Suchergebnisse

Climate Finance -- Frontmatter -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Foreword: NYU Abu Dhabi and the Sustainable Environment -- Summary of Key Findings and Recommendations -- About the Contributors -- Part I. Climate Change and Mitigation: Overview and Key Themes -- 1. Climate Finance for Limiting Emissions and Promoting Green Development: Mechanisms, Regulation, and Governance -- 2. Understanding the Causes and Implications of Climate Change -- 3. T e Climate Financing Problem: Funds Needed for Global Climate Change Mitigation Vastly Exceed Funds Currently Available -- 4. The Future of Climate Governance: Creating a More Flexible Architecture -- Part II. Proposals for Climate Finance: Regulatory and Market Mechanisms and Incentives -- A. Trading or Taxes? -- 5. Cap-and-Trade Is Preferable to a Carbon Tax -- B. Reforming the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM ) -- 6. Expectations and Reality of the Clean Development Mechanism: A Climate Finance Instrument between Accusation and Aspirations -- C. Sectoral Programs for Emissions Control and Crediting -- 7. Why a Successful Climate Change Agreement Needs Sectoral Elements -- 8. Sectoral Crediting: Getting the Incentives Right for Private Investors -- 9. Forest and Land Use Programs Must Be Given Financial Credit in Any Climate Change Agreement -- 10. Stock-and-Flow Mechanisms to Reduce Land Use, Land Use Change, and Forestry Emissions: A Proposal from Brazil -- D. Leveraging Trading to Maximize Climate Benefits -- 11. Mitigating Climate Change at Manageable Cost: Th e Catalyst Proposal -- 12. Engaging Developing Countries by Incentivizing Early Action -- E. Linking Trading Systems -- 13. Carbon Market Design: Beyond the EU Emissions Trading Scheme -- F. Investor Perspectives -- 14. Incentivizing Private Investment in Climate Change Mitigation -- 15. Investment Opportunities and Catalysts: Analysis and Proposals from the Climate Finance Industry on Funding Climate Mitigation -- Part III. Bringing Developed and Developing Countries Together in Climate Finance Bargains: Trust, Governance, and Mutual Conditionality -- A. Meeting Developing Country Climate Finance Priorities -- 16. Developing Country Concerns about Climate Finance Proposals: Priorities, Trust, and the Credible Donor Problem -- 17. Developing Countries and a Proposal for Architecture and Governance of a Reformed UNFCCC Financial Mechanism -- 18. Climate Change and Development: A Bottom-Up Approach to Mitigation for Developing Countries? -- 19. Operationalizing a Bottom-Up Regime: Registering and Crediting NAMAs -- B. Conditionality and Its Governance -- 20. From Coercive Conditionality to Agreed Conditions: The Only Future for Future Climate Finance -- 21. Getting Climate-Related Conditionality Right -- 22. Making Climate Financing Work: What Might Climate Change Experts Learn from the Experience of Development Assistance? -- Part IV. National Policies: Implications for the Future Global Climate Finance Regime -- 23. Climate Legislation in the United States: Potential Framework and Prospects for International Carbon Finance -- 24. The EU ETS: Experience to Date and Lessons for the Future -- 25. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Mitigation Measures in China -- 26. Cities and GHG Emissions Reductions: An Opportunity We Cannot Afford to Miss -- 27. A Prototype for Strategy Change in Oil-Exporting MENA States? The Masdar Initiative in Abu Dhabi -- Part V. Climate Finance and World Trade Organization (WTO) Law and Policy -- 28. The WTO and Climate Finance: Overview of the Key Issue -- 29. Carbon Trading and the CDM in WTO Law -- 30. Countervailing Duties and Subsidies for Climate Mitigation: What Is, and What Is Not, WTO-Compatible? -- 31. Border Climate Adjustment as Climate Policy -- 32. Enforcing Climate Rules with Trade Measures: Five Recommendations for Trade Policy Monitoring -- 33. Carbon Footprint Labeling in Climate Finance: Governance and Trade Challenges of Calculating Products' Carbon Content -- Part VI. Taxation of Carbon Markets -- 34. Fiscal Considerations in Curbing Climate Change -- 35. Tax and Efficiency under Global Cap-and-Trade -- 36. Tax Consequences of Carbon Cap-and-Trade Schemes: Free Permits and Auctioned Permits -- Afterword: Reflections on a Path to Effective Climate Change Mitigation -- Abbreviations -- Index

This paper examines the Global Climate Action Agenda (GCAA) and discusses options to improve sub‐ and non‐state involvement in post‐2020 climate governance. A framework that stimulates sub‐ and non‐state action is a necessary complement to national governmental action, as the latter falls short of achieving low‐carbon and climate‐resilient development as envisaged in the Paris Agreement. Applying design principles for an ideal‐type orchestration framework, we review literature and gather expert judgements to assess whether the GCAA has been collaborative, comprehensive, evaluative and catalytic. Results show that there has been greater coordination among orchestrators, for instance in the organization of events. However, mobilization efforts remain event‐driven and too little effort is invested in understanding the progress of sub‐ and non‐state action. Data collection has improved, although more sophisticated indicators are needed to evaluate climate and sustainable development impacts. Finally, the GCAA has recorded more action, but relatively little by actors in developing countries. As the world seeks to recover from the COVID‐19 crisis and enters a new decade of climate action, the GCAA could make a vital contribution in challenging times by helping governments keep and enhance climate commitments; strengthening capacity for sub‐ and non‐state action; enabling accountability; and realizing sustainable development.

This paper examines the Global Climate Action Agenda (GCAA) and discusses options to improve sub- and non-state involvement in post-2020 climate governance. A framework that stimulates sub- and non-state action is a necessary complement to national governmental action, as the latter falls short of achieving low-carbon and climate-resilient development as envisaged in the Paris Agreement. Applying design principles for an ideal-type orchestration framework, we review literature and gather expert judgements to assess whether the GCAA has been collaborative, comprehensive, evaluative and catalytic. Results show that there has been greater coordination among orchestrators, for instance in the organization of events. However, mobilization efforts remain event-driven and too little effort is invested in understanding the progress of sub- and non-state action. Data collection has improved, although more sophisticated indicators are needed to evaluate climate and sustainable development impacts. Finally, the GCAA has recorded more action, but relatively little by actors in developing countries. As the world seeks to recover from the COVID-19 crisis and enters a new decade of climate action, the GCAA could make a vital contribution in challenging times by helping governments keep and enhance climate commitments; strengthening capacity for sub- and non-state action; enabling accountability; and realizing sustainable development.

This paper examines the Global Climate Action Agenda (GCAA) and discusses options to improve sub- and non-state involvement in post-2020 climate governance. A framework that stimulates sub- and non-state action is a necessary complement to national governmental action, as the latter falls short of achieving low-carbon and climate-resilient development as envisaged in the Paris Agreement. Applying design principles for an ideal-type orchestration framework, we review literature and gather expert judgements to assess whether the GCAA has been collaborative, comprehensive, evaluative and catalytic. Results show that there has been greater coordination among orchestrators, for instance in the organization of events. However, mobilization efforts remain event-driven and too little effort is invested in understanding the progress of sub- and non-state action. Data collection has improved, although more sophisticated indicators are needed to evaluate climate and sustainable development impacts. Finally, the GCAA has recorded more action, but relatively little by actors in developing countries. As the world seeks to recover from the COVID-19 crisis and enters a new decade of climate action, the GCAA could make a vital contribution in challenging times by helping governments keep and enhance climate commitments; strengthening capacity for sub- and non-state action; enabling accountability; and realizing sustainable development.