This paper examines budgetary responses of public schools to competition from school choice, exploiting a discrete change in the choice set available to New York City high school students in 2003–2004. Schools facing increased competition (zoned, unscreened, and those with few applicants) increase per‐pupil expenditures on noninstructional functions, reducing resources for instruction. Thus, schools may face important tradeoffs when competing for applicants, including between quantity and academic quality of applicants and between incentives to reach capacity and to improve academic outcomes. While advocates claim that school choice improves academic achievement, these results may help explain mixed findings in the previous literature.
AbstractInstitutional form is believed to influence organizational behavior and performance in producing collective goods such as healthcare services. Recent efforts in the United States seek to increase healthcare services provided by hospitals, but it is unclear whether and how these organizations respond to the policy changes. In this study, we examine the extent to which nonprofit hospitals change their provision of charity care in response to a regulatory policy specifying a target benchmark aimed at expanding charitable obligations. Specifically, we focus on the minimum charity care provision (MCCP) requirements in Illinois. Importantly, unlike previous research, we differentiate between hospitals facing minimum charity care spending requirements (nonprofits) and those not (for-profit and public). We use panel data from Illinois' Annual Hospital Questionnaire and county data from the American Community Survey, employing a differences-in-differences model. We find no evidence that nonprofit hospitals increase charity care in response to the MCCP requirements on average. Instead, we find that there is heterogeneity in responses; hospitals providing low levels of charity care prior to the policy increase charity care, while hospitals providing high levels of charity care prior to the policy do not respond or, if anything, decrease charity care. Thus, while regulations that set low-target benchmarks provide insufficient incentives for nonprofit hospitals to increase charity care on average, explicit policy mandates that reduce directive goal ambiguity may still narrow gaps in performance.
Nonprofit hospitals receive significant federal, state, and local tax exemptions, partly based on the rationale that nonprofit hospitals provide public goods and services. Through Minimum Charity Care Provision (MCCP) requirements, nonprofit hospitals are required to spend a certain percentage of their revenues on charity care. However, it is not clear whether these requirements increase spending on charity care. This brief summarizes findings from research examining the differences in provisions of charity care across different hospital market sectors – non-profit, for-profit, and government. Findings suggest that MCCP requirements for nonprofit hospitals do not lead to more charity care. If anything, targeting policies that use external incentives may have crowded out some organizations' internal motivations to provide public goods and services.
What can governments do to encourage nonprofit hospitals to provide greater benefits to their communities? Recent efforts by the federal and state governments seek to hold hospitals accountable for community health, in part by incentivizing charity care provision. Laws that set benchmarks for charity care spending are increasingly used, but their efficacy is uncertain. In this study, we examine the extent to which Illinois' minimum charity care provision (MCCP) law increases nonprofit hospital charity care. Importantly, we differentiate between responses for hospitals required to provide minimal charitable spending (nonprofits) and those that are not (for-profit and public). We use detailed panel (2009-2015) data from Illinois' Annual Hospital Questionnaire and county-level data from the American Community Survey. We exploit a discrete change in charitable care requirements for nonprofit hospitals to identify the effect of the MCCP law on charity care, controlling for hospital characteristics, county demographics, and year and county (or hospital) fixed effects. Employing a differences-in-differences model, we find no evidence that the MCCP law increases charity care on average. Instead, we find some evidence that the law's effects vary by how much charity care hospitals provided previously – charity care increases for those providing lower levels at baseline, narrowing the gap in charity care provision with those that provide high levels at baseline. The results suggest that setting low benchmarks does not create sufficient incentives for nonprofit hospitals to provide greater charity care on average, but instead may narrow the gap between high and low charity care hospitals.
AbstractThis paper investigates the impact of extending free school lunch to all students, regardless of income, on academic performance in New York City middle schools. Using a difference‐in‐differences design and unique longitudinal, student‐level data, we derive credibly causal estimates of the impacts of "Universal Free Meals" (UFM) on test scores in English Language Arts (ELA) and mathematics, and participation in school lunch. We find UFM increases academic performance by as much as 0.083 standard deviations in math and 0.059 in ELA for non‐poor students, with smaller, statistically significant effects of 0.032 and 0.027 standard deviations in math and ELA for poor students. Further, UFM increases participation in school lunch by roughly 11.0 percentage points for non‐poor students and 5.4 percentage points for poor students. We then investigate the academic effects of school lunch participation per se, using UFM as an instrumental variable. Results indicate that increases in school lunch participation improve academic performance for both poor and non‐poor students; an additional lunch every two weeks increases test scores by roughly 0.08 standard deviations in math and 0.07 standard deviations in ELA. Finally, we explore potential unintended consequences for student weight outcomes, finding no evidence that UFM increases the probability that students are obese or overweight. We also find no evidence of increases in average body mass index (BMI). Instead, we find some evidence that participation in school lunch improves weight outcomes for non‐poor students. Results are robust to an array of alternative specifications and assumptions about the sample.
AbstractPork‐barrel spending is a form of public spending controlled by individual legislators and primarily serving a local interest. In this paper, we investigate the impact of a type of pork, council member capital discretionary education spending voted upon in a participatory budgeting (PB) process, on school budgets and performance in New York City. Exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in discretionary spending induced by the PB elections, we find winning a PB election increases school pork appropriations. However, we find no evidence these transfers from council members improve fiscal and performance outcomes. Further, pork may interfere with school budgeting.
Administrative adjudication can serve as a quasi-judicial forum for resolving disputes resulting from government regulations. New York City recently required restaurants to post letter grades reflecting their compliance with food safety regulations and incorporated an easily accessible administrative adjudication system into its policy design. This study examines the implementation of this feature of the policy by using a regression discontinuity framework to explore the effects of the grading policy on adjudication processes and regulatory outcomes. Quantitative data included 222,527 food safety inspection records (2007–2014); qualitative data included interviews, observations, and document review. Restaurants were more likely to have violations reduced and grades improved at adjudication when grades were at stake. Moreover, adjudication outcomes were highly sensitive to score differences near grade cut-points. Professional representatives helped restaurants to negotiate the interpretation of rules in the quasi-judicial proceedings, softening rigidity of regulations. Representatives' expertise was consistent with being "repeat players," which may distort the use of such forums to ensure justice and fairness. This study illuminates the ramifications of including alternative dispute resolution systems in the implementation of regulatory policies.
AbstractCan governments use grades to induce businesses to improve their compliance with regulations? Does public disclosure of compliance with food safety regulations matter for restaurants? Ultimately, this depends on whether grades matter for the bottom line. Based on 28 months of data on more than 15,000 restaurants in New York City, this article explores the impact of public restaurant grades on economic activity and public resources using rigorous panel data methods, including fixed‐effects models with controls for underlying food safety compliance. Results show that A grades reduce the probability of restaurant closure and increase revenues while increasing sales taxes remitted and decreasing fines relative to B grades. Conversely, C grades increase the probability of restaurant closure and decrease revenues while decreasing sales taxes remitted relative to B grades. These findings suggest that policy makers can incorporate public information into regulations to more strongly incentivize compliance.
