Basel III: Effects of capital and liquidity regulations on European bank lending
In: Journal of economics and business, Band 95, S. 26-46
ISSN: 0148-6195
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In: Journal of economics and business, Band 95, S. 26-46
ISSN: 0148-6195
In: Archipel: études interdisciplinaires sur le monde insulindien, Band 24, Heft 1, S. 73-86
ISSN: 2104-3655
In: IMF Working Paper No. 17/245
SSRN
The theory of financial intermediation highlights various channels through which capital and liquidity are interrelated. Using a simultaneous equations framework, we investigate the relationship between bank regulatory capital buffer and liquidity for European and U.S. publicly traded commercial banks. Previous research studying the determinants of bank capital buffer has neglected the role of liquidity. On the whole, we find that banks do not strengthen their regulatory capital buffer when they face higher illiquidity as defined in the Basel III accords or when they create more liquidity as measured by Berger and Bouwman (2009). However, considering other measures of illiquidity that focus more closely on core deposits in the United States, our results show that small banks do actually strengthen their solvency standards when they are exposed to higher illiquidity. Our empirical investigation supports the need to implement minimum liquidity ratios concomitant to capital ratios, as stressed by the Basel Committee; however, our findings also shed light on the need to further clarify how to define and measure illiquidity and also on how to regulate large banking institutions, which behave differently than smaller ones.
BASE
The theory of financial intermediation highlights various channels through which capital and liquidity are interrelated. Using a simultaneous equations framework, we investigate the relationship between bank regulatory capital buffer and liquidity for European and U.S. publicly traded commercial banks. Previous research studying the determinants of bank capital buffer has neglected the role of liquidity. On the whole, we find that banks do not strengthen their regulatory capital buffer when they face higher illiquidity as defined in the Basel III accords or when they create more liquidity as measured by Berger and Bouwman (2009). However, considering other measures of illiquidity that focus more closely on core deposits in the United States, our results show that small banks do actually strengthen their solvency standards when they are exposed to higher illiquidity. Our empirical investigation supports the need to implement minimum liquidity ratios concomitant to capital ratios, as stressed by the Basel Committee; however, our findings also shed light on the need to further clarify how to define and measure illiquidity and also on how to regulate large banking institutions, which behave differently than smaller ones.
BASE
Globalisation and the governance of the international financial system have arrived at the crossroads, where either a coherent level playing field for the cross-border activities of banks and multinational enterprises is settled upon, or the risk of another crisis will build up again. This book will explore the underlying problems alongside inconsistent economic and financial trends as a guide for researchers, advanced students and professionals to think about the interconnectedness of the factors involved. Readers will gain insights drawn from recent developments in economic theory and empirical research - a toolkit to help them in their future careers in economics and finance - illustrated with an analysis of the 2008 crisis and its aftermath.
In: Journal of financial economic policy, Band 5, Heft 4, S. 339-360
ISSN: 1757-6393
Purpose
– The study examines the roles of capital rules, macro variables and bank business models in determining the safety of banks as measured by the "distance-to-default" (DTD) with the purpose of drawing implications for regulation of bank capital and business models.
Design/methodology/approach
– A panel regression study using pre- and post-crisis data for 108 US and European banks is used to explore the issue empirically. A new technique is also used to back out the amount of capital banks would have needed during the crisis to keep the "DTD" in the very safe zone.
Findings
– The simple leverage ratio has a strong relationship with "DTD", while the Basel ratio does not. The most important business model features are derivatives and wholesale funding, which have a strong negative relationship with "DTD". Trading and available-for-sale securities have a positive influence. Calculations show that it is not possible for any reasonable capital rule to compensate for the risks created by business model features encompassing large derivative-based activities. Bank separation policies are essential.
Originality/value
– The micro evidence-based analysis as an approach to bank regulation and business model requirements stands in contrast to the ad hoc way policy has been constructed before and after the crisis. The empirical evidence supports separation based on the balance sheet size of derivatives and a leverage ratio instead of the complex Basel risk-weighted capital approach. The current approaches to structural separation are criticised constructively, and some evidence-based suggestions for improving bank business models to reduce systemic risk are made.
In: National Institute economic review: journal of the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, Band 221, S. R31-R43
ISSN: 1741-3036
This paper looks at the urgent and ongoing need to change the business models of global systemically important banks — particularly those that dominate the OTC derivatives markets which carry massive counterparty risk via collateralisation practices. It explores the three main lessons of the financial crisis: too big to fail, excess leverage and conflicts of interest. While regulatory reforms have been plentiful, none have adequately addressed the main source of the problems which lie in the very nature of the business models of large interconnected banks.