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The fight against money laundering has taken center stage in the global arena. The European Union (EU), in line with various international organizations, plays an active role in the fight against this crime and promotes anti money laundering directions to its member states. The statistics regarding Portugal (a member of the EU since 1986) indicate that it lags behind most of the EU members in terms of reporting of suspicions of money laundering. This paper adopts a game theory approach to study the efficiency of the combat against money laundering in Portugal, both with regard to the financial and the non financial sector of the economy. Additionally, the paper studies the impact of the increase of sanctions, as recommended by the 4th Directive 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20th May of 2015, on that combat. The results show that the low probability of the institutions being caught (and fined) for not complying with their reporting duties, coupled with the low conviction rates for money laundering crimes, justifies the reduced number of suspicious transactions reported. The findings highlight that an increase of sanctions, on both financial and non financial institutions, would tend to augment the efficiency of the combat against money laundering in Portugal.

In this paper we investigate the impact of firms' pricing policies upon entry and welfare under duopoly price competition and product differentiation. We consider a model where an incumbent serves two distinct and independent geographical markets and an entrant may enter in one of the markets. Our results show that discriminatory pricing may be either more, less or equally favorable to entry than uniform pricing. The welfare effect of banning price discrimination is also ambiguous. However, the case for banning price discrimination is much weaker than under monopoly. Interestingly, discriminatory pricing may yield higher welfare even when entry occurs only under uniform pricing.

The fight against money laundering has taken center stage in the global arena. The European Union (EU), in line with various international organizations, plays an active role in the fight against this crime and promotes anti money laundering directions to its member states. The statistics regarding Portugal (a member of the EU since 1986) indicate that it lags behind most of the EU members in terms of reporting of suspicions of money laundering. This paper adopts a game theory approach to study the efficiency of the combat against money laundering in Portugal, both with regard to the financial and the non financial sector of the economy. Additionally, the paper studies the impact of the increase of sanctions, as recommended by the 4th Directive 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20th May of 2015, on that combat. The results show that the low probability of the institutions being caught (and fined) for not complying with their reporting duties, coupled with the low conviction rates for money laundering crimes, justifies the reduced number of suspicious transactions reported. The findings highlight that an increase of sanctions, on both financial and non financial institutions, would tend to augment the efficiency of the combat against money laundering in Portugal.

The governance challenge of management succession is critical in the family firms. This paper provides insight on the role that the emotional factors as well as the founder's governance approach, have on successor selection in family firms. The successor selection is studied using game theory. The paper models games for both approaches of the founder towards successor selection and then compares both. The results demonstrate that the emotional factors determine the successor outcome. The founder's governance approach is essential to ensure firm continuity as well as secure that his preferred successor is indeed appointed successor. This is one of only few studies investigating family firm succession using game theory, and the first, to the best of our knowledge, to include the emotional factors as variables in the analysis. This paper also contributes to analytically demonstrate the importance of the founder adopting an activist approach to the succession process to ensure family firm intergenerational continuity.