Welfare analysis in insurance markets
In: The Geneva risk and insurance review
ISSN: 1554-9658
22 Ergebnisse
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In: The Geneva risk and insurance review
ISSN: 1554-9658
In: CESifo working paper series 5071
In: Public finance
We develop a framework for optimal taxation when agents can earn their income both in traditional activities, where private and social products coincide, and in rent-seeking activities, where private returns exceed social returns either because they involve the capture of pre-existing rents or because they reduce the returns to traditional work. We characterize Pareto optimal non-linear taxes when the government does not observe the shares of an individual's income earned in each of the two activities. We show that the optimal externality correction typically deviates from the Pigouvian correction that would obtain if rent-seeking incomes could be perfectly targeted, even at income levels where all income is from rent-seeking. If rent-seeking externalities primarily affect other rent-seeking activity, then the optimal externality correction lies strictly below the Pigouvian correction. If the externalities fall mainly on the returns to traditional work, the optimal correction strictly exceeds it. We show that this deviation can be quantitatively important.
In: The Geneva risk and insurance review, Band 45, Heft 2, S. 75-79
ISSN: 1554-9658
In: Journal of Risk and Insurance, Band 87, Heft 3, S. 719-750
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In: The Geneva risk and insurance review, Band 44, Heft 2, S. 207-221
ISSN: 1554-9658
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5165
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Working paper
In: The Geneva risk and insurance review, Band 39, Heft 2, S. 184-221
ISSN: 1554-9658
In: The Geneva risk and insurance review, Band 39, Heft 2, S. 131-135
ISSN: 1554-9658
We develop a framework for optimal taxation when agents can earn their income both in traditional activities, where private and social products coincide, and in rent-seeking activities, where private returns exceed social returns either because they involve the capture of pre-existing rents or because they reduce the returns to traditional work. We characterize Pareto optimal non-linear taxes when the government does not observe the shares of an individual's income earned in each of the two activities. We show that the optimal externality correction typically deviates from the Pigouvian correction that would obtain if rent-seeking incomes could be perfectly targeted, even at income levels where all income is from rent-seeking. If rent-seeking externalities primarily affect other rent-seeking activity, then the optimal externality correction lies strictly below the Pigouvian correction. If the externalities fall mainly on the returns to traditional work, the optimal correction strictly exceeds it. We show that this deviation can be quantitatively important.
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In: The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review 39, 184-221, 2014
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In: NBER Working Paper No. w19822
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Working paper
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5071
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In: Encyclopedia of Health Economics vol 3, 272-280, 2014
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In: NBER Working Paper No. w18228
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In: Quarterly journal of political science: QJPS, Band 7, Heft 1, S. 69-87
ISSN: 1554-0634