Suchergebnisse

The River City Marsh Conflict negotiation exercise describes a conflict between two government organizations—the River City Planner's Office and the Wisconsin State Department of Natural Resources—in a dispute over what to do with the LaCrosse River Marsh. The City Planner's Office wanted to fill part of the marsh to use for expansion of the industrial park. River City officials also wanted to build an additional highway through part of the marsh to accommodate anticipated traffic increases. The Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources wanted the marsh habitat enhanced and protected from development so that threatened species could increase in numbers. These officials also wanted to build trails, canoe access points, and other facilities in order to promote recreational activities in the marsh. In this exercise, students are assigned to the role of either the River City Planner's Office or the State Department of Natural Resources office. Both sides are provided with the same set of facts and many options for consideration involving road construction or expansion, wildlife enhancement, and trail construction. Using these interrelated issues, students must negotiate a plan for the marsh that integrates both side's objectives.

The present study attempted to replicate the findings of Kolb's research identifying two groups of mediators, which she labeled "Dealmakers" and "Orchestrators." Seventy‐seven mediators were presented with a written dispute and asked to react the likelihood that they would use each of nine different mediation techniques. The techniques corresponded to Sheppard's taxonomy of Process Control, Content Control, and Motivational Control techniques. They also rated the perceived effectiveness of each of these three types of control with the dispute. Based upon their responses, the mediators were separated into groups using average‐link cluster analysis. The results suggested four clusters: Cluster 1 members corresponded to Kolb's "Dealmakers," relying upon Process, Content, and Motivational Control techniques. Cluster 2 members did not correspond to either of Kolb's classifications, choosing to use Content and Motivational Control strategies. Cluster 3 members were similar to Kolb's "Orchestrators;" members of this cluster relied upon Process and Content Control techniques only. Cluster 4 members were reluctant to use any of the control strategies. These findings suggest a partial replication and extension of Kolb's initial work. Implications for future research are discussed.

In a simulated three‐issue organizational dispute, subjects were interrupted by a third party (their supervisor) who recommended—and eventually imposed—one of five different outcomes. Each outcome provided subjects the same overall payoff, though the arrangement of payoffs across each of the three issues varied. The design allowed us to evaluate four different perspectives regarding negotiators' perceptions of their outcomes. In addition, third parties provided justifications, apologies, or excuses for their actions. Fairness judgments and supervisory evaluations were most favorable when negotiators received an outcome reflecting favorable settlements on the majority of the issues, or the midpoint compromise; the least favorable reactions occurred when subjects received favorable outcomes on only their most important issue. Third parties who offered a justification for their actions were seen as fairer than those offering apologies or excuses. The findings reiterate the importance of considering both the symbolic characteristics of outcomes and the interactional justice inherent in different types of explanations.

In a simulated organizational conflict, concession behavior by a negotiator's opponent was manipulated to examine how subsequent third party intervention would influence negotiator perceptions of process control, decision control, distributive justice, and the third party. Negotiators whose opponents made large concessions reciprocated by also making large concessions, suggesting a high level of movement toward agreement by the disputants; subjects whose opponents made few concessions reciprocated in kind, resulting in little movement toward agreement. Third parties, however, imposed outcomes on all negotiators prior to negotiated agreements. Perceptions of decision control, distributive justice, and the necessity of third party intervention were influenced by whether disputants were close to reaching an agreement on their own or not. Outcome imposed by the third party influenced almost all measures. The study suggests that behavior by the disputants (in the form of movement toward agreement), and not just behavior by the third party, can influence ratings of both procedures and outcomes.

A telephone survey was conducted of 458 adult residents of La Crosse, Wisconsin, a community with over 2,000 Hmong immigrants, as well as lesser numbers of other Southeast Asian (SEA) immigrants. Knowledge about and attitude toward the SEA immigrants were assessed. The community was almost evenly divided in its attitude toward the new immigrants. A positive attitude toward SEAs was negatively related to ethnocentrism and positively related to economic optimism. It was also correlated with selected demographic variables. Multiple regression analyses showed that ethnocentrism accounted for a significant portion of the variance in attitude even after economic optimism and demographic background factors had been entered into the equation. Implications for policy and community attitude change are discussed.

A six‐day negotiation simulation was developed from newspaper articles and interviews with elected officials. In this integrative bargaining exercise, participants assume the role of either the Richland Town Board or the River City Mayor's Office and attempt to resolve a conflict between the two governments. Several homeowners in the unincorporated town of Richland have had their wells fail and have asked to annex into River City. Richland officials want to stop such annexations and instead purchase water from River City. River City officials want to annex as much of Richland as possible and prevent it from incorporating. Both sides are provided with common information as well as confidential information. Using their information, they must negotiate over several days, seeking an agreement that addresses each side's interests and concerns.