post-accession and that TTCs have taken advantage of low excise duties by raising prices. Interview data suggest that TTCs enjoy high-level political support and continue to actively attempt to influence policy. Conclusion: There is clear evidence of past and ongoing TTC influence over tobacco advertising and excise policy. We conclude that this helps explain the country's weak tobacco control record. The findings suggest there is significant scope for tobacco tax increases in the Czech Republic and that large (rather than small, incremental) increases are most effective in reducing smoking.

This article provides the first comprehensive picture and independent estimates of both illicit cigarette consumption and the resulting government tax revenue loss in Vietnam using data from a representative survey of cigarette smokers in 12 Vietnamese provinces. The survey consisted of face-to-face interviews and on-site cigarette pack examinations. We find that more than 720 million illicit cigarette packs, or 20.7% of total cigarette consumption, circulated in Vietnam in 2012. Consequently, government tax revenue loss due to illicit trade ranged from US $223 to 295 million. Our estimates also indicate that (1) the most popular illicit brands were Jet and Hero, both were sold at higher prices than the average legal brand; (2) the average price of illicit cigarettes was 51% higher than the average price of legal cigarettes; and (3) majority of illicit cigarettes were sold at convenience stores, which were registered and licensed businesses. Our findings suggest that prices are not a driver of illicit cigarette consumption in Vietnam, and this illicit trade is at least partially a consequence of weak market control enforcement.

BACKGROUND: In response to high smoking rates, especially among men, Mauritius launched a National Action Plan on Tobacco Control in 2008. It changed its tax system from a mixed system to a uniform specific system. Despite these interventions, cigarette consumption and smoking prevalence in Mauritius decreased only marginally in the subsequent decade. METHOD: Using publicly available data, we decompose the retail price of cigarettes into tax and net-of-tax components, between 2011 and 2017. We cover premium, popular and economy cigarettes. RESULTS: Since its introduction in 2008, the nominal excise tax was increased six times. Between 2011 and 2017, the real value of the excise tax increased by 47%. Meanwhile, British American Tobacco (BAT) increased the real net-of-tax price of premium cigarettes by 61.8% and of popular cigarettes by 47.2%, thus overshifting the tax increase. On economy cigarettes, BAT decreased the real net-of-tax price by 14.7%, thus undershifting the excise tax increase. CONCLUSION: Through its pricing strategy, BAT has greatly undermined Mauritius's tobacco control policy. However, BAT cannot continue undershifting the excise tax on economy brands, since the net-of-tax proportion of the retail price is very low already. BAT would have little choice but to increase the retail price on economy brands in response to future excise tax increases. The government of Mauritius is encouraged to keep the specific excise tax structure but to increase the rate at which it is levied.

The illicit tobacco trade undermines the effectiveness of tobacco tax policies; increases the availability of cheap cigarettes, which, in turn, increases tobacco use and tobacco related deaths; and causes huge revenue losses to governments. There is limited evidence on the extent of illicit tobacco trade particularly cigarettes in Bangladesh. The paper presents the protocol for a mixed-methods study to estimate the extent of illicit cigarette trade in Bangladesh. The study will address three research questions: (a) What proportion of cigarettes sold as retail are illicit? (b) What are the common types of tax avoidance and tax evasion? (c) Can pack examination from the trash recycle market be considered as a new method to assess illicit trade in comparison to that from retailers and streets? Following an observational research method, data will be collected utilizing empty cigarette packs from three sources: (a) retailers; (b) streets; and (c) trash recycle market. In addition, a structured questionnaire will be used to collect information from retailers selling cigarettes. We will select post codes as Primary Sampling Unit (PSU) using a multi-stage random sampling technique. We will randomly select eight districts from eight divisions stratified by those with land border and non-land border; and within each district, we will randomly select ten postcodes, stratified by rural (five) and urban (five) PSU to ensure maximum geographical variation, leading to a total of eighty post codes from eight districts. The analysis will report the proportions of packs that do not comply with the study definition of illicit. Independent estimates of illicit tobacco are rare in low- and middle-income countries such as Bangladesh. Findings will inform efforts by revenue authorities and others to address the effects of illicit trade and counter tobacco industry claims.

Abstract Background Tobacco control policies at the state level have been a critical impetus for reduction in smoking prevalence. We examine the association between recent changes in smoking prevalence and state-specific tobacco control policies and activities in the entire U.S. Methods We analyzed the 1992-93, 1998-99, and 2006-07 Tobacco Use Supplement to the Current Population Survey (TUS-CPS) by state and two indices of state tobacco control policies or activities [initial outcome index (IOI) and the strength of tobacco control (SOTC) index] measured in 1998-1999. The IOI reflects cigarette excise taxes and indoor air legislation, whereas the SOTC reflects tobacco control program resources and capacity. Pearson Correlation coefficient between the proportionate change in smoking prevalence from 1992-93 to 2006-07 and indices of tobacco control activities or programs was the main outcome measure. Results Smoking prevalence decreased from 1992-93 to 2006-07 in both men and women in all states except Wyoming, where no reduction was observed among men, and only a 6.9% relative reduction among women. The percentage reductions in smoking in men and women respectively were the largest in the West (average decrease of 28.5% and 33.3%) and the smallest in the Midwest (18.6% and 20.3%), although there were notable exceptions to this pattern. The decline in smoking prevalence by state was correlated with the state's IOI in both women and men (r = -0.49, p < 0.001; r = -0.31, p = 0.03; respectively) and with state's SOTC index in women(r = -0.30, p = 0.03 0), but not men (r = -0.21, p = 0.14). Conclusion State level policies on cigarette excise taxes and indoor air legislation correlate strongly with reductions in smoking prevalence since 1992. Strengthening and systematically implementing these policies could greatly accelerate further reductions in smoking.