Suchergebnisse

This article seeks to evidence the social, environmental and political repercussions of phosphate extraction and transformation on two peripheral Tunisian cities (Gabes and Gafsa). After positing the difference between class environmentalism and political ecology, it addresses the harmful effects of phosphate transformation on the world's last coastal oasis and on various cities of the Gulf of Gabes. It then sheds light on the gross social, environmental and health inequalities brought about by phosphate extraction in the mining region of Gafsa. The confiscatory practices of the phosphate industry are subsequently linked with global production and distribution chains at the international level as well as with centralized and authoritarian forms of government at the national and local level. Dispossessed local communities have few alternatives other than violent protest movements and emigration towards urban centers of wealth. Using the recent experience in self-government in the Jemna palm grove, the article ends with a reflection on the possible forms of subaltern resistance to transnational extractivism and highlights the ambiguous role of the new "democratic state" as a power structure reproducing patterns of domination and repression inherited from the colonial period and cemented under the dictatorship of Ben Ali.Keywords: political ecology, transnational extractivism, phosphate, Tunisia.

This article seeks to evidence the social, environmental and political repercussions of phosphate extraction and transformation on two peripheral Tunisian cities (Gabes and Gafsa). After positing the difference between class environmentalism and political ecology, it addresses the harmful effects of phosphate transformation on the world's last coastal oasis and on various cities of the Gulf of Gabes. It then sheds light on the gross social, environmental and health inequalities brought about by phosphate extraction in the mining region of Gafsa. The confiscatory practices of the phosphate industry are subsequently linked with global production and distribution chains at the international level as well as with centralized and authoritarian forms of government at the national and local level. Dispossessed local communities have few alternatives other than violent protest movements and emigration towards urban centers of wealth. Using the recent experience in self-government in the Jemna palm grove, the article ends with a reflection on the possible forms of subaltern resistance to transnational extractivism and highlights the ambiguous role of the new "democratic state" as a power structure reproducing patterns of domination and repression inherited from the colonial period and cemented under the dictatorship of Ben Ali.Keywords: political ecology, transnational extractivism, phosphate, Tunisia.

This article seeks to conceptualise the role of modern communications technologies in revolutionary social movements starting from the jasmine revolution in Tunisia. After pointing to the limited explanatory potential of rationalist models of resource mobilisation and political opportunity structures in the case at hand, the article offers to investigate the extent to which the Internet provided new, immaterial territories over which discontent could prosper. Importing Deleuze and Guattari's concept of 'territorialisation' in the study of contentious politics, the article proposes to apprehend social movements on the basis of the inclusiveness and thickness of their territorial foundations and hypothesises that immaterial territories of struggle gave rise to an extremely inclusive but fairly shallow social movement, which was only able to solve basic collective action problems. More complex forms of collective action were conducted in less inclusive communities with thicker territorial foundations.

Bien qu'elle n'ait pas vu s'opérer la fusion des divers mouvements sociaux en une même multitude, l'édition tunisienne du Forum Social Mondial (FSM) de mars 2013 permit à la communauté altermondialiste d'occuper un certain nombre de territoires tant matériels (fragments d'espaces publics) qu'immatériels (fragments d'espaces digitaux). Pour les participants, la fréquentation conjointe de ces territoires permit une certaine forme de ressourcement, de renouvellement des énergies, de réconfort et d'encouragement mutuels ( Ermunterung ). En démultipliant les formes d'association affective avec le FSM, les nouvelles technologies de l'information et de la communication jouèrent un rôle important dans les processus de territorialisation et d' Ermunterung de la communauté altermondialiste.

