Suchergebnisse

International audience ; This paper describes processe s of disqualification in an environmental dispute, and the impact they (can) have. Scientists, benefiting from an aura of neutrality and reason, publicly express their negative personal opinions as relevant constructed knowledge. This has an impact on the public's level of trust in the scientific inquiry, and can destroy the possibility of doing field work. This is especially the ca se when the problem under study (here, pollution issues) has strong links with sc ientific activity, and can generate serious delays in a political process. The disqualification of others being often observed in academics, an in stitution should be designed to solve such issues with civility.

International audience ; This paper describes processe s of disqualification in an environmental dispute, and the impact they (can) have. Scientists, benefiting from an aura of neutrality and reason, publicly express their negative personal opinions as relevant constructed knowledge. This has an impact on the public's level of trust in the scientific inquiry, and can destroy the possibility of doing field work. This is especially the ca se when the problem under study (here, pollution issues) has strong links with sc ientific activity, and can generate serious delays in a political process. The disqualification of others being often observed in academics, an in stitution should be designed to solve such issues with civility.

Note : This paper has been written as a follow-up of a seminar called DEFORM Project workshop in 2017, on Research Quality, Integrity and Misconduct. This paper was sent as the end of 2017 for publication, but the review process is taking longer than expected. A short note at the end has been added to explain how the social setting also evolved. What was predicted by some opponents to the industry (and that « reasonable colleagues » refused to hear) has happened more or less in the expected timing. Abstract: This paper describes the place of disqualification in an environmental dispute in which scientists, although supposedly representing neutrality and reason, express publicly their opinion in place of constructed knowledge. This has an impact in terms of trust in science for the general public, can destroy the possibility to do field work, especially when the problem under study (here a pollution issue) is strongly linked to scientific activity, but can even generate a serious delay in a political process. The disqualification of others being very often observed in academics, an institution should be designed to solve disqualification issues with civility. In this paper I wish to address an issue that can impact in the organization of public decision making in France, when decisions are made, in a way or another, based on scientific expertise. The problem at stake is the rather easy apparition of disqualification in the academic world-be it to qualify "others" (from the outside of academics) or "colleagues". The paper describes a field study on an environmental conflict, during which disqualification was present and had a massive impact on the political and scientific dynamics. It happens that there is no regulation body concerning the behaviours of researchers in public space or the spreading of reputation, and no incentive to self-regulate. In the contemporary context, power relations associated to the capture of rent through massive projects can conduct to weird positions when the capture of speech is made ...

Note : This paper has been written as a follow-up of a seminar called DEFORM Project workshop in 2017, on Research Quality, Integrity and Misconduct. This paper was sent as the end of 2017 for publication, but the review process is taking longer than expected. A short note at the end has been added to explain how the social setting also evolved. What was predicted by some opponents to the industry (and that « reasonable colleagues » refused to hear) has happened more or less in the expected timing. Abstract: This paper describes the place of disqualification in an environmental dispute in which scientists, although supposedly representing neutrality and reason, express publicly their opinion in place of constructed knowledge. This has an impact in terms of trust in science for the general public, can destroy the possibility to do field work, especially when the problem under study (here a pollution issue) is strongly linked to scientific activity, but can even generate a serious delay in a political process. The disqualification of others being very often observed in academics, an institution should be designed to solve disqualification issues with civility. In this paper I wish to address an issue that can impact in the organization of public decision making in France, when decisions are made, in a way or another, based on scientific expertise. The problem at stake is the rather easy apparition of disqualification in the academic world-be it to qualify "others" (from the outside of academics) or "colleagues". The paper describes a field study on an environmental conflict, during which disqualification was present and had a massive impact on the political and scientific dynamics. It happens that there is no regulation body concerning the behaviours of researchers in public space or the spreading of reputation, and no incentive to self-regulate. In the contemporary context, power relations associated to the capture of rent through massive projects can conduct to weird positions when the capture of speech is made ...

Note : This paper has been written as a follow-up of a seminar called DEFORM Project workshop in 2017, on Research Quality, Integrity and Misconduct. This paper was sent as the end of 2017 for publication, but the review process is taking longer than expected. A short note at the end has been added to explain how the social setting also evolved. What was predicted by some opponents to the industry (and that « reasonable colleagues » refused to hear) has happened more or less in the expected timing. Abstract: This paper describes the place of disqualification in an environmental dispute in which scientists, although supposedly representing neutrality and reason, express publicly their opinion in place of constructed knowledge. This has an impact in terms of trust in science for the general public, can destroy the possibility to do field work, especially when the problem under study (here a pollution issue) is strongly linked to scientific activity, but can even generate a serious delay in a political process. The disqualification of others being very often observed in academics, an institution should be designed to solve disqualification issues with civility. In this paper I wish to address an issue that can impact in the organization of public decision making in France, when decisions are made, in a way or another, based on scientific expertise. The problem at stake is the rather easy apparition of disqualification in the academic world-be it to qualify "others" (from the outside of academics) or "colleagues". The paper describes a field study on an environmental conflict, during which disqualification was present and had a massive impact on the political and scientific dynamics. It happens that there is no regulation body concerning the behaviours of researchers in public space or the spreading of reputation, and no incentive to self-regulate. In the contemporary context, power relations associated to the capture of rent through massive projects can conduct to weird positions when the capture of speech is made ...

Abstract – In this article, we study various so-called " decision aiding " practices used to design and implement environmental public policies, based on " economic arguments ". We analyse these practices to determine if they truly provide an aid to decision-making. We tackle this issue thanks to a case-based inquiry, implemented in two, very different case-studies: the " red muds " of Gardanne, and the territorial public policies devoted to conserve and restore wetlands in France. These cases exemplify practices sharing a similar pathology: they claim to take advantage of economic science, but in fact they are based on fallacious rationales which fail to satisfy even minimal rigorousness and scientificity requirements. We do not claim to produce quantitative evidence that our observation is generalizable. We rather claim that our empirical elements can be used to articulate ideas whose generality should be investigated in future quantitative studies: (i) decision aiding, when applied to environmental public policies, is barely, if at all, based on economic science; (ii) it nevertheless is overwhelmed by economic vocabulary, which suggests that (iii) the legitimacy of environmental public policies is badly undermined by decision aiding practices which, for lack of a robust anchorage in economic science, systematically weaken any possible justification of these policies. Mots clefs: aide à la décision, politiques environnementales, science économique, arguments, légi-timité ; – Nous analysons des arguments économiques utilisés en aide à la décision en politique publique environnementale. Pour cela, nous appliquons une méthodologie d'étude de cas aux boues rouges de Gardanne et aux politiques territoriales de zones humides. Ces cas illustrent une même pathologie : des aides à la décision prétendent s'appuyer sur la science économique, mais échouent à remplir des critères minimaux de rigueur et scientificité. Ces cas permettent ainsi de formuler des idées que des études ultérieures pourront tester : (i) l'aide à la ...

Abstract – In this article, we study various so-called " decision aiding " practices used to design and implement environmental public policies, based on " economic arguments ". We analyse these practices to determine if they truly provide an aid to decision-making. We tackle this issue thanks to a case-based inquiry, implemented in two, very different case-studies: the " red muds " of Gardanne, and the territorial public policies devoted to conserve and restore wetlands in France. These cases exemplify practices sharing a similar pathology: they claim to take advantage of economic science, but in fact they are based on fallacious rationales which fail to satisfy even minimal rigorousness and scientificity requirements. We do not claim to produce quantitative evidence that our observation is generalizable. We rather claim that our empirical elements can be used to articulate ideas whose generality should be investigated in future quantitative studies: (i) decision aiding, when applied to environmental public policies, is barely, if at all, based on economic science; (ii) it nevertheless is overwhelmed by economic vocabulary, which suggests that (iii) the legitimacy of environmental public policies is badly undermined by decision aiding practices which, for lack of a robust anchorage in economic science, systematically weaken any possible justification of these policies. Mots clefs: aide à la décision, politiques environnementales, science économique, arguments, légi-timité ; – Nous analysons des arguments économiques utilisés en aide à la décision en politique publique environnementale. Pour cela, nous appliquons une méthodologie d'étude de cas aux boues rouges de Gardanne et aux politiques territoriales de zones humides. Ces cas illustrent une même pathologie : des aides à la décision prétendent s'appuyer sur la science économique, mais échouent à remplir des critères minimaux de rigueur et scientificité. Ces cas permettent ainsi de formuler des idées que des études ultérieures pourront tester : (i) l'aide à la ...

Les circuits courts semblent à l'heure actuelle dans une phase d'institutionnalisation avérée, en particulier du fait du positionnement croissant des politiques publiques et des mises en réseau multi-scalaires et inter-sectorielles des acteurs. Les observatoires se multiplient : nous étudions celui mis en place par le Conseil Régional PACA. À travers une approche inspirée du cadre d'analyse d'Elinor Ostrom, nous identifions l'impact de cet observatoire sur la capacité des acteurs et participants à faire émerger des règles qui résolvent les dilemmes sociaux liés à la ressource clef du système : la visibilité, à la fois produite et consommée au sein de l'observatoire.

Short circuits currently seem to be in a proven institutionalisation phase, in particular due to the increasing positioning of public policies and multi-scaled and inter-sectoral networking of actors. The number of observatories is increasing: we are studying the one set up by the PACA Regional Council. Using an approach based on the analysis framework of Elinor Ostrom, we identify the impact of this observatory on the capacity of actors and participants to develop rules that resolve the social dilemmas linked to the key resource of the system: visibility, both produced and consumed within the observatory. ; Les circuits courts semblent à l'heure actuelle dans une phase d'institutionnalisation avérée, en particulier du fait du positionnement croissant des politiques publiques et des mises en réseau multi-scalaires et inter-sectorielles des acteurs. Les observatoires se multiplient : nous étudions celui mis en place par le Conseil Régional PACA. À travers une approche inspirée du cadre d'analyse d'Elinor Ostrom, nous identifions l'impact de cet observatoire sur la capacité des acteurs et participants à faire émerger des règles qui résolvent les dilemmes sociaux liés à la ressource clef du système : la visibilité, à la fois produite et consommée au sein de l'observatoire.

Les circuits courts semblent à l'heure actuelle dans une phase d'institutionnalisation avérée, en particulier du fait du positionnement croissant des politiques publiques et des mises en réseau multi-scalaires et inter-sectorielles des acteurs. Les observatoires se multiplient : nous étudions celui mis en place par le Conseil Régional PACA. À travers une approche inspirée du cadre d'analyse d'Elinor Ostrom, nous identifions l'impact de cet observatoire sur la capacité des acteurs et participants à faire émerger des règles qui résolvent les dilemmes sociaux liés à la ressource clef du système : la visibilité, à la fois produite et consommée au sein de l'observatoire.

Les circuits courts semblent à l'heure actuelle dans une phase d'institutionnalisation avérée, en particulier du fait du positionnement croissant des politiques publiques et des mises en réseau multi-scalaires et inter-sectorielles des acteurs. Les observatoires se multiplient : nous étudions celui mis en place par le Conseil Régional PACA. À travers une approche inspirée du cadre d'analyse d'Elinor Ostrom, nous identifions l'impact de cet observatoire sur la capacité des acteurs et participants à faire émerger des règles qui résolvent les dilemmes sociaux liés à la ressource clef du système : la visibilité, à la fois produite et consommée au sein de l'observatoire.

International audience ; The paper presents a multi-agent model simulating a two-level public decision game in which politicians, voters and interest groups interact. The objective is to model the political market for influence at the domestic level and at the international level, and to assess how new consultation procedures affect the final decision. It is based on public choice theory as well as on political science findings. We consider in this paper that lobbying groups have different strategies for influencing voters and decision-makers, with long-term and short-term effects. Our computational model enables us to represent the situation as an iterative process, in which past decisions have an impact on the preferences and choices of agents in the following period. In the paper, the model is applied to the European decision-making procedure for authorizing the placing on the market of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO). It illustrates the political links between public opinions, lobbying groups and elected representatives at the national scale in the 15 country members, and at the European scale. It compares the procedure which was defined by the European 90/220 Directive in 1990 with the new procedure, the 2001/18 Directive, which replaced it in 2001. The objective is to explore the impact of the new decision rules and the reinforced public participation procedures planned by the 2001/18 Directive on the lobbying efficiency of NGOs and biotechnology firms, and on the overall acceptability of the European decision concerning the release of new GMOs on the European territory.

International audience ; The paper presents a multi-agent model simulating a two-level public decision game in which politicians, voters and interest groups interact. The objective is to model the political market for influence at the domestic level and at the international level, and to assess how new consultation procedures affect the final decision. It is based on public choice theory as well as on political science findings. We consider in this paper that lobbying groups have different strategies for influencing voters and decision-makers, with long-term and short-term effects. Our computational model enables us to represent the situation as an iterative process, in which past decisions have an impact on the preferences and choices of agents in the following period. In the paper, the model is applied to the European decision-making procedure for authorizing the placing on the market of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO). It illustrates the political links between public opinions, lobbying groups and elected representatives at the national scale in the 15 country members, and at the European scale. It compares the procedure which was defined by the European 90/220 Directive in 1990 with the new procedure, the 2001/18 Directive, which replaced it in 2001. The objective is to explore the impact of the new decision rules and the reinforced public participation procedures planned by the 2001/18 Directive on the lobbying efficiency of NGOs and biotechnology firms, and on the overall acceptability of the European decision concerning the release of new GMOs on the European territory.