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The article presents the experience of methodological and cultural-historical reconstruction of one of the main works of I. Kant "Critique of Pure Reason". The author outlines the problems associated with difficulties in understanding this work: what is the general idea of "Critique of Pure Reason", how to understand reason, different sources of knowledge, things in themselves, and finally, a combination of rational and sacred arguments. The author shows that Kant relies on the pictures of reality of Aristotle and Nicholas of Cusa, rethinking them, and also analyzes the works of Galileo, which made it possible to make a conviction in the priority of a priori ideas. A hypothesis is formulated about how Kant understood the mind: culturally, following the Enlightenment. The main strategies of thought are outlined, with the help of which Kant creates "Critique of Pure Reason", while his ideas are compared with the views of Aristotle and Nicholas of Cusa. These include: rethinking transcendental ideas (not similarities and mathematics like those of Nicholas of Cusa), but thinking through the conditions of conceivability, reflection of the foundations of knowledge (this is the critique of reason); the introduction of schematisms of thinking, as explaining the connection between a priori ideas and intuitions; a special interpretation of mind and reason, allowing them to include rules, categories and ideas; projection of the rethought ways of thinking of philosophers onto the mind (for example, Kant transfers to the mind the ability to build a system of scientific knowledge, which he borrowed from E.B. de Condillac); elucidation of the conditions of conceivability, they allowed Kant to find the mind as a whole and to find out the condition of contemplation and action of the mind (according to Kant, these are "self-consciousness" or the idea of the "synthetic unity of apperception").

The article presents the experience of building an epistemological space of communication of the concepts of the philosophy of science. Based on his experience of teaching philosophy of science at three universities, the author raises the question of the conditions for building such a space. One condition is the analysis of different approaches to constructing the concepts of science. The second is the correction of one's own approach and understanding of science, which would take into account other approaches to the study of science and the results obtained in them. The concepts of K. Popper, T. Kuhn, S. Toulmin, I. Lakatos are chosen for correction. In addition, the author's concept of science is presented, carried out within the framework of the cultural-historical approach and general methodology. The author distinguishes two start-ups of science - the ancient one, where the 'genome of science' is formed, and the new European one, in which science and its genome function as an 'institution of modernity' are presented. He shows that in the construction of the theory of science, an important role is played by problems arising in culture, their resolution with the help of schemes, the construction of ideal objects based on schemes and logic requirements, which allow building a theoretical discourse, solving problems within its framework, comprehending empirical material. The methodological analysis made it possible to state that the development of science is not only a law-like process, due to the change of cultures, personality traits of scientists and forms of understanding science ("conceptualization" of science), but also a singular process in which each historical step in the development of science brings unique features with it. (they can be described, but cannot be subsumed under the concepts of 'law' or 'regularity'). These provisions correspond to the ideas about science by Popper, Kuhn, Toulmin and Lakatos. At the same time, the author shows that they set themselves the task of explaining scientific revolutions or the historical development of science, but they took modern natural science as the ideal of science, often referred to the situation of the formation of modern science to illustrate these processes, and replaced the historical study of science by constructing it as a constant mechanism.

The article discusses the current situation in mathematics, which is interpreted as a crisis. The problems that allow making such a conclusion are considered: the question of the scientific status of mathematics, the possibility of its substantiation, the mental or experimental nature of mathematics, the time of its formation. The author presents the results of the genesis of geometry, the generalization of which makes it possible to assert that mathematics, on the one hand, can be considered a kind of empirical science, on the other, a constructive scientific discipline, in which more complex ideal objects are created on the basis of initial ideal objects and knowledge. Two different understandings of the foundations of mathematics are considered - general scientific and David Hilbert's, as well as what paradoxes are in science and how they are removed. The author is inclined to believe that antinomies in mathematics cannot be eliminated once and for all, their source is attributing inconsistent characteristics to objects of mathematics, which is due to the very structure of mathematics. The fact is that the construction of ideal objects of mathematics proceeds under the influence of at least four areas: the empirical area, describing which mathematicians create initial ideal objects and knowledge; areas of design based on the original more complex ideal objects; areas of geometric theorem proofs; area of construction of the theory of geometry. In addition, here it is necessary to add the concept of the foundation of mathematics by D. Hilbert, and also take into account that there are different concepts of the foundation of mathematics. At the end of the article, the features of the current crisis in mathematics and the possible direction of its resolution are discussed.

The article analyzes the discussion by political scientists and some Russian intellectuals of the ideas of the Moscow Methodological Circle (MMC), whose representatives are accused of arming the modern government with inadequate methodology, trying to control it, almost ideologically preparing a special military operation. The author separates two main directions of methodology - philosophical research and applying it into practice, arguing that the accusations relate primarily to the second direction, in addition, he argues that there is no single methodology, there are different groups of methodologists with different views and tasks. In order to develop criteria for understanding and evaluating the discussion, a reconstruction of the evolution of the views and concepts of the MMC is proposed: from the first program for the study of thinking, through the program for constructing the theory of activity and mental activity, to organizational activity games (OAG) and the concepts of management and OLM (organization, leadership, management). At the same time, the influence of Marxist ideas, which led to the reduction of sociality and management to activity, is demonstrated. The nature of the OAG is discussed. At the end of the article, the achievements of methodology are characterized, which the author refers to the "golden fund of methodology", obtained in the framework of philosophical research. The study is accompanied by an analysis of the positions of methodologists and their critics, as well as social situations that predetermined the development of methodology. In particular, they point to the crisis of socialism in the USSR, the weakening of ideological pressure, the expansion of freedom, and the expansion of the activity of philosophers and scientists. According to the author, the main methodological schemes for reforming sociality were created at the MMC (Moscow Methodological Circle) without a serious study of sociality, which was used by some political scientists and ambitious intellectuals, blaming methodologists, attributing imperious intentions and goals to them. As the author shows, everything is much more complicated, it is necessary to take into account both the difference in methodological views, and the division of methodology into two directions, as well as the political context influencing it.

The article proposes to move from the principle of objectivity of scientific knowledge to the reconstruction of different situations of knowledge production. To do this, it is first shown that this principle does not work in the humanities and social sciences and has partially ceased to work in natural science (in the field of micro and macro phenomena). A scheme of the genesis of the principle of objectivity is outlined (the need to substantiate knowledge in the natural sciences, the proposals of Kant and Hume). As an alternative to the principle of objectivity, a reconstruction of different situations of knowledge production is proposed, containing two plans: including an external position, on the assumption that we know how everything really happened, and a borrowed one, in which the concept of cognition of those subjects that are subject to analysis is characterized. To demonstrate the logic of this reconstruction, several situations of the production of new knowledge are considered: using schemes (Plato's work), ideas about thinking (Aristotle), mathematics and experiment (Galileo), interpretations of the researcher (Z. Bauman). Criteria for the truth and effectiveness of new knowledge, which differ significantly in the natural and human sciences, are discussed. For the natural sciences, it is a mathematical description of the processes and mechanisms of a certain natural phenomenon, as well as an experiment that makes it possible to calculate and predict, and create engineering structures. For the humanities, it is an interpretation of a phenomenon that ensures its understanding and use in certain audiences. Since the social sciences are focused on solving two problems at once (the ability to calculate and predict social processes and to comprehend (understand) the social actors who initiated these processes and act in them), insofar as the criteria of authenticity and effectiveness in the social sciences partially coincide with the criteria of the natural sciences indicated here, partly humanitarian.

The article presents a detailed response to the new book of the philosopher Oleg Bazaluk "Discursive Thinking through Education". The problem of understanding Plato's terms is discussed, in connection with which the author of the article expresses the idea that the correct reconstruction of the statements of ancient philosophers allows not only to choose the necessary values from the existing ones, but also to set new ones; at the same time, he believes, understanding the narratives of a foreign culture (or one's own, but cultivating a different type of thinking) is quite possible, however, the condition for this is a change in one's own consciousness, which, figuratively speaking, must be re-educated through the methodology and practice of historical and cultural thinking. The author reconstructs the picture of the world that Plato built and the ontological foundations taken by Bazaluk as the basis of his research and constructions. The author of the article raises the questions why the author of the book took the project of Plato as a basis, who began to doubt it even in antiquity, and also whether knowledge of the cosmos and its evolution can help in building a good society and sociality, as well as make a person happy. Special attention is paid to the issue of Bazaluk's reconstruction of the evolution of the cosmos and the support of the discursive thinking of education on the knowledge and results obtained in this reconstruction. A number of questions and problems are discussed here: what the author of the book understands by education, what are the features of his reconstruction of the evolution of the cosmos, if it is possible to deepen his understanding of the basic reality (matter) in the direction of taking into account not only the first nature, but also the second. Evaluating the book, the author of the article proceeds from the understanding of Bazaluk's work as a tradition and discourse that implements at least three principles: Plato himself, Russian cosmism, and the cognitive approach, which is popular nowadays. The author of the article understands his response as a benevolent discussion of the book, calling on other readers to do the same.