This article seeks to explain why powerful governance-seekers select the European rule rather than any other rule available to them. Building upon explanatory mechanisms put forward in the Europeanization literature, the article proposes a conceptual framework in which rule transfer is a function of three variables: the domestic preference of the governance-seeker; the comparative properties of the various rules in competition; and the power distribution between governance-seekers and governance-providers. On this basis, two explanatory hypotheses are formulated, labelled Europe-by-force (or constraint-based rule transfer) and Europe-by-choice (or consent-based rule transfer), which are then tested thanks to four comparative case studies dedicated to the transfer of European rules and standards towards the People's Republic of China.

After having shown that the current European External Governance framework would fail to predict or explain the transfer of European environmental standards for the automotive industry towards the People's Republic of China, the article proposes a revised framework which includes new assumptions regarding the domestic preferences of rule importers. The case study highlights the central explanatory role of the Chinese domestic preference in the rule transfer process. It also shows that the Chinese decision, although primarily motivated by considerations of effectiveness, was also influenced by the greater legitimacy of the Euro emission standards.

1\. Introduction 5 2\. The EU as a Bilateral Rule Exporter: What Do We Know? 6 2.1 How Does the EU Export Its Rules Bilaterally? Power Asymmetries, Functional Dynamics and Domestic Politics 6 2.2 When Is the Bilateral Transfer of EU Rules Successful? Domestic Preferences and Power Asymmetries 7 3\. Bridging Europeanization and Globalization Studies: Identifying Commonalities in the Explanatory Mechanisms 9 4\. Theoretical Implications of the Shift from Bilateral to Multilateral Rule Transfer 11 4.1 How Do Bilateral Transfer Processes Differ from Multilateral Ones? 11 4.2 Determining the Collective Preference of Rule Importers 12 4.3 Imposing Constraint at the Multilateral Level 14 4.4 Seeking Consent at the Multilateral Level 14 5\. Hypotheses, Methodology and Case Selection 15 6\. The IMO Ban on Single-Hull Oil Tankers 17 7\. The UNECE-Sponsored Spread of the European Emission Control System 19 8\. The Spread of GSM Standards for Mobile Telephony Despite the ITU Neutrality 21 9\. The Failure to Integrate the Singapore Issues into WTO Negotiations 23 10\. Conclusion: Constraint and Consent in the Transfer of EU Rules 24 Literature 26 ; This working paper investigates the conditions which prompt a variety of non- EU states grouped within an international organization to adopt European rules or standards rather than any alternative rule or standard available for selection. The paper reviews the main conceptual frameworks from research on the bilateral transfer of European rules and highlights similarities between these and alternative explanatory models of rule transfer, diffusion or convergence found in the broader IR literature. After identifying the main differences between bilateral and multilateral rule transfer processes, the paper proposes theoretical amendments to capture the original forms and new channels via which the EU can either impose constraint or seek consent at the multilateral level. On this basis, two hypotheses are formulated whose plausibility is subsequently probed by means of four ...

Cet article analyse les conséquences des comportements migratoires de trois groupes sociaux (les étudiants, les actifs et les retraités) sur les structures sociales européennes. Après avoir passé en revue l'état de la recherche sociologique sur le sujet, l'article identifie deux profils idéal-typiques de migrants européens : d'une part, les personnes prédisposées à la mobilité par leur capital humain et relationnel et d'autre part, celles dont les décisions de migration dépendent de l'existence de structures d'opportunité au niveau européen. L'étude détaille ensuite, pour chaque groupe social, les motivations des décisions individuelles de migration et analyse les conséquences de la démarche migratoire sur les sociétés d'accueil. Les auteurs soulignent l'importance de la socialisation en réseau et notent l'européanisation accrue de certains de ces réseaux. Cette étude conclut qu'il n'est pas possible d'identifier une classe privilégiée d'Européens mobiles, puisque l'accès à la mobilité s'est considérablement démocratisé et ouvert à de nouvelles catégories socioprofessionnelles. En revanche, l'exercice du droit à la mobilité permet aux migrants européens de s'approprier la géographie européenne et de créer du territoire, ce qui pourrait anticiper l'émergence d'une société européenne.