Suchergebnisse

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Tables and Figures -- Acknowledgments -- 1. Introduction: Domestic Institutions, Political Norms, and the Evolution of International Conflict -- 2. The Impact of Institutions and Norms in International Crises -- 3. International Disputes and the Evolution of Conflict -- 4. Institutional Constraint Versus Regime Type -- 5. Political Norms Versus Institutional Structures -- 6. Democratization and International Conflict -- 7. The Evolution of Conflicts, Institutions, and Norms: An Agent-Based Simulation -- 8. Conclusions -- Bibliography -- Index

Warfare in Europe contributed to the development of the modern state. In response to external conflict, state leaders raised armies and defended borders. The centralization of power, the development of bureaucracies, and the integration of economies all maximized revenue to support war. But how does a persistent external threat affect the development of a strong state? The "Garrison State" hypothesis argues that states that face a severe security threat will become autocracies. Conversely, the "Extraction School," argues that warfare indirectly promotes the development of democratic institutions. Execution of large-scale war, requires the mobilization of resource and usually reluctant populations. In most cases, leaders must extend economic or political rights in exchange for resolving the crisis. Large-scale warfare thus expands political participation in the long run. The authors use empirical statistical modeling to show that war decreases rights in the short term, but the longer and bigger a war gets, the rights of the citizenry expand with the conflict. The authors test this argument through historical case studies - Imperial Russia, Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy, African Americans in World War I and II, and the Tirailleurs Senegalese in World War I - through the use of large N statistical studies - Europe 1900-50 and Global 1893-2011 - and survey data. The results identify when, where, and how war can lead to the expansion of political rights.

Realists assume that individuals are obsessed with relative gains and that cooperation is the exception rather than the norm in international relations. In contrast, liberal institutionalists assume that, in many situations, individuals are motivated by absolute gains. These critical assumptions are examined. Results show that the salience of relative gains varies with the beliefs of the individual, the nature of the opponent, and the context of the situation, and that individuals often employ alternative pure strategies (e.g., equity) or mixed strategies (e.g., relative gains in the domain of gains and absolute gains in the domain of losses). Decision strategies (e.g., relative gains, absolute gains, joint gains, equality, and altruism) are linked to the growing constructivist literature in international relations.

Realists in international relations and realistic conflict theorists in social psychology argue that the perception of threat in intergroup conflict is a function of power asymmetries between groups. In contrast, social constructivists and social identity theorists argue that a shared sense of identity can reduce perceptions of intergroup threat. In this article, we test these competing arguments using three laboratory experiments conducted in two different countries (Spain and the United States). Four findings emerge from the experiments: (1) a weak position in terms of military power increases threat perception, as realists predict; (2) shared identity decreases threat perception, as constructivists predict; (3) an interactive relationship between power and identity appears in two of the three studies; and (4) shared identity increases cooperation in economic policy areas.

Classical liberals such as Kant argued that expanding political participation and increasing economic interdependence would promote peace among states. Recent empirical support for both propositions has led to a growing consensus on the power of the 'liberal peace'. This article challenges one pillar of the liberal peace. Using a dataset of international disputes from 1960 to 1988, the authors find that there is no statistical evidence of the pacifying effect of economic interdependence. Findings in the existing literature appear to be due to the improper use of the classic logit (or probit) method despite the existence of the 'simultaneity problem' between the use of force and interdependence (i.e. reciprocal causation). In this study, the authors employ a two-stage probit least squares method to control this problem. Although Kant's prediction with respect to regime type is supported by the analysis, the claim that economic interdependence will decrease conflict is not. The two-stage results reveal that international conflict reduces economic interdependence (rather than interdependence reducing conflict). The findings are robust using five alternative operationalizations of the economic interdependence variable. Finally, a re-analysis of the Russett & Oneal dataset using a two-stage probit model also indicates that the impact of economic interdependence evaporates after correcting for the simultaneity problem.