Suchergebnisse

AbstractIn a competitive dynamic durable good market where sellers have private information about quality, I identify certain inefficiencies that arise due to heterogeneity in buyers' valuations. Even if the market induces dynamic sorting among sellers and all goods are eventually traded, inefficiency can arise because high valuation buyers buy early when low‐quality goods are sold, while high‐quality goods are allocated to low valuation buyers that buy later. This misallocation adds to the inefficiency caused by delay in trading. Under certain circumstances, high‐quality goods may never be traded as in a static market.

We analyze the effect of transparency of past trading volumes in markets where an informed long-lived seller can repeatedly trade with short-lived uninformed buyers. Transparency allows buyers to observe previously sold quantities. In markets with intraperiod monopsony (single buyer each period), transparency reduces welfare if the ex ante expected quality is low but improves welfare if the expected quality is high. The effect is reversed in markets with intraperiod competition (multiple buyers each period). This discrepancy in the efficiency implications of transparency is explained by how buyer competition affects the seller's ability to capture rents, which, in turn, influences market screening. (JEL D40, D82, D83, G14, L15)

Purpose
This study aims to examine the impact of multidimensional perfectionism on academic procrastination among university students in India and to explore whether gender plays any role in this relationship.


Design/methodology/approach
Data were collected from a sample of 90 female and 60 male students, aged 18-23 years, enrolled in full-time bachelor's and master's programs in a central university in the National Capital Region of India and analyzed adopting different statistical techniques.


Findings
The findings indicated that academic procrastination positively correlates with all the three dimensions of perfectionism – self-oriented perfectionism, other-oriented perfectionism and socially prescribed perfectionism. The different dimensions of perfectionism also significantly predict academic procrastination. Gender differences exist with regard to other-oriented perfectionism, socially prescribed perfectionism and academic procrastination.


Research limitations/implications
The results highlight that the different dimensions of perfectionism play a critical role in shaping academic procrastination among university students, but this trajectory often differs between male and female students. Further research among a larger student audience would help concretize the study conclusions.


Originality/value
This study extends the extant literature by examining the predictive relationships between the different dimensions of perfectionism and academic procrastination and the gender differences that exist with regard to academic procrastination and the different dimensions of perfectionism among university students, especially within the context of a developing country (i.e., India).

Abstract In a two‐country Hotelling type duopoly model of price competition, we show that parallel import (PI) policy can act as an instrument of strategic trade policy. The home firm's profit is higher when it cannot price discriminate internationally if and only if the foreign market is sufficiently bigger than the domestic one. The key mechanism in the model is that the home firm's incentive to keep its domestic price close to the optimal monopoly price affects its behavior during price competition abroad. We also analyze the welfare implications of PI policies and show that our key insights extend to quantity competition.

Abstract.  We investigate the nature of trading and sorting induced by the dynamic price mechanism in a competitive durable good market with adverse selection and exogenous entry of traders over time. The model is a dynamic version of Akerlof (1970). Identical cohorts of durable goods, whose quality is known only to potential sellers, enter the market over time. We show that there exists a cyclical equilibrium where all goods are traded within a finite number of periods after entry. Market failure is reflected in the length of waiting time before trade. The model also provides an explanation of market fluctuations. JEL classification: D82A propos des marchés de biens durables quand il y a entrée de nouveaux commerçants et sélection adverse.  Les auteurs analysent la nature du commerce et du triage engendrés par le mécanisme dynamique des prix dans un marché concurrentiel de biens durables quand il y a sélection adverse et entrée exogène de nouveaux commerçants dans le temps. Ce modèle est une version dynamique du modèle d'Akerlof (1970). Des cohortes identiques de biens durables, dont la qualité est connue seulement des vendeurs potentiels, arrivent sur le marché dans le temps. Il semble qu'il y ait plus de commerce actif que ce qui est prévu par un modèle statique. En particulier, on montre qu'il existe un équilibre cyclique où tous les biens sont transigés à l'intérieur d'un nombre fini de périodes après leur arrivage et que, à chaque phase du cycle, l'éventail de qualité des biens transigés s'accroît. Les commerçants qui transigent des produits de plus haute qualité attendent plus longtemps et l'imperfection du marché se traduit par la longueur de temps d'attente avant la transaction. Le modèle fournit aussi une explication des fluctuations du marché.