Suchergebnisse

Abstract
In the literature on European Contract Law and German contract law, a number of authors claim that the free movement of goods (Article 28 EC), services (Article 49 EC), capital (Article 56 EC) and persons (Article 39 EC) guarantee party autonomy and freedom of contract. In this paper, the opposite will be argued. It is submitted that 'freedom of contract is taken for granted' within the European Union. However, it is also generally accepted that there are restraints to freedom of contract to protect societal interests, as for instance protection of weaker parties, the environment and the capital market. Thus, the real question concerns the balance between on the one hand, freedom of contract and, on the other, restrictions to freedom of contract.
The issue whether freedom of contract is a constitutionally protected right within the European Union is relevant, since if freedom of contract is taken as point of departure '… collective interests [are put] to the background'.
In order to show that the free movements do not guarantee freedom of contract, first, the origin of the claim that the free movements guarantee party autonomy will be explored and will be placed against a historical background. Then, it will be discussed to what extent the Treaty provisions reflect the idea that the free movements guarantee freedom of contract and whether it can be inferred from the ECJ case law.

On 28 March 2003 the Amsterdam Institute for Private Law organized a conference named ?European Constitutionalization of Private Law?. The aim of this conference was to discuss the influence of European constitutional public law on (national) private legal systems. To do so, speakers from the area of private law and European public law were invited.
Although, there is no formal European Constitution, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) considers the European Treaties the ?constitutional charter? of the European Communities in its Les verts-decision. The heart of this substantive constitution is the internal market and the core thereof are competition rules and the free movement of goods, services, capital and persons. The ECJ has guaranteed the application of these European rules by the development of the doctrines of direct effect and supremacy of European law.

Abstract: This paper investigates the Green Paper's proposals for the revision of the Consumer Acquis from the angle of public consultation. The Green Paper asks many abstract questions; however, the crucial question of whether Europe needs and/or wants a European Consumer Code has not been addressed. The rhetorical use of leading questions seems to lean in one direction, which is a horizontal instrument embracing maximum harmonization. The imperatives of the Green Paper are highly political and not merely technical, as the Commission seems to suggest. Only two policy–oriented goals are mentioned, yet others need to be identified and pursued, such as the appropriate level of consumer protection. First, this paper adopts a critical methodological enquiry to examine the Commission's leading questions technique, as well as indicates that the presentation of its report on the outcome of public consultation is not entirely neutral. Next, the option of a horizontal instrument is discussed more fully. It would seem that more empirical evidence is required to convince us of that such an instrument is workable and effective. Finally, the appropriate level of harmonization – minimum or maximum – is investigated. Arguments against 'full targeted harmonization' are given. It is suggested that the Commission is not telling us the full story.
Résumé: Les propositions du Papier Vert pour la révision de l'acquis communautaire seront examinées dans cet article sous l'angle de la consultation publique. Le Papier Vert pose beaucoup de questions abstraites, mais ne pose pas celle, cruciale, qui consiste à savoir si l'Europe a besoin et/ou souhaite un Code européen de la consommation. L'utilisation d'une technique de rhétorique semble conduire dans une seule direction, à savoir l'adoption d'un instrument horizontal englobant l'harmonisation maximale. Les impératifs du Papier Vert sont hautement politiques et pas simplement techniques, comme la Commission le laisse entendre. Seuls deux buts politiquement orientés sont mentionnés, alors qu'il est nécessaire d'identifi er et poursuivre d'autres, tel le degré approprié de protection des consommateurs. D'abord, une analyse critique et méthodologique sera entreprise pour examiner la technique de la Commission consistant à poser des questions directives. Nous constatons également que la présentation de l'issue de la consultation publique faite par la Commission dans son rapport est loin d?être neutre. Ensuite, l'option de l'instrument horizontal sera considérée plus en profondeur. Il semblerait qu'il faille apporter davantage de preuves empiriques afi n de nous convaincre qu'un tel instrument sera opérationnel et effectif. Enfi n, le degré approprié – minimal ou maximal – de protection des consommateurs sera étudié. Des arguments contre l'harmonisation ciblée et maximale seront discutés. Il nous semble que la Commission ne nous révèle pas toute l'histoire.
Zusammenfassung: Dieser Beitrag untersucht die Vorschläge im Grünbuch über die Überprüfung des gemeinschaftlichen Besitzstands im Verbraucherschutz aus Sicht einer öffentlichen Konsultation. Das Grünbuch wirft viele abstrakte Fragen auf. Dagegen wird die entscheidende Frage, ob nämlich Europa ein Europäisches Verbrauchergesetzbuch überhaupt braucht, nicht gestellt. Di