Suchergebnisse

The capacity of Myanmar's government to effectively rule and administer peripheral areas of the country has been challenged since independence by a vast array of non-state armed groups (NSAGs), and the country is home to the most long-lasting insurgencies still active today. The core interest of this article rests on analysing the degree of continuity and change in the strategy enacted by Myanmar's government in order to counter, contain and re-absorb insurgencies in the wake of the recent liberalisation process. The government activity vis-à-vis insurgencies is assessed in two core dimensions: economic and military. The analysis is developed in diachronic perspective, spanning three key phases. The first, meant to provide the essential historical background and benchmark, is the post-1989 period, characterised by the implementation of the ceasefires. The other two focus on the current transition, splitting it into two (2008–2011 and 2011–2015), taking Thein Sein's new peace plan as a turning point. Moving through these three phases the paper assesses how Myanmar's government achieves a balance between military pressure and economic incentives in the face of three major insurgencies: in Shan state, versus various NSAGs; against the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO); and against the Karen National Union (KNU).

The capacity of Myanmar's government to effectively rule and administer peripheral areas of the country has been challenged since independence by a vast array of non-state armed groups (NSAGs), and the country is home to the most long-lasting insurgencies still active today. The core interest of this article rests on analysing the degree of continuity and change in the strategy enacted by Myanmar's government in order to counter, contain and re-absorb insurgencies in the wake of the recent liberalisation process. The government activity vis-à-vis insurgencies is assessed in two core dimensions: economic and military. The analysis is developed in diachronic perspective, spanning three key phases. The first, meant to provide the essential historical background and benchmark, is the post-1989 period, characterised by the implementation of the ceasefires. The other two focus on the current transition, splitting it into two (2008–2011 and 2011–2015), taking Thein Sein's new peace plan as a turning point. Moving through these three phases the paper assesses how Myanmar's government achieves a balance between military pressure and economic incentives in the face of three major insurgencies: in Shan state, versus various NSAGs; against the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO); and against the Karen National Union (KNU).

Chapter 1. Introduction: protecting merchant vessels from pirates -- Chapter 2. Piracy and counter-piracy in the Twenty-first century -- Chapter 3. From divergence to isomorphism in vessel protection policy: a theoretical framework -- Chapter 4. Privateers versus pirates? The United Kingdom case -- Chapter 5. Vessel protection in the Netherlands: a belated commercialisation? -- Chapter 6. From hybrid to commercial vessel protection: the Italian case -- Chapter 7. Vessel protection in other European countries -- Chapter 8. Open registries and vessel protection: Panama, Liberia and the Marshall Islands -- Chapter 9. Isomorphic convergence in vessel protection -- Chapter 10. Conclusion: vessel protection between private and maritime security studies.

In 2011, the growing number of pirate attacks prompted several flag states to authorise the use of armed guards aboard vessels. Despite facing the same threat, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Italy have adopted three distinct approaches to securing their merchant ships, ranging from the exclusive use of private security companies (PSCs) to the employment of military personnel only. This article conducts a congruence testing of the main theoretical explanations for the use of PSCs on land against UK, Dutch and Italian vessel protection policies. By relying on sequencing as a technique for theoretical synthesis, we develop a multicausal explanation of states' vessel protection arrangements, showing the varying influence of functionalist, ideational, organisational and political drivers of security privatisation at different phases of the policy process.

In 2011, the growing number of pirate attacks prompted several flag states to authorise the use of armed guards aboard vessels. Despite facing the same threat, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Italy have adopted three distinct approaches to securing their merchant ships, ranging from the exclusive use of private security companies (PSCs) to the employment of military personnel only. This article conducts a congruence testing of the main theoretical explanations for the use of PSCs on land against UK, Dutch and Italian vessel protection policies. By relying on sequencing as a technique for theoretical synthesis, we develop a multicausal explanation of states' vessel protection arrangements, showing the varying influence of functionalist, ideational, organisational and political drivers of security privatisation at different phases of the policy process.