STATLEGE ORGANISASJONARS AUTONOMI: NORGE I KOMPARATIVT PERSPEKTIV
In: Stat & styring, Band 18, Heft 1, S. 31-34
ISSN: 0809-750X
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In: Stat & styring, Band 18, Heft 1, S. 31-34
ISSN: 0809-750X
In: Scandinavian political studies: SPS ; a journal, Band 31, Heft 1, S. 1-26
ISSN: 0080-6757
In: Scandinavian political studies, Band 31, Heft 1, S. 1-26
ISSN: 1467-9477
This article describes the regulatory agencies in Norway as part of the population of state agencies by focusing on who controls and what is controlled and how. The authors analyze whether regulatory agencies are regulated and controlled to different degrees, by different external actors, and in different ways than other agencies, and on whether this control focuses on different aspects. They also examine whether the variation in regulation and control according to type of agency task is sustained if one controls for structural and cultural features. The empirical basis is a broad survey of Norwegian state agencies carried out in 2004, and the theoretical approaches embrace a task-specific, a structural-instrumental and a cultural-institutional perspective. The authors find that regulatory tasks represent a major activity for state agencies in Norway and that external control by both the executive and the legislative bodies of agencies is rather significant. Moreover, in contrast to what one would expect, given current regulatory orthodoxy, regulatory agencies are controlled to a larger extent than other agencies. Adapted from the source document.
In: International public management journal, Band 10, Heft 4, S. 387-413
ISSN: 1559-3169
The literature on autonomous public agencies often adopts a top‐down approach, focusing on the means with which those agencies can be steered and controlled. This article opens up the black box of the agencies and zooms in on their CEO's and their perceptions of hierarchical accountability. The article focuses on felt accountability, denoting the manager's (a) expectation to have to explain substantive decisions to a parent department perceived to be (b) legitimate and (c) to have the expertise to evaluate those decisions. We explore felt accountability of agency‐CEO's and its institutional antecedents with a survey in seven countries combining insights from public administration and psychology. Our bottom‐up perspective reveals close connections between de facto control practices rather than formal institutional characteristics and felt accountability of CEO's of agencies. We contend that felt accountability is a crucial cog aligning accountability holders' expectations and behaviors by CEO's.
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In: Governance: an international journal of policy and administration, Band 34, Heft 3, S. 893-916
ISSN: 1468-0491
AbstractThe literature on autonomous public agencies often adopts a top‐down approach, focusing on the means with which those agencies can be steered and controlled. This article opens up the black box of the agencies and zooms in on their CEO's and their perceptions of hierarchical accountability. The article focuses on felt accountability, denoting the manager's (a) expectation to have to explain substantive decisions to a parent department perceived to be (b) legitimate and (c) to have the expertise to evaluate those decisions. We explore felt accountability of agency‐CEO's and its institutional antecedents with a survey in seven countries combining insights from public administration and psychology. Our bottom‐up perspective reveals close connections between de facto control practices rather than formal institutional characteristics and felt accountability of CEO's of agencies. We contend that felt accountability is a crucial cog aligning accountability holders' expectations and behaviors by CEO's.
In: Administration & society, Band 53, Heft 8, S. 1232-1262
ISSN: 1552-3039
In contemporary public governance, leaders of public organizations are faced with multiple, and oftentimes conflictual, accountability claims. Drawing upon a survey of CEO's of agencies in seven countries, we explore whether and how conflictual accountability regimes relate to strategic behaviors by agency-CEO's and their political principals. The presence of conflictual accountability is experienced as a major challenge and is associated with important behavioral responses by those CEO's. This article demonstrates empirically how conflictual accountability is related to (a) controlling behaviors by principals, (b) constituency building behaviors by agencies, and (c) a general pattern of intensified contacts and information processing by both parties.
In contemporary public governance, leaders of public organizations are faced with multiple, and oftentimes conflictual, accountability claims. Drawing upon a survey of CEO's of agencies in seven countries, we explore whether and how conflictual accountability regimes relate to strategic behaviors by agency-CEO's and their political principals. The presence of conflictual accountability is experienced as a major challenge and is associated with important behavioral responses by those CEO's. This article demonstrates empirically how conflictual accountability is related to (a) controlling behaviors by principals, (b) constituency building behaviors by agencies, and (c) a general pattern of intensified contacts and information processing by both parties.
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