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"For much of American history, the federal government has played a limited role in local police regulation. That all changed in 1994, when Congress passed a little known statute that permitted the US Attorney General to reform troubled police department. Since then, many of the nation's largest police departments - including those in Los Angeles, Chicago, Seattle, Washington, DC, Seattle, New Orleans, Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Cleveland, and Albuquerque - have been subject to federal oversight. But until recently, we've known little about how this federal process works. Drawing on original interviews, court documents, statistical data, and media reports, this book provides the first comprehensive account of federal intervention in American police departments. It shows that, under the right circumstances, federal intervention is uniquely effective at combating misconduct in police departments. However, federal intervention is far from perfect. This book concludes by arguing that Congress should expand and improve federal oversight of policing"--

Congress passed the Death in Custody Reporting Act in 2014, which created a national database on civilian deaths caused by law enforcement. The Federal Bureau of Investigations and the Bureau of Justice Statistics have subsequently also announced new efforts to collect data on the frequency of deadly encounters between law enforcement and civilians. This Article explores how the federal government could use these newly amassed datasets to reduce police violence. This Article makes two contributions. The first Part of the Article argues that data alone will be insufficient to bring about widespread reform in local police departments. By making these datasets publicly available, the federal government could incentivize some police departments to prioritize reductions in police violence. But even when faced with troubling statistical trends, there is no guarantee that some of the nation's most problematic law enforcement agencies will voluntarily make expensive policy and procedural reforms. Thus, the second Part of the Article considers some ways that the U.S. Attorney General could harness these new datasets to improve the use of federal civil rights litigation against local police departments. Under 42 U.S.C. § 14141, the Attorney General has the power to seek equitable relief against police departments engaged in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional misconduct, including excessive uses of force. By using this data, the Attorney General can incrementally improve the enforcement of § 14141 in a way that incentives local police departments to implement reforms aimed at reducing officer violence.

In 1994, Congress passed 42 U.S.C. §14141, a statute authorizing the United States Attorney General to seek equitable relief against local and state police agencies that are engaged in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional misconduct. Although police departments in some of the nation's largest cities have now undergone this sort of structural reform litigation, there has been little empirical research on the topic. Drawing on original interviews, court documents, statistical data, and media reports, this dissertation describes the federal government's use of structural reform litigation in American police departments and theorizes on its effectiveness. It shows that, under the right circumstances, structural reform litigation is uniquely effective at combating misconduct in police departments. It forces local municipalities to prioritize investments into police misconduct regulations. It utilizes external monitoring to ensure that frontline officers substantively comply with top-down mandates. And it provides police executives with legal cover to implement wide-ranging reforms aimed at curbing misconduct. Although expensive, structural reform litigation may ultimately pay for itself through reducing a police department's civil liability. But structural reform litigation is far from a perfect regulatory mechanism. Successful organizational reform requires continual support from municipal leaders, dedication by executives within the targeted agency, and buy-in by frontline officers. This suggests that structural reform litigation alone is insufficient to transform a law enforcement agency. The financial burden of structural reform litigation falls on local police agencies over a relatively short period of time. Additional questions remain about whether targeted agencies will sustain reforms after federal intervention ends and about whether this type of federal intervention makes officers less aggressive. This dissertation concludes by showing how the lessons from structural reform litigation can inform future regulations of law enforcement.

Across the political spectrum, politicians, commentators, and activists frequently invoke federal funding as a lever to induce changes in local police behavior. But can federal funding function as an effective policy lever at the local level? Is federal funding or the threat of defunding a sufficiently strong tool to effectuate deeply contentious policy goals over local opposition? This Essay conducts an empirical examination of federal funding for local and state police agencies in the United States. It finds that the federal government remains a relatively minor contributor to local police budgets. We find that federal funding only reaches a minority of local police agencies. Similarly, federal funds account, on average, for a relatively small percentage of what the typical American municipality spends on policing each year. Overall, our findings suggest that most American law enforcement agencies are not acutely reliant on federal funding. These findings have several important implications for the literature on police reform and accountability. First, efforts to use the lever of federal funding to alter the behavior of local police departments may be ineffective. This may be particularly true when the reform demanded by federal lawmakers is expensive or unpopular locally. In such cases, rational local leaders may assess that the risk of losing federal funding is preferable to change demanded by federal lawmakers. Second, our findings suggest that federal lawmakers may be better off considering alternative paths other than the withholding of federal funds in promoting constitutional policing. To this point, we briefly lay out some additional avenues for federal police reform that do not rely on leveraging limited federal funds. Finally, our findings reinforce the fact that the ongoing debate about defunding police departments and reimagining public safety must occur primarily at the local, not federal level.

Across the political spectrum, politicians, commentators, and activists frequently invoke federal funding as a lever to induce changes in local police behavior. But can federal funding function as an effective policy lever at the local level? Is federal funding or the threat of defunding a sufficiently strong tool to effectuate deeply contentious policy goals over local opposition? This Essay conducts an empirical examination of federal funding for local and state police agencies in the United States. It finds that the federal government remains a relatively minor contributor to local police budgets. We find that federal funding only reaches a minority of local police agencies. Similarly, federal funds account, on average, for a relatively small percentage of what the typical American municipality spends on policing each year. Overall, our findings suggest that most American law enforcement agencies are not acutely reliant on federal funding. These findings have several important implications for the literature on police reform and accountability. First, efforts to use the lever of federal funding to alter the behavior of local police departments may be ineffective. This may be particularly true when the reform demanded by federal lawmakers is expensive or unpopular locally. In such cases, rational local leaders may assess that the risk of losing federal funding is preferable to change demanded by federal lawmakers. Second, our findings suggest that federal lawmakers may be better off considering alternative paths other than the withholding of federal funds in promoting constitutional policing. To this point, we briefly lay out some additional avenues for federal police reform that do not rely on leveraging limited federal funds. Finally, our findings reinforce the fact that the ongoing debate about defunding police departments and reimagining public safety must occur primarily at the local, not federal level.