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This article advances a theory of responsibility attributions in which such judgments are rooted in considerations of intensity and comparability. Informed by insights from the study of attitudinal ambivalence, the article contributes to the attribution literature in three important ways. First, we propose a new technique for measuring responsibility judgments, one that explicitly incorporates information about intensity and comparability into a single scale. Second, from a methodological standpoint, we demonstrate that our new measures of comparative responsibility ratings have greater construct validity than traditional ratings-based measures and outperform them as predictors of political evaluations. More substantively, we show that comparative responsibility ratings are politically consequential and strongly influenced presidential approval, presidential vote choice, and congressional vote choice in the United States during the 2012 elections.

This article analyzes the effects of value‐driven ambivalence and group attachment on response variability in public attitudes toward campaign finance reform. The analysis demonstrates that group attachment, when activated by affective cues, moderates the effects of ambivalence on response variability. By tipping the balance of considerations in one direction or the other, group attachments make it easier for ambivalent respondents to make tradeoffs between competing values during policy choices and, as a result, dampen response variability. Methodologically, the results offer an important cautionary note about the use of linear ambivalence scales by calling into question the assumption that indifference is an intermediate state between preference and ambivalence.

The concept of responsibility lies at the heart of theories of democratic accountability. This article represents the first attempt to explicitly model attributions of presidential versus congressional responsibility for the economy. The article investigates the extent to which contextual and individual‐level factors influence citizens' attributions of responsibility for the economy and how, in turn, such judgments shape their political evaluations. Employing a multinomial probit model of attributional choice, I find that responsibility judgments are shaped to varying degrees by economic ideology, perceptions of institutional context, and partisanship, although the effects of partisanship are not uniform across political parties. The results demonstrate that responsibility attributions are politically consequential and moderate the effects of economic perceptions on presidential and congressional approval. Finally, the results suggest that the effects of responsibility attributions in the sanctioning process are not invariant across the target of institutional evaluation.