Suchergebnisse

In Al-Skeini v the United Kingdom, the European Court on Human Rights clarified the scope ratione loci of the European Convention on Human Rights. Without fully abandoning the territorial concept of jurisdiction, which it had affirmed in the 2001 Bankovic decision, the Court inched somewhat closer to the personal model of jurisdiction. After Al-Skeini, an ECHR Contracting State's exercise of public powers over a given territory, even in the absence of full effective control, may bring persons present in that territory within the State's jurisdiction. The Court did not, however, pronounce itself on the applicability of the ECHR in case (agents of ) a Contracting State exercise governmental authority over persons abroad without exercising public powers over the territory where these persons are located.

This article focuses on the dialogue between the Russian Federation and the European Union based on "common values" (legal sphere and the rule of law), which form the framework for the EU-Russia "common spaces" — on the economy, freedom, security and justice, as well as in the field of research and education (including cultural aspects). The author analyses the current state of the EU-Russia dialogue (section 1), East-West cooperation in the framework of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (section 2), and the position of the Council of Europe member states on the European Court for Human Rights (section 3). The author comes to a conclusion that the concept of "common values" is to a great degree fictitious, and its viability depends on whether Russia behaves as a European country. The complete internalisation of democratic values, human rights, and good governance is still unattainable for the Russian Federation, which uses the platform of common values predominantly to achieve strategic goals (section 4).

It is generally considered that an international organization ('IO') has an international legal personality which is distinct from that of its Member States, as a result of which the IO itself, rather than the Member States, is to be held responsible for the IO's internationally wrongful acts.1 It appears to be an accepted principle that Member States cannot generally be held liable for the acts of IOs by virtue of their membership of an IO alone. This view can be found in a 1996 resolution of the Institut de Droit International, which provides that 'there is no general rule of international law whereby States members are, due solely to their membership, liable, concurrently or subsidiarily, for the obligations of an international organization of which they are members.'2 This is echoed in the International Law Commission's ('ILC') Commentary to article 62 of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations ('ILC DARIO'): 'It is clear that … membership does not as such entail for member States international responsibility when the organization commits an internationally wrongful act'.3 The ILC holds the view that only in the case of an intervening act by a Member State that influences the commission of a wrongful act by the IO (aid and assistance, direction and control, coercion, avoidance of compliance, acceptance) could the Member State be held responsible.4