Suchergebnisse

Wie sind verschiedene Bedrohungen menschlicher Sicherheit – Bürgerkrieg, Menschenrechtsverletzungen und andere politische Gewalt – miteinander verbunden? Wie können diese Verbindungen genutzt werden, um das Risiko zusätzlicher Gewalt abzuschätzen? Und was können wir tun, um gewalttätige Konflikte zu beenden? Dieses Buch untersucht diese Fragen empirisch. Im ersten Teil des Buches prüft der Autor Verbindungen zwischen verschiedenen Bedrohungen menschlicher Sicherheit. Eine erste Studie ergibt, dass Völkermord in neu unabhängig gewordenen Staaten die Chancen für Demokratie mindert. Eine zweite Studie zeigt eine starke Verbindung zwischen der Unterdrückung von Menschenrechten und dem Risiko von neuen Bürgerkriegen in den folgenden Jahren. Im zweiten Teil werden drei Risikomodelle für Bürgerkrieg, Menschenrechtsverletzungen und Völkermord vorgestellt. Diese Modelle, die verschiedene andere Bedrohungen menschlicher Sicherheit berücksichtigen, können das Risiko zukünftiger gewalttätiger Konflikte mit einiger Genauigkeit vorhersehen. Der dritte Teil untersucht zwei Möglichkeiten, Bürgerkriege zu beenden. Die Resultate zeigen, dass internationale Verhandlungsvermittlung zwischen Bürgerkriegsparteien einen zwiespältigen Einfluss auf die Dauer des Friedens nach einem Bürgerkrieg hat. Die Resultate für Friedensmissionen zeigen, dass Staaten nicht davor zurückschrecken, ihre eigenen Soldaten in komplexe Konflikte zu entsenden

AbstractWhat role does religion play in preventing civil war from recurring? Politicians have proposed that when warring groups share the same religion, achieving a durable peace will be easier. We test this hypothesis empirically using a large-nsample of all ethnic civil wars that began and ended between 1950 and 2006, and a measure of co-religiosity between the ethnic group in power and the main opposition group. The analysis shows that there is no positive relationship between co-religiosity and the duration of post-civil war peace, showing that sharing the same religion may not help to bring about peace following an ethnic civil war. To the contrary, the closer religious ties, the less likely it is that peace will last after the end of the conflict, and the higher the risk that conflict will recur.

We explore factors that influence the duration of peace after an ethnic civil war. Results from a series of survival models indicate that political and economic discrimination against the ethnic group that was involved in the war on the opposition side diminishes chances for peace. This finding is robust across different model specifications. Group size, group concentration, war duration and war outcome also influence the risk of war recurrence, although these results are not as robust as those for ethnic discrimination. The intensity of the war and its humanitarian consequences—deaths, displacement, and genocide—do not seem significantly to influence the duration of post-war peace. Taken together, our findings show that the way ethnic groups interact with each other after a war is a more important factor than the level of violence during the war. Peace and ethnic co-existence are possible in the aftermath of ethnic conflicts.

Abstract.  Since 1945, newly independent states have differed from longer lived states in their greater risk of violent conflict and more challenging environment for democratisation. The authors of this article theorise that certain economic, demographic, violence‐related and external factors should affect the regime type (level of democracy versus autocracy) in newly independent states. Examining exclusively newly independent states that have undergone major political transitions allows one to determine factors favouring democracy over autocracy under such volatile circumstances. The authors test several hypotheses, using cross‐sectional and cross‐sectional time‐series analyses, and find that economic development elevates the level of democracy in new states. Cultural heterogeneity has no effect, but external factors play an important role. Genocide and politicide reduce democracy, while civil wars have the opposite effect. These findings prove robust to alternative measurements of the dependent variable and alternative model specifications.

Why and when do states take the burden upon themselves to send peacekeepers into a civil war, rather than relying on intergovernmental organizations to do so? While there are a few empirical studies on the conditions under which the UN sends peacekeeping missions, no such analyses of state-conducted peacekeeping exist. In this study, a theoretical framework on state-conducted peacekeeping in civil wars is developed and empirically tested. Not surprisingly, when acting outside international organizations, states are able to take their own interests directly into account and select those civil wars to which they send peacekeepers accordingly. States' interests play a much greater role here than, for example, the interests of the major powers do for UN peacekeeping. When states send peacekeepers they are more likely to choose former colonies, military allies, trade partners, or countries with which they have ethnic ties. Yet, this does not mean that state-conducted peacekeeping occurs only where states see their own interests. Contrary to conventional wisdom, states also provide peacekeeping to 'tough' cases, the most challenging civil wars. These are long, ethnic wars. This tendency for states to provide peacekeeping holds when civil wars produce dire effects on civilians. States are more likely to send peacekeepers into civil wars that kill or displace many people. Finally, states react to opportunities: the more previous mediation attempts, the higher the chances for state-conducted peacekeeping.