Suchergebnisse

The hypothesis that parties are better able to carry out mandates in Britain than the United States is tested for the Reagan and Thatcher years. A list of specific pledges was compiled and it was determined whether or not the pledges were fulfilled. The primary finding is that more Conservative party pledges were fulfilled, compared to those of the Republican and Democratic parties in the United States. In each country policy took a conservative turn, but because more pledges were fulfilled in Britain, the 'Conservative revolution' was more thorough there than in the United States. It is suggested, in contrast to the findings of previous literature, that institutional differences between the two countries are one factor that matters when it comes to bringing about policy change.

The hypothesis that parties are better able to carry out mandates in Britain than the United States is tested for the Reagan and Thatcher years. A list of specific pledges was compiled and it was determined whether or not the pledges were fulfilled. The primary finding is that more Conservative party pledges were fulfilled, compared to those of the Republican and Democratic parties in the United States. In each country policy took a conservative turn, but because more pledges were fulfilled in Britain, the "Conservative revolution" was more thorough there than in the United States. It is suggested, in contrast to the findings of previous literature, that institutional differences between the two countries are one factor that matters when it comes to bringing about policy change. (British Journal of Political Science / FUB)

Abstract Despite considerable interest in comparative fiscal policy in general, and the high salience of tax policy and tax reform in the industrialized democracies, there are relatively few cross–national studies of the economic and political correlates of revenues over time. We undertake a cross–national time series study of revenue growth in fourteen OECD countries between 1958 and 1990.We test a number of political and economic hypotheses about revenue change, including political business cycle, 'fiscal illusion', elasticity, and ideological theories. For the 1958—1990 period, we find that all countries, regardless of revenue structure, experience higher real revenue growth as a result of inflation, but that revenue growth is more responsive to unemployment in countries that rely more on direct taxes compared to countries with less direct–tax reliance. We find that this effect is most pronounced in the post–1972 period. We also find that revenue tends to increase in the years following elections, consistent with the idea that governments try to minimize the political fallout from tax increases by separating them as much as possible from election campaign periods; this effect, too, is most pronounced in the post–1972 period. We find no support for 'fiscal illusion' and ideological theories of revenue growth.

Despite considerable interest in comparative fiscal policy in general, and the high salience of tax policy and tax reform in the industrialized democracies, there are relatively few cross-national studies of the economic and political correlates of revenues over time. We undertake a cross-national time series study of revenue growth in fourteen OECD countries between 1958 and 1990. We test a number of political and economic hypotheses about revenue change, including political business cycle, 'fiscal illusion', elasticity, and ideological theories. For the 1958-1990 period, we find that all countries, regardless of revenue structure, experience higher real revenue growth as a result of inflation, but that revenue growth is more responsive to unemployment in countries that rely more on direct taxes compared to countries with less direct-tax reliance. We find that this effect is most pronounced in the post-1972 period. We also find that revenue tends to increase in the years following elections, consistent with the idea that governments try to minimize the political fallout from tax increases by separating them as much as possible from election campaign periods; this effect, too, is most pronounced in the post-1972 period. We find no support for 'fiscal illusion' and ideological theories of revenue growth. (European Journal of Political Research / FUB)

The ability of parties to carry out campaign pledges is a central theme of democratic theory. While many scholars have viewed US parties as weak and ineffective, recent studies have suggested that the US system is surprisingly effective. We suggest that previous studies have not presented a clear picture of the relative success of each party under a variety of circumstances - i.e. `who gets what, when?'. We investigate each party's success in economic policy under united and divided government by analyzing fulfillment of the 384 economic policy pledges in both parties' platforms of 1976, 1980, 1984 and 1988. We conclude that institutional control is fairly predictive of the relative success of the parties, although other factors are also influential. We find that, contrary to the assumption of some studies, the president's party does not have an advantage in overall economic policy unless it has some congressional control as well.

Abstract. Roubini and Sachs provided the first systematic test of the idea that political structure the size, composition, diversity, and/or stability of a governing cabinet ‐ is related to budget deficits. In this paper, we take issue with several of Roubini and Sachs' choices concerning data and operationalization, and argue that their approach cannot offer clear conclusions about the relationship between national political structure and budget deficits. We test the 'strength of government' hypothesis using central government finance data on 16 countries, 1959–1990. We measure deficits in a way that maximizes comparability across countries but avoids the potential problems of standardizing by GDP. We examine carefully the definition and measurement of 'strength of government', in light of recent theoretical and empirical work in comparative politics. We perform pooled time‐series regression analysis of deficit change in 16 OECD countries for the period 1959–1990. We argue that while structural differences between governments may have little impact on deficits during good economic times, they may become especially noticeable and influential during periods when governments struggle to cope with severe economic problems.

Roubini and Sachs provided the first systematic test of the idea that political structure - the size, composition, diversity and/or stability of a governing cabinet - is related to budget deficits. In this paper, we take issue with several of Roubini and Sachs' choices concerning data and operationalization, and argue that their approach cannot offer clear conclusions about the relationship between national political structure and budget deficits. We test the "strength of government" hypothesis using central government finance data on 16 countries, 1959-1990. We measure deficits in a way that maximizes comparability across countries but avoids the potential problems of standardizing by GDP. We examine carefully the definition and measurement of "strength of government", in light of recent theoretical and empirical work in comparative politics. We perform pooled time-series regression analysis of deficit change in 16 OECD countries for the period 1959-1990. We argue that while structural differences between governments may have little impact on deficits during good economic times, they may become especially noticeable and influential during periods when governments struggle to cope with severe economic problems. (European Journal of Political Research / AuD)

Intro -- Contents -- Preface -- One. Why Comparative Research on the Fulfillment of Election Pledges Matters / Elin Naurin, Terry J. Royed, and Robert Thomson -- Two. A Systematic Research Design for Studying the Fulfillment of Election Pledges / Terry J. Royed, Elin Naurin, and Robert Thomson -- Three. The Pledges That Parties Make: A Comparative Analysis / Robert Thomson, Elin Naurin, and Terry J. Royed -- Four. A Comparative Analysis of Pledge Fulfillment / Robert Thomson, Elin Naurin, and Terry J. Royed -- Five. The United Kingdom / Terry J. Royed -- Six. The United States / Terry J. Royed, J. Norman Baldwin, and Stephen A. Borrelli -- Seven. Canada / François Pétry and Dominic Duval -- Eight. Spain / Joaquín Artés -- Nine. Portugal / Marco Lisi, Catherine Moury, and Ana M. Belchior -- Ten. Sweden / Elin Naurin -- Eleven. Ireland / Robert Thomson, Rory Costello, and Edwina Love -- Twelve. Italy / Catherine Moury, Nicolò Conti, and Jorge M. Fernandes -- Thirteen. Germany / Mark J. Ferguson -- Fourteen. Austria / Katrin Praprotnik and Laurenz Ennser-Jedenastik -- Fifteen. The Netherlands / Robert Thomson -- Sixteen. Bulgaria / Petia Kostadinova -- Seventeen. Making and Keeping Pledges: What We Have Learned / Terry J. Royed, Elin Naurin, and Robert Thomson -- References -- Contributors -- Index.

Offering the final word in a continuing exchange that began with the authors' criticism (2002) of G. Bingham Powell & Guy D. Whitten's (1993) original analysis of the role of "clarity of responsibility" in economic voting & extended through multiple comments & rebuttals, it is argued that Harvey D. Palmer & Guy D. Whitten's (2003) most recent contribution only serves to distract readers from the main issue, ie, whether there is solid evidence supporting the importance of clarity of responsibility in voting behavior. Additional points of contention are addressed, arguing that this is much more than what Palmer & Whitten (2003) classify "a debate about the philosophy of scientific inquiry.". K. Hyatt Stewart