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Criminal law efficiency is a concept often referred to but seldom defined. Clarity, the author argues, is necessary for finding practical solutions to fundamental challenges in this area of law, especially with the criminal justice system itself at risk. Tina Søreide offers views in contrast to mainstream ideas on optimal criminal law responses to corruption, with emphasis on the fundamental role of the criminal justice system in the fight against corruption, and the effect this can have on other mechanisms in society. Her analysis explains the concept of criminal law efficiency through economic approaches and why many criminal law responses to corruption are at risk of becoming 'façade strategies' that may, in fact facilitate corruption. Corruption and Criminal Justice offers insights into the obstacles that policymakers and government advisors cannot ignore. It serves as an invaluable resource for advanced students and academics interested in law, economics, and large corporations

This report provides an overview of arguments explaining the risk of corruption. Corrupt acts are subject to decision making authority and assets available for grabbing. These assets can be stolen, created by artificial shortage, or become available as the result of a market failure. Assets that are especially exposed to corruption include profits from the private sector, revenues from the export of natural resources, aid and loans, and the proceeds of crime. Whether or not opportunities for corruption are exploited depends on the individuals involved, the institution or society they are part of, and the law enforcement circumstances. Corruption usually persists in situations in which players are aware of the facts but nonetheless condone the practice. Absence of reaction can result from information asymmetries (in which the people who are supposed to act are not aware of the need to act), coordination failure, patronage-determined loyalty, and incentive problems at the political level. This review of results and insights from different parts of the scholarly literature on corruption focuses on areas where research can guide anticorruption policy. The report also describes a number of corruption-related challenges in need of more attention from researchers

AbstractInternational anticorruption treaties create an almost universal requirement that