Suchergebnisse

Ethnic conflict in Africa is reaching critical levels. Governments are being toppled. National economies are collapsing. And the potential for civil unrest--even violent encounters--throughout the continent threatens to engulf not only Africa, but much of the world. Africa's salvation depends on the development and implementation of effective institutions of ethnic conflict management. In this book, Donald Rothchild analyzes the successes and failures of attempts at conflict resolution in different African countries and offers comprehensive ideas for successful mediation. To provide a clear picture of the current situation, Rothchild traces Africa's ethnic unrest back to its beginnings during the period of colonial rule, through the post-independence era, when governments built the institutions of government control and consolidated power; and into its more recent period when it is possible to discern greater democratic governance. Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa demonstrates how negotiation and mediation can promote conflict resolution and a political environment that fosters economic development. It offers a compelling case for the use of both political incentives (power sharing, elections, and fiscal programs) and a variety of actions (including principles of inclusiveness, coercion, and punishment) to support reconciliation. This "carrot and stick" approach can be employed by a state to promote increased political bargaining while maintaining stability, and by outside intermediaries to cope with conflict brought on by the breakdown of domestic regimes.

What forms of U.S. intervention are likely to prove realizable & to be appropriate for facilitating the implementation of peace agreements & protecting human rights in Africa? The choices for action are certainly wider than the polar opposites of disengagement & large-scale military intervention. Because the United States can afford neither prolonged military hegemony nor the indulgence of neo-isolationism, it must find some form of creative engagement that fulfills its obligations to facilitate & protect in ways that are acceptable to both American & overseas opinion. Limited interests in Africa & the nature of public pressures leave little alternative to utilizing soft intervention approaches in most cases. Within the category of soft intervention, there appears to be a continuum of means leading to possible movement into muscular intervention. At one end, there is coercive diplomacy, which is associated with threats of military & economic sanctions; if these sanctions are actually used, the intervening state becomes involved in muscular intervention. At the other end is diplomacy associated not with threats, but with the promise of rewards. Between the two poles lies diplomacy that involves neither threats nor rewards (i.e., conciliation & mediation without the use of pressures & incentives). In real world contexts, third parties tend to apply mixed packages of non-coercive & coercive incentives, with coercive incentives becoming increasingly dominant as the costs of altering preferences & the intensity of conflict rise. Figures, References. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractWhat forms of U.S. intervention are likely to prove realizable and to be appropriate for facilitating the implementation of peace agreements and protecting human rights in Africa? The choices for action are certainly wider than the polar opposites of disengagement and large-scale military intervention. Because the United States can afford neither prolonged military hegemony nor the indulgence of neo-isolationism, it must find some form of creative engagement that fulfills its obligations to facilitate and protect in ways that are acceptable to both American and overseas opinion. Limited interests in Africa and the nature of public pressures leave little alternative to utilizing soft intervention approaches in most cases. Within the category of soft intervention, there appears to be a continuum of means leading to possible movement into muscular intervention. At one end, there is coercive diplomacy, which is associated with threats of military and economic sanctions; if these sanctions are actually used, the intervening state becomes involved in muscular intervention. At the other end is diplomacy associated not with threats, but with the promise of rewards. Between the two poles lies diplomacy that involves neither threats nor rewards (i.e., conciliation and mediation without the use of pressures and incentives). In real world contexts, third parties tend to apply mixed packages of non-coercive and coercive incentives, with coercive incentives becoming increasingly dominant as the costs of altering preferences and the intensity of conflict rise.

AbstractIn the pre-independence conflict between the Nkrumah regime and the Ashanti-led opposition in the Gold Coast, the departing colonial power found itself caught up in an internal confrontation. The NLM and its allies, fearing the shadow of the future, sought to establish credible guarantees against majoritarian rule after independence. The Nkrumah government insisted upon the centralization of political power and majoritarian principles. The effect was to increase minority insecurity and raise inter-group suspicions and tensions. In this situation, the colonial mediator, determined to advance the negotiation process, secured concessions from the Nkrumah regime on the devolution of limited functions and powers to the sub-regions. However, the preconditions for successful official mediation were not present. The CPP offered concessions that disappeared with the advent of independence, and the opposition refused to participate in an implementation process that appeared to offer them uncertain guarantees. Colonial bargaining therefore represented a lost opportunity, one that failed to resolve the commitment problem.

The author asks why the design and establishment of political institutions can sometimes contribute to the collapse of peace agreements and power sharing regimes, and further the development of centralized institutional arrangements. Focusing on institutional design after civil war, the author suggests that peace implementation should be viewed as a two phase process. The short term phase centers around confidence building phase, while the long term phase is focuses on security building. The challenges facing rival parties in the both phases are addressed, followed by a discussion of the way these challenges create strain and affect the commitments made to support an agreement. Finally, the author takes the long view, examining how the two step processes affects long term institutional design.

In this important reappraisal of Africa's political evolution
over an extended period, Jeffrey Herbst engages in a dialogue
with scholars of comparative and African politics on the
causes of state weakness and the possibilities for state
redesign. Herbst argues that state consolidation in Africa has
been complicated by the problem of extending authority over
its distant territories. Low population densities have been a
long-standing obstacle encountered by precolonial, colonial,
and independent African rulers alike. It has proven expensive
for leaders at the political center to project power over
peoples and territories far from the capital city. As a result,
rural areas have been neglected, particularly by colonial
regimes, and urban areas have been favored in terms of
public services and amenities.

This article analyzes some recent developments in the US political attitude toward the continent of Africa, examining why policies have changed since the failure of military efforts in Somalia & considering how the US is viewed by African nations. The article gives a brief history of US involvement in Africa since the mid-20th century & then discusses in detail the attitude of each presidential administration toward African political affairs, specifically, how the balance of international power came to outweigh human rights violations, political corruption, & other issues. The article details specific policy measures undertaken by the Clinton administration. Adapted from the source document.