Ordinally Bayesian incentive compatible probabilistic voting rules
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 114, S. 11-27
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In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 114, S. 11-27
In: Statistica Neerlandica: journal of the Netherlands Society for Statistics and Operations Research, Band 75, Heft 3, S. 324-342
ISSN: 1467-9574
A new estimation method is proposed founded upon a nonlinear conjugate gradient‐type algorithm having an efficient line search technique for cure rate models with competing risks, which are subject to elimination. An extensive simulation study is carried out to compare the performance of the proposed algorithm with some existing algorithms, including other conjugate gradient‐type algorithms and the expectation maximization algorithm. For this purpose, it is assumed that the initial competing risks follow an exponentially weighted Poisson distribution. In particular, it is shown that that the proposed algorithm produces estimates that are more accurate and efficient (i.e., the bias and root mean square errors are smaller), specifically with respect to the parameters related to the cure rate. Although for the purpose of simulation study an exponentially weighted Poisson competing risks distribution is assumed, the proposed algorithm incorporates a generic framework that can accommodate any competing risks distribution. Finally, a real data application is provided.
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In: JME-D-22-00027
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In: Group decision and negotiation
ISSN: 1572-9907
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We consider voting rules on a multidimensional policy space for a continuum of voters with elliptic preferences. Assuming continuity, gamma -strategy-proofnessmeaning that coalitions of size smaller or equal to a small number gamma cannot manipulateand unanimity, we show that such rules are decomposable into one-dimensional rules. Requiring, additionally, anonymity leads to an impossibility result. The paper can be seen as an extension of the model of Border and Jordan (1983) to a continuum of voters. Contrary, however, to their finite case where single voters are atoms, in our model with nonatomic voters even a small amount of strategy-proofness leads to an impossibility.
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In: YGAME-D-22-00498
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In: JME-D-23-00458
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In: Asian Journal of Mathematical Sciences, 2018; 2(1):08-13
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In: International Journal of Electrical Engineering & Technology, Band 11(2), S. 121-128
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