Suchergebnisse

Civil war dynamics and outcomes are shaped by processes of change largely unaccounted for in current studies. This examination explores how the fragmentation of combatants, especially the weaker actors, affects the duration and outcomes of civil wars. Some results of a computational modelling analysis are consistent with the article's expectations, several of them are counterintuitive. They show that when combatants fragment, the duration of war does not always increase and such wars often end in negotiated agreements, contrasting with the expectations of literatures on spoilers, moderates and extremists. Empirical cases, such as Iraq, Congo, Chechnya and the Sudan, illustrate the importance of fragmentation. This study demonstrates the value of accounting for diverse changes in actors and circumstances when studying the dynamics of war.

Does the ethnic dimension of violence—religious versus tribal—shape whether individuals perceive national versus local issues as central? Based on survey data collected in Jos, Nigeria—a site of recurring ethnic violence since 2001—this paper argues that attribution to local versus national causes varies depending on whether individuals perceive the violence as religious or tribal. We also show that this has implications for peacebuilding, as views of the ethnic dimensions of violence also distinctly shape attitudes regarding national- versus local-level solutions. Broadly, this paper demonstrates the importance of a more nuanced approach to the study of ethnic conflict—specifically, the need to interrogate how perceptions of identity, conflict, and the locus of conflict interrelate.

We consider whether the fragmentation of combatants during civil war has downstream effects on the durability of peace following civil wars. We contend that the splintering of combatant groups, a primary manifestation of rebel group fragmentation, produces potential spoiler groups that are neither incidental nor unimportant in the process of civil war resolution. Making connections to the spoiling and credible commitment literatures, we hypothesize that rebel splintering hastens the recurrence of civil wars. Using event history modeling and propensity score matching to analyze two different civil war datasets, we examine whether the occurrence of fragmentation during a civil war influences the length of peace after the civil war. The empirical analysis of fragmentation events during civil wars since World War II offers support for the hypothesis that splintering decreases the duration of post-civil war peace. The results suggest the need to pay closer attention to the dynamics of fragmentation, and particularly how these dynamics lead to future consequences – even when those consequences take place after the war has concluded. For example, governments that attempt to splinter groups or to use existing fragmentations within rebel groups to end a civil war may encourage the unintended consequence of shorter peace duration.

Studies find that members of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) are less likely to be involved in militarized conflict. An expectation of continuing amicable trade relations is among the factors linking PTAs to peace. However, this role of PTAs is difficult to test due to the problem of observational equivalence; PTAs correlate with trade levels and liberalization, factors also linked to peace. In this article, we isolate the impact of PTAs on trade expectations by distinguishing between signed agreements and those in force. A focus on signed but not-yet-in-force PTAs allows us to assess the correlation between agreements and peace before other pacifying, and therefore potentially confounding, elements emerge. Statistical tests spanning 1957 to 2000 demonstrate that signed PTAs are pacifying, while in-force agreements have no statistically significant impact when controlling for other factors linked to peace. (International Interactions (London)/FUB)

Civil war dynamics and outcomes are shaped by processes of change largely unaccounted for in current studies. This examination explores how the fragmentation of combatants, especially the weaker actors, affects the duration and outcomes of civil wars. Some results of a computational modelling analysis are consistent with the article's expectations, several of them are counterintuitive. They show that when combatants fragment, the duration of war does not always increase and such wars often end in negotiated agreements, contrasting with the expectations of literatures on spoilers, moderates and extremists. Empirical cases, such as Iraq, Congo, Chechnya and the Sudan, illustrate the importance of fragmentation. This study demonstrates the value of accounting for diverse changes in actors and circumstances when studying the dynamics of war. (British Journal of Political Science/ FUB)

This analysis examines the link between 'indirect rivalry factors' – situations in which states are neighbors of direct US rivals, and/or states that share rivalries in common with the US – and allocations of foreign aid to shed light on the impact of strategic calculations on a key area of foreign policy behavior. Blending literatures on rivalry/conflict and foreign aid, the study is situated in the relevant prior work and a theory is developed that links indirect rivalry factors with allocations of foreign aid. It is argued that indirect rivalry factors are likely to affect a state's foreign assistance as states in a rivalry strategically allocate aid to create friends and isolate their targeted rivals. In particular, it is argued that donors direct greater amounts of aid to (i) other states involved in a rivalry with the donor's rivals (rivalries in common, or 'rivals of my rival' effects) and (ii) states within the geographic region in which the donor's existing rivals are situated (neighborhood effects, or 'neighbors of rivals'). Hypotheses on the effects of these indirect rivalry factors on aid allocations are developed and then tested empirically against US foreign aid allocations from 1962 to 2000. The results lend support to the authors' theory of indirect rivalry factors and their impact on aid allocation.