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In a comparative perspective, the Swedish welfare state is known for being more universal, comprehensive and extensive than what is the case for most other OECD countries. Usually, the normative, economic and political parts of this enterprise are analyzed separately by scholars in different disciplines. This chapter presents an analysis of how the moral, electoral and redistributive logic of the Swedish welfare state are integrated and should be understood as a precondition for the system as a whole. The argument is based on the idea that the political support for the welfare system cannot be explained without reference to its moral foundations and which explains the sustainability of the system

Ranking the World: Grading States as a Tool of Global Governance, edited by Alexander Cooley and Jack Snyder, assembles an impressive group of political scientists to critically discuss "the important analytical, normative, and policy issues associated with the contemporary practice of 'grading states.'" The volume addresses a topic of importance to a wide range of political scientists in comparative politics, international relations, and political theory, and raises some fundamental questions about the role of political science at the nexus of theory and practice. We have thus invited a number of colleagues to discuss the volume and its broader implications for political science inquiry.

IN THE GENERAL ELECTION IN 1991, THE SWEDISH SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (SAP) MADE ITS WORST SHOWING SINCE 1928. IN THE RECENT ELECTION AS WELL AS IN PAST ONES, THE PARTY DECLARED ITSELF THE SOLE GUARANTOR OF THE WELFARE STATE, BUT THE ARGUMENT DID NOT WORK THIS TIME. THIS ARTICLE EXPLORES THE EARTHQUAKE ELECTION AND THE FUTURE OF THE UNIVERSAL WELFARE STATE, THE MORAL AND POLITICAL LOGIC OF THE SWEDISH WELFARE STATE, MISMANAGEMENT, THE UNIVERSAL WELFARE STATE AND THE QUESTION OF CHOICE, AND, EXPLORES A FUTURE SCENARIO.

Argues that when it comes to justice, the labor market is the most important market and that discussions of social justice that neglect this are incomplete: following Marx, the relation between 'sellers' and 'buyers' on the labor market is seen as the focal point for understanding the power structure in capitalist societies. (RSM)

Discusses the relation between Marxist analysis and the neoinstitutional school. Emphasizes the importance of understanding the politically determined nature of labour market power in explaining the relation between social classes and public policies. Stresses the importance of the institutions responsible for implementing government policies and shows how questions of organisation have consequences outside the field of public administration. (JLN)

IN WHAT WAY DOES CORPORATIST REPRESENTATION CHANGE THE BEHAVIOUR OF PARTICIPATING ORGANIZATIONS? THE CLASSICAL QUESTION IS WHETHER THE INTEREST ORGANIZATIONS' REPRESENTATIVES ARE CAPTURED OR NOT. SWEDEN IS ONE OF THE COUNTRIES IN WHICH THE CLASS-BASED INTEREST ORGANIZATIONS ARE HEAVILY REPRESENTED IN THE CENTRAL PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION. THE IMPORTANCE OF CORPORATIST ARRANGEMENT IN THIS AREA IN SWEDEN IS DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE TASK OF IMPLEMENTING GOVERNMENT POLICY IS LARGELY GIVEN TO SEMI-INDEPENDENT DIRECTORATES. SINCE THE EARLY 1970S, THE MAJOR BUSINESS ORGANIZATION IN SWEDEN HAS BEEN STRONGLY DEMANDING CUTS IN PUBLIC SPENDING. AS IT IS REPRESENTED IN SOME OF THE MOST IMPORTANT, AND EXPANDING, PUBLIC AGENCIES OF THE SWEDISH WELFARE STATE, IT COULD BE EXPECTED THAT THEIR REPRESENTATIVES WOULD DEMAND A DECREASE IN THE AGENCIES' YEARLY BUDGET PROPOSALS. DURING A TEN-YEAR PERIOD (1974-1983), THERE IS NO SIGN OF SUCH BEHAVIOUR OF THE BUSINESS ORGANIZATION'S REPRESENTATIVES IN THESE CORPORATIST INSTITUTIONS. ON THE CONTRARY, BUSINESS IN SWEDEN CAN BE SAID TO HAVE BEEN MORE GENEROUS WITH THE TAXPAYERS' MONEY THAN BOTH SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC AND BOURGEOIS GOVERNMENTS HAVE FOUND POSSIBLE. ASSUMING THAT BOTH ITS GENERAL DEMAND FOR CUTS IN PUBLIC SPENDING AND ITS SPECIFIC ACTION IN THE CORPORATIST INSTITUTIONS ARE RATIONAL, IT IS DISCUSSED HOW THIS SEEMINGLY CONTRADICTORY BEHAVIOUR OF SWEDISH BUSINESS CAN BE EXPLAINED.

We show a link between levels of mass education in 1870 and corruption levels in 2010 for seventy-eight countries that remains strong when controlling for change in the level of education, GDP/ capita, and democracy. A model for the causal mechanism between universal education and control of corruption is presented. Early introduction of universal education is linked to levels of economic equality and to efforts to increase state capacity. First, societies with more equal education gave citizens more opportunities and power for opposing corruption. Secondly, the need for increased state capacity was a strong motivation for the introduction of universal education in many countries. Strong states provided more education to their publics and such states were more common where economic disparities were initially smaller.

The importance of interpersonal social trust is difficult to exaggerate. It builds societies and lowers most kinds of transaction costs. The normative ideal in a society is to have high levels of social trust and a minimum of differences in trust between social, economic, and political groups. These normative expectations are put to a test using World Value Survey data from some 80 different countries. If one had high hopes, the outcome is somewhat of a disappointment. The level of social trust is only on a reasonable level in a very limited number of countries—in the Nordic countries, in the Netherlands, in Switzerland,Australia, and New Zealand. In most other countries, the majority of citizens do not trust their fellow man. Furthermore, except for gender and age differences in social trust, which tend to be minor in most countries, there are rather clear (and normatively unwanted) group differences in social trust in many countries, and especially so in established democracies. Citizens with university degrees, in good health, and gainfully employed do trust other people much more than citizens with low education, in poor health, and out of work. Less fortunate and less privileged people across the world tend to have lower levels of interpersonal trust. That is not good for them, and it is not good for society.

Generalized trust has become a prominent concept at the nexus of several disciplines, and the wide differences in trust between different societies continue to puzzle the social sciences. In this study, we explore the effects of micro and macro level factors in explaining an individual's propensity to 'trust others'. We hypothesize that higher levels of education will lead to higher social trust in individuals, given that the context (country or regions within countries) in which they reside has a sufficiently impartial and non-corrupt institutional setting. However, the positive effect of education on trust among individuals is expected to be negligible in contexts with greater levels of corruption and favoritism toward certain people are more inclined to view the system as 'rigged' as they become more educated. This multi-level interaction effect is tested using original survey data of 85,000 individuals in 24 European countries. Using hierarchical modelling, we find strong support for our hypothesis. This effect is robust to a number of specifications, and even holds for regional variation of institutional quality (QoG) within countries – with the strongest effects being higher education – yet the country effects of QoG are strongest.