Suchergebnisse

Intro -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- Notes on the Contributors -- About the Editors -- About the Authors -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Part I: Analysing Capitalisms as Institutional Systems: Our Approach -- 1: Analysing the Capitalisms of Developing Countries: What's the Point? -- 1.1 The Rise of New Capitalisms -- 1.2 Varieties of Mature Capitalisms: Working Out the Elements of a System-based Method -- 1.3 Analysing Developing Countries' Capitalist Systems through the Lens of Institutional Clusters -- 1.4 From Institutional Clusters to the 2+4 Models of Capitalism -- 1.5 What Is So Special about (Analysing) Developing Countries' Capitalisms and How We Deal with That? -- 1.6 What This Book Is and What It Is Not -- References -- 2: Existing Typologies of Developing Countries' Institutional Systems -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Varieties of Political Economies -- 2.3 Regional Varieties of Deviant Capitalisms -- 2.4 Institutional Clusters and Statistical Analyses of Economic Systems -- 2.5 Conclusion -- References -- 3: Systems, Institutional Complementarities and Politics: Various Methodological Considerations -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Capitalisms as Institutional Systems: Theoretical Considerations -- 3.3 The Seven Sectors of Institutional Systems -- 3.4 Adapting Institutional Complementarity to Developing Countries: De jure and De facto Complementarity -- 3.5 The Original Two-Tier Methodological Approach -- 3.6 Politics -- Technical Appendix -- References -- Part II: The Seven Sectors of Institutional Governance -- 4: Labour and Production Relations -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Economic Systems and Labour Issues: A Review -- 4.3 Measuring Labour Institutions -- 4.4 Models of Labour and Production Relation Governance -- 4.4.1 The Main Patterns of Labour Governance Differentiation.

Around 2011, several Middle-East and North-African (MENA) previously stable regimes have been challenged, sometimes violently, by unprecedented waves of civil protests. The so-called "Arab Springs" have generally been motivated by the growing gap between young adults' aspirations to climb up the social ladder and the dearth of socioeconomic opportunities consecutive to the slow pace of structural change featured by the economies of the region. The present paper argues that this slow pace of structural change, measured by export sophistication and diversification, may well be the consequence of the authoritarian-redistributive social contracts that were established after the Independence and were subsequently only marginally reformed. MENA social contracts are generally described as political bargains by which socioeconomic security, based on high levels of redistribution and state control of the economy, were traded against the absence of political freedom. We show in this paper that although redistribution and political authoritarianism have an impact on structural change, by their own, their combination certainly explains the deficit of structural transformation of MENA economies. More specifically, we provide cross-sectional and dynamic-panel evidence that the positive impact of redistribution on structural change, measured by export diversification and sophistication, vanishes for the very high levels of authoritarianism characterizing the MENA region. Our results hold for different specifications of the estimated equations and of the social contract variable, as well as when endogeneity issues are addressed. The paper finally describes the political economy that sustained, over the last three decades, this combination of political authoritarianism and slow productive diversification and sophistication throughout the region, before explaining how these features could well have inhibited the political capacities and willingness of most MENA incumbent regimes to reform the social contract in a radical and timely manner.

This book presents the results of a collective and original empirical investigation of the institutional systems underlying the capitalisms that are coming to the fore in developing nations. While varieties of industrialized countries' capitalisms are extensively scrutinized, those of developing countries' capitalisms are far less documented. By implementing a unified and original comparative approach based on the institutional complementarity theory, the different contributors of the book find evidence for the originality and heterogeneity of the forms of capitalism to be observed in developing countries. This text analyses capitalist systems as clusters of sectoral institutions and regulations, identifying differences between these clusters in a large sample of emerging and developing countries. Rougier and Combarnous bring together contributions answering the following questions: What are these clusters of institutions underlying emerging capitalisms? Are there common or specific patterns of institutional clustering across countries and what are the main characteristics of the varieties of capitalism they shape? What are their main long-term determinants? Are there specific patterns of economic outcome associated with these clusters? Can different forms of institutional complementarity be observed? How can we analyse institutional reform from this perspective?

This book presents the results of a collective and original empirical investigation of the institutional systems underlying the capitalisms that are coming to the fore in developing nations. While varieties of industrialized countries' capitalisms are extensively scrutinized, those of developing countries' capitalisms are far less documented. By implementing a unified and original comparative approach based on the institutional complementarity theory, the different contributors of the book find evidence for the originality and heterogeneity of the forms of capitalism to be observed in developing countries. This text analyses capitalist systems as clusters of sectoral institutions and regulations, identifying differences between these clusters in a large sample of emerging and developing countries. Rougier and Combarnous bring together contributions answering the following questions: What are these clusters of institutions underlying emerging capitalisms. Are there common or specific patterns of institutional clustering across countries and what are the main characteristics of the varieties of capitalism they shape. What are their main long-term determinants. Are there specific patterns of economic outcome associated with these clusters. Can different forms of institutional complementarity be observed. How can we analyse institutional reform from this perspective.

This book presents the results of a collective and original empirical investigation of the institutional systems underlying the capitalisms that are coming to the fore in developing nations. While varieties of industrialized countries' capitalisms are extensively scrutinized, those of developing countries' capitalisms are far less documented. By implementing a unified and original comparative approach based on the institutional complementarity theory, the different contributors of the book find evidence for the originality and heterogeneity of the forms of capitalism to be observed in developing countries. This text analyses capitalist systems as clusters of sectoral institutions and regulations, identifying differences between these clusters in a large sample of emerging and developing countries. Rougier and Combarnous bring together contributions answering the following questions: What are these clusters of institutions underlying emerging capitalisms. Are there common or specific patterns of institutional clustering across countries and what are the main characteristics of the varieties of capitalism they shape. What are their main long-term determinants. Are there specific patterns of economic outcome associated with these clusters. Can different forms of institutional complementarity be observed. How can we analyse institutional reform from this perspective.