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This paper compares the use of the notion of 'shame' in the criminological theory of John Braithwaite and the theory of civilising processes elaborated by Norbert Elias. It examines Braithwaite's suggestion that there are some deep 'resonances' between Elias's work and his own and concludes that their work diverges considerably, not only in terms of their fundamental understanding of the meaning of shame itself, but also in terms of their broader theoretical assumptions and perspectives, their inten tions and the uses to which their work might be put.

Abstract.  Empirical evidence indicates that, in countries with low inflation rates, a permanent decrease in inflation rate either has no impact on capital stock and output (superneutrality) or causes them to fall moderately. Existing budget arithmetic models of monetary policy cannot deliver superneutrality. In this paper, we conduct a budget arithmetic analysis of monetary policy using a money demand specification – money in the utility function – that is new to this literature. We find that one simple assumption about utility from money delivers superneutrality, while a more general assumption delivers departures from superneutrality in the direction consistent with the evidence. JEL classification: E60, E13

Cover -- Contents -- Abstract -- I. Introduction -- II. Model -- A.Basic Setup: Banks, Depositors, Loans -- B.Return Distributions on Loans -- Base Returns and Random Schocks Thereto -- Determinants of Base Loan Returns: Manager Competence -- C. Bank Interconnectedness (Asset Portfolio Diversification) -- D. Liquidation of Loans -- III. Construction an Equilibrium -- A.Information -- B. The Liquidation Decision -- C. The Diversification Decision -- D. The "Firing" Decision -- When is the Decision Nontrivial? -- The Manager Replacement Decision When it is Not Trivial -- Looking for an Equilibrium in Which Both Banks Replace their Managers -- E. Optimal Regulation -- F. Characterizing Equilibria -- G. Interpretations and Assumptions -- H. Summary of the Baseline Example -- Specification -- Laissez Faire Equilibria -- Equilibria Under Government Regulation -- IV. Conclusions -- Tables -- Table 1. Marginal and Joint Base Loan Return Distributions -- Figures -- Figure 1. Timeline of the Model -- Appendixes -- Appendix A: Two Issues -- Appendix B: The Baseline Numerical Example -- References -- References.

In this paper the authors study the stability properties of the alternative steady-state equilibria that arise in a neoclassical production model that delivers pleasant monetarist arithmetic. They show that if the government's monetary policy rule involves a fixed money supply growth rate, then "pleasant arithmetic" steady states—steady states from which a permanent increase in the money growth and inflation rates is associated with a permanent decrease in the real interest rate and a permanent increase in the level of output—are dynamically stable.