Suchergebnisse

Die Frage, wie und von wem staatliche Herrschaft zu organisieren ist, berührt zentrale Elemente unserer Verfassungsordnung. Von der historischen Begrifflichkeit der Organisationsgewalt bis hin zur heutigen Europäisierung des Verwaltungsrechts wird immer wieder die Frage zentral, welche substanziellen Aussagen dem Grundgesetz über die Verwaltungsorganisation zu entnehmen sind. David Roth-Isigkeit erarbeitet ein umfassendes Bild davon, welche Akteure im Verfassungsstaat über die Organisation der öffentlichen Verwaltung zu entscheiden haben und an welche verfassungsrechtlichen Maßstäbe sie dabei gebunden sind. Dabei zeigt sich die durchdringende Ordnungskraft des besonderen Verhältnisses von Demokratie und Rechtsstaat in der deutschen Verfassungsdogmatik.

Intro -- Foreword -- Series Editor's Foreword -- Preface -- Contents -- List of Figures -- Chapter 1: Introduction: Theory, Practice, and Meta-Theory -- 1.1 Theory and Practice -- 1.1.1 Performativity of Theory -- 1.1.2 Theory as Politics -- 1.1.3 Legal Thought -- 1.2 Making a Map: The Case for Meta-Theory -- 1.2.1 Structure of Theoretical Discourse -- 1.2.2 Conceptual Fragmentation -- 1.2.3 Unity of the Social -- 1.3 About This Book -- 1.3.1 Aim: Cutting Through the Complexity of Global Legal Thought -- 1.3.2 Method: Contextualizing Societal Epistemologies -- 1.3.3 Structure: Habermas-Luhmann-Dworkin -- Bibliography -- Chapter 2: Global Legal Thought and Plurality -- 2.1 Global Law and Plurality: Three Levels of Discourse -- 2.1.1 First-Order Plurality: Regime Conflict and Transnationalization of Law -- 2.1.2 Second-Order Plurality: Legitimacy and Global Order -- 2.1.3 Third-Order Plurality: Meta-Theory -- 2.2 Plurality as a Problem of Legal Theory -- 2.2.1 The Doctrine of Sources and Plurality -- 2.2.2 Contested Collision Rules -- 2.2.3 Losing Ground: The Erosion of the Traditional Framework -- 2.3 Coordination, Normativity, and the Theoretical Turn -- 2.3.1 Coordination -- 2.3.2 Normativity -- 2.3.3 Theory and Practice in the Formation of Global Law -- 2.4 Concepts, Labels, and the Need for Signposts -- 2.4.1 Spatial Differentiations: From National to Global -- 2.4.2 Conceptual Differentiations: Constitutionalism, Pluralism, Constitutional Pluralism -- 2.4.3 The Geometry of Global Legal Thought -- Bibliography -- Chapter 3: Taming Plurality Through Formal Legal Rationality: Habermasian Approaches to Global Law -- 3.1 Habermas and the Civilization of Legal Authority in the Global Realm -- 3.1.1 Democratic Legal Authority and International Relations -- 3.1.2 Institutional Reform as a Response to Plurality.

Die Frage, wie und von wem staatliche Herrschaft zu organisieren ist, berührt zentrale Elemente unserer Verfassungsordnung. Von der historischen Begrifflichkeit der Organisationsgewalt bis hin zur heutigen Europäisierung des Verwaltungsrechts wird immer wieder die Frage zentral, welche substanziellen Aussagen dem Grundgesetz über die Verwaltungsorganisation zu entnehmen sind. David Roth-Isigkeit erarbeitet ein umfassendes Bild davon, welche Akteure im Verfassungsstaat über die Organisation der öffentlichen Verwaltung zu entscheiden haben und an welche verfassungsrechtlichen Maßstäbe sie dabei gebunden sind. Dabei zeigt sich die durchdringende Ordnungskraft des besonderen Verhältnisses von Demokratie und Rechtsstaat in der deutschen Verfassungsdogmatik.

This article is concerned with the debate about interdisciplinary methods in international law, in particular the turn to International Relations. It finds the historical critique of Martti Koskenniemi grounded in a more methodological issue: the turn toward a redefinition of norm properties impedes on the critical discursive quality of law. Shaping this historical critique into a research question that allows for meaningful engagement, the article discusses Koskenniemi's charges drawing on recent constructivist scholarship. Giving an account of what it means to be 'obliged' to obey the law, this article defends the coherence of Koskenniemi's position and suggests that we should take the critique of the interdisciplinary project between law and International Relations seriously. While it agrees that a significant part of the discourse fails to appreciate the particularities of the law, it suggests that understanding legal obligations requires taking the institutional autonomy of the law into account. Respecting this autonomy, in turn, points to a multi- instead of an interdisciplinary project. The reflexive formalist conception of the law that this article advocates captures the obligating nature of the law, independent of the normative content of particular rules.

Inhalt: I. Einführung II. Das Konzept der General Comments im Internationalen Pakt für bürgerliche und politische Rechte (IPbpR) und sein Wandel – ein Politikum III. Bedeutung und Grenzen der General Comments IV. Fazit

Recently, human rights law has been restricted increasingly by measures taken in the interest of public security. This raises the question whether there are limits in human rights protection that cannot be touched without questioning the very essence of individual rights protection itself. This article submits that the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in cases dealing with the compatibility of measures taken in the public interest with the echr has defined such limits predominantly in terms of procedure. Accordingly, individuals must not be deprived of the right to independent review in the light of their fundamental rights. Thus, the Court has been developing what may be called a right to invoke rights, a procedural component underlying all guarantees of the Convention. This principle has been established and upheld in three different constellations: general measures for public security, states of emergencies and the implementation of un sanctions regimes.

For many centuries, thinkers have tried to understand and to conceptualize political and legal order beyond the boundaries of sovereign territories. Their concepts, deeply entangled with ideas of theology, state formation, and human nature, form the bedrock of todays theoretical discourses on international law. This volume engages with models of early international legal thought from Machiavelli to Hegel before international law in the modern sense became an academic discipline of its own. The interplay of system and order serves as a leitmotiv throughout the book, helping to link historical models to contemporary discourse