Suchergebnisse

The question, "Who wins in House-Senate conferences?" has largely been answered for recent Congresses. But the question, "Why does the Senate win?" has not been adequately answered. The research reported here presents and tests some necessary conditions of a theory that provides an answer to this question. The Senate wins because it is most frequently the second acting chamber and, because it has constitutionally derived power over House decisions, giving it the capacity to get the adjustments it makes in House bills accepted in conference. In the minority of cases in which the Senate acts first, the House "wins" in conference. Unlike earlier attempts to explain conference outcomes, the theory proposed here is consistent with the overall pattern of House dominance in the legislative process.

Some conditions under which simple social-psychological processes may affect collective (committee) decisions in legislative settings are investigated. While rational choice theory predicts that social-psychological effects will be canceled, randomized, or corrected by communication, recurring conditions under which such factors influence individual decisions are posited. A general approach for identifying strategic misperception is then presented & discussed in terms of its ability to predict: (1) the intensity with which committee members pursue alternatives, & (2) the effects of abstention, bandwagon voting, persuasion, & log-rolling. Further research into the comparing models based on fixed preferences (rational choice) & strategic misperception, however, is needed to determine which approach provides the most accurate explanation of the collective decision-making process. 6 Tables, 16 References. Modified HA

This paper concerns the relationship between voters and corrupt politicians. An explanation is suggested for why voters would discount even credible information that a candidate is corrupt. Then the results of an experiment designed to test a necessary condition in this explanation are reported. The principal implication of this exploratory study is that corrupt elected officials are immune from electoral reprisal because voters rather easily trade off the information that a candidate is corrupt in return for other things they value in the candidate.