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Abstract
The essay deals with the law and revenge issue, questioning the fundamental assumption according to which the law, by its own nature, should act as a substitute for vengeance. Provided that both law and revenge have their common grounds on the different, and at times conflicting, feelings of resentment and loyalty, the paper maintains that law can prevent revenge only if it is trusted by the victims, being itself a part to a bond of loyalty. Graham Greene's 1958 "entertainment" Our Man in Havana is chosen as a reference scenario. The paper analyses the characters' attitudes towards the law, their resentments, and their bonds of loyalty, and investigates the emotional scenario behind the two revenges mentioned in the novel. Finally, the essay maintains that each person's degree of trust in the law, and therefore their willingness to renounce revenge, depends on that person's own choices and inner feelings about themselves and the community.

Abstract
The essay considers Hermann Melville's character Bartleby as an example of irresponsible power, since, in the story, the scrivener changes deeply his lawyer employer's way of thinking and living, without giving any single answer to the many questions which the narrator keeps asking him about his apparently absurd behavior. The article offers some reflections about the difficulties that legal rules, as well as other set of rules (moral, ethics) meet when they are called to face irresponsible powers, and about the need to keep asking questions, though knowing that they will meet no final answers (thus accepting the irrationality of life, and coping with it).

Despite their inherent seriousness, the law and those who practice it, be it lawyers, judges, politicians, or bureaucrats, are amongst the most popular objects of comedy and humour. Sometimes even the mention of the law, or the mere use of legal vocabulary, can trigger laughter. This is deeply counterintuitive, but true across cultures and historical eras: while the law is there to prevent and remedy injustice, it often ends up becoming the butt of comedy. But laughter and comedy, too, are also infused with seriousness: as universal social phenomena, they are extremely complex objects of study. This book maps out the many intersections of the law and laughter, from classical Greece to the present day. Taking on well-known classical and modern works of literature and visual culture, from Aristophanes to Laurel and Hardy and from Nietzsche to Totò and Fernandel, laughter and comedy bring law back to the complexity of human soul and the unpredictability of life

Abstract
One of the most prominent fears related to the debate on AI is the moment when it stops offering services and starts demanding from the user. Today, the dystopian scenarios represented in literature and cinema describe totalitarian regimes dominated by technology in which the individual is a system of data interpreted by the machine. It is here described a world with no politics or right, but only technology and protocols that the citizen is endured. How can a technology that claims to be human-centered and a guarantee of tailor-made services intended to support man and his well-being, as communication on AI tells us, be a source of despotism, tyranny and technological oppression? If the reason lies in a rational, impartial and impersonal application of technology to civil life, then reasoning in terms of bureaucracy can be useful to understand the limits and responsibilities of the actors involved: the citizen, the politician, the scientist, the technician, the businessman. In fact, while bureaucracy is committed to ensuring the achievement of a collective goal through implementation procedures, which verify that the interests of the individual and the community are realised in accordance with the legal principles of a given state system, we know that bureaucracy can also turn into the blind application of vexatious rules. Through the analysis of a short film series called Screening Surveillance (2019–2022), the paper investigates a bureaucratic use of technology, while the bureaucratic implementation of AI and the bureaucratic approach to the regulation of digital technologies will be discussed also in the light of recent developments in EU law (such as the two tiers of the "Digital Services Package", and April 21, 2021 proposal for an "Artificial Intelligence Act").

Abstract
It is obvious that AI is marking its entry onto the global scene. Anyway, since any AI is supposed to perform a task in such a way that the outcome would be indistinguishable from the outcome of a human agent working to achieve the same task, it is more and more difficult to recognize its presence in our daily life. Issues of transparency and ethics are crucial not only to be aware of the presence of an AI, but mostly to know how the algorithm is actually working and to verify the 'quality' of its dataset. It is important to realize that only the engineers know what an AI does, even if it enacts actions in real life. For common people, and even for regulators, it may turn out to be a digital voodoo that goes far beyond their understanding. Who does what? That is the question.
The first part of the essay discusses the claims of "digital philosophy" (or "digital ontology") under the light of legal analysis. The assumption that humankind and "intelligent" machines share the same digital/algorithmic ontology (as parts of an all-encompassing "digital universe") could deprive the law of its ethical and emotional foundations. A sound regulation of both the circulation of digital information and AI requires adequate knowledge of technology (transparency) and the capacity to make ethical choices based on wide social consensus, in order to safeguard the fundamentally "human" nature of the law.
The second part of the essay is an inquiry into AI as a machine-writing system, that is into the capacity of an AI to produce literary texts. Three examples will be discussed and a comparison to electronic literature will be pointed out. What seems to be fundamental is the idea of a literary output stuck on the very moment of its generation (process of writing) which is conceived by the reader as an anaesthetic experience. More than creativity, it is the perception of creativity that rules such literary works. This literary production can make readers aware of the power of an underlying algorithm.

AbstractA reading of Bruce Chatwin's well-known (fictional) travel book

Mode of access: Internet. ; Marca tipográfica en portada. ; Sign.: A-Q8.

Mode of access: Internet. ; Marca tipográfica en portada. ; Sign.: A-Q8.