EUROPESE UNIE - Rusland en de Europese Unie: onmogelijke zoektocht naar gedeelde waarden
In: Internationale spectator, Band 66, Heft 9, S. 424-429
ISSN: 0020-9317
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In: Internationale spectator, Band 66, Heft 9, S. 424-429
ISSN: 0020-9317
In: Baltic Region, Heft 4, S. 90-98
This article focuses on the dialogue between the Russian Federation and the European Union based on "common values" (legal sphere and the rule of law), which form the framework for the EU-Russia "common spaces" — on the economy, freedom, security and justice, as well as in the field of research and education (including cultural aspects). The author analyses the current state of the EU-Russia dialogue (section 1), East-West cooperation in the framework of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (section 2), and the position of the Council of Europe member states on the European Court for Human Rights (section 3). The author comes to a conclusion that the concept of "common values" is to a great degree fictitious, and its viability depends on whether Russia behaves as a European country. The complete internalisation of democratic values, human rights, and good governance is still unattainable for the Russian Federation, which uses the platform of common values predominantly to achieve strategic goals (section 4).
In: The international & comparative law quarterly: ICLQ, Band 60, Heft 4, S. 997-1016
ISSN: 1471-6895
It is generally considered that an international organization ('IO') has an international legal personality which is distinct from that of its Member States, as a result of which the IO itself, rather than the Member States, is to be held responsible for the IO's internationally wrongful acts.1 It appears to be an accepted principle that Member States cannot generally be held liable for the acts of IOs by virtue of their membership of an IO alone. This view can be found in a 1996 resolution of the Institut de Droit International, which provides that 'there is no general rule of international law whereby States members are, due solely to their membership, liable, concurrently or subsidiarily, for the obligations of an international organization of which they are members.'2 This is echoed in the International Law Commission's ('ILC') Commentary to article 62 of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations ('ILC DARIO'): 'It is clear that … membership does not as such entail for member States international responsibility when the organization commits an internationally wrongful act'.3 The ILC holds the view that only in the case of an intervening act by a Member State that influences the commission of a wrongful act by the IO (aid and assistance, direction and control, coercion, avoidance of compliance, acceptance) could the Member State be held responsible.4
In: Studia diplomatica: Brussels journal of international relations, Band 64, Heft 2, S. 99-99
ISSN: 0770-2965
In: Netherlands international law review: NILR ; international law - conflict of laws, Band 57, Heft 3, S. 481-494
ISSN: 1741-6191
In: Internationale spectator, Band 64, Heft 11, S. 587-592
ISSN: 0020-9317
In: The military law and the law of war review: Revue de droit militaire et de droit de la guerre, Band 47, Heft 2, S. 377-399
ISSN: 2732-5520
In: European journal of international law, Band 19, Heft 5, S. 1035-1053
ISSN: 1464-3596
In: European journal of international law, Band 19, Heft 5, S. 1035-1053
ISSN: 0938-5428
World Affairs Online
In: Chinese Journal of International Law, Band 7, Heft 3, S. 625-658
SSRN
In: Netherlands yearbook of international law: NYIL, Band 38
ISSN: 1574-0951
In: European company and financial law review: ECFR, Band 4, Heft 3
ISSN: 1613-2556
In: European Company and Financial Law Review, Band 4, Heft 3
SSRN
In: The British yearbook of international law
ISSN: 2044-9437
Abstract
The US is increasingly weaponizing economic sanctions to push through its foreign policy agenda. Making use of the centrality of the US in the global economy, it has imposed 'secondary sanctions' on foreign firms, which are forced to choose between trading with US sanctions targets or forfeiting access to the lucrative US market. In addition, the US has penalized foreign firms for breaching US sanctions legislation. In this contribution, it is argued that the international lawfulness of at least some secondary sanctions is doubtful in light of the customary international law of jurisdiction, as well as conventional international law (eg, WTO law). The lawfulness of these sanctions could be contested before various domestic and international judicial mechanisms, although each mechanism comes with its own limitations. To counter the adverse effects of secondary sanctions, third states and the EU can also make use of, and have already made use of, various non-judicial mechanisms, such as blocking statutes, special purpose vehicles to circumvent the reach of sanctions, or even countermeasures. The effectiveness of such mechanisms is, however, uncertain.
In: Netherlands international law review: NILR ; international law - conflict of laws, Band 66, Heft 3, S. 537-553
ISSN: 1741-6191
Abstract
This article provides an analysis of the Dutch Supreme Court judgment in the Mothers of Srebrenica case, placing it in its context, and comparing it with earlier and related decisions, in particular the judgments in the cases of Nuhanović and Mustafić. The Mothers of Srebrenica is a foundation established to represent the interests of the approximately 6000 surviving relatives of the victims of the fall of Srebrenica during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia (1995). The foundation holds the Netherlands responsible for not having done enough to protect the victims of the Srebrenica genocide. This contribution addresses the attribution of the conduct of the United Nations peacekeeping contingent to the troop-contributing State (the Netherlands), followed by the wrongfulness of the peacekeepers' conduct and the State's attendant liability for damages suffered by the victims. It is argued that the Dutch State's international responsibility was only engaged because of the exceptional circumstances present in Srebrenica at the time. In the ordinary course of events, the liability of troop-contributing States is unlikely to be engaged if the Supreme Court's review standard were to be applied.