Suchergebnisse

This book presents a collection of papers which evaluate the achievements of the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974 in making Australian markets more competitive. The contributors have all played major roles in Australian and New Zealand antitrust actions, either as expert economic witnesses, as antitrust enforcers, as judges or as quasi-judicial administrators. No other publication presents such in-depth economic analysis of the Act and the cases decided under it in its first two decades of its operation. As well as an introductory paper, this collection includes a foreword by the Hon. George Gear, Assistant Treasurer of the Australian Government and Minister responsible for the administration of the Act, plus two broad analytical overviews of the last two decades of Australian antitrust actions by two economists who have continually been at the heart of antitrust proceedings. In addition, papers are provided which give a judicial view of the Act and economic analysis, which compare the Act with its New Zealand counterpart. Other contributions look in detail at those sections of the Act which cover mergers, misuse of market power, price-fixing and vertical practices. The book shows that the Act has had a major impact on Australian market behavior. Judges, lawyers and economists between them have produced a truly Australian approach to antitrust, which has reflected overseas trends in both law and economics, as well as developed a unique Australian flavor. The book will be of interest to academic and practicing lawyers and economists, judges and corporate executives. It will be essential reading for Australian students in undergraduate courses in antitrust law, business regulation, antitrust economics and industrial organization. It provides by far the most comprehensive economic evaluation of Australian antitrust yet published and so will be the definitive source of information on this topic for non-Australians interested in comparative antitrust legislation and enforcement issues

Abstract: Recent moves by both Labor and Liberal Governments in Australia indicate increased awareness of the possibilities that a centralized government purchasing body may be able to secure economies in purchasing large quantities of a wide range of goods used by government departments, agencies and commissions, and also that such a purchasing authority can be used as an instrument with which to put into effect government policies concerned with supporting a particular industry or geographic area. The argument in this paper elaborates on this theme. It is suggested that a centralized purchasing authority should act, using its countervailing power, to secure cost savings which would not only provide benefits to government departments, but which could also be passed on to the general public. For these savings to be achieved, significant changes would have to occur in the relatively passive system of tendering which characterizes most government purchases. The government purchasing body would need actively to induce some real competition between rival tenderers, if need be playing one bid against the other. A government contract would be awarded only on the condition that the lower price offered the government was, in fact, also passed on to the general public. Thus both the public and the firm would benefit; the public by paying lower prices and the firm by the extra demand likely to be generated for its product, as well as the security of the government contract. Of course, such a purchasing policy could only be followed against firms with significant market power and excess profits. Even if such a policy were followed for a small number of products, the result could be greater efficiency and lower prices for all consumers of these products.

AbstractThe aim of the International Air Services Commission (IASC) Act is to promote competition in Australia's international air transport markets. Its role is to allocate new capacity, made available by negotiation of bilateral air services agreements, between incumbent airlines and entrant applicants. The IASC faces a number of dilemmas. It has to operate on the basis of country pairs whereas airlines operate, and competitive outcomes are determined, in country groups or networks. The IASC is also required to apply criteria which confuse means and ends. Most importantly, its objective is pro‐competitive but it has at its disposal only one instrument for that purpose, the allocation of capacity, which may not be the most appropriate instrument for achieving that goal. In the longer run, these dilemmas will be resolved by a movement to a more competitive market and deregulation of air transport capacity. In the meantime, suggestions are made about the weight which the IASC should put on the competition criterion; a simplification of the assessment of applications for capacity; and the IASC's relationship with the Trade Practices Commission.

AbstractAs China approaches economic superpower status, its need to achieve considerably higher standards of corporate governance is becoming paramount. Despite impressive recent advances in its capital and stock exchange markets, the on-going overhang of state ownership in its former state-owned enterprises, together with an unwieldy and ineffective dual board governance system, has left China facing major corporate governance problems that will deter the private investment necessary for its continued growth. This paper illustrates these problems, and suggests possible reforms that will provide the foundation for the efficient further development of China's capital markets that is needed to help China become a major economic superpower.

An efficient pricing system for university degrees should take into account the external benefits of degree programs. Results from a small sample survey comparing the external benefits of these programs are reported.

Résistance et capacité d'adaptation des cartels sur les marchés australiens (1901-1967) Cet article examine la persistance du comportement de cartel en Australie. Il tire bénéfice de l'évidence relevée de 1901 à 1939, lorsque l'intérêt pour les cartels était intense. Il s'appuie aussi sur les études académiques menées depuis les années 1950 et 1960, à la fin desquelles fut introduite une législation antitrust moderne. Le but n'est pas d'identifier les cartels à long terme, mais les facteurs qui ont pu conduire à l'émergence du comportement de cartel. Il est possible d'identifier un comportement de préférence pour les cartels chez divers acteurs durant différentes périodes et dans certaines circonstances, mais toujours dans les mêmes industries et dans le même environnement ou dans d'autres qui leur sont immédiatement liés. Se trouve ainsi démontrée la réalité d'une « résilience » des cartels, c'est-à-dire d'une double capacité de résistance et d'adaptation. Bien que l'étude des structures industrielles puisse fournir la meilleure preuve « anthropologique » de l'existence des cartels, beaucoup peut être appris de la mise en évidence, sur une longue période, d'un comportement favorable aux cartels par-delà les types d'activités et de marchés. JEL Codes: K21, L41, N80

More than a century elapsed between Australia's first legislative attempts to modify anticompetitive behaviour (the Australian Industries Preservation Act 1906) and its most recent efforts to criminalise price fixing (Trade Practices Amendment (Cartel Conduct and Other Measures) Act 2009). After a burst of activity in the first decade of Federation, the intervening years saw only sporadic interest by governments to promote competitive markets, with limited impact until the late 1960s. This paper assesses the first period of Australia's attempts to promote competition. It traces the political, economic and social environments of anticompetitive business behaviour in Australia from 1901 up to World War I. We suggest that Australia's initial forays into regulating cartels were motivated more by protectionist aims than by efforts to increase competition, which in part also explains the next half‐century of legislative apathy towards anti‐competitive legislation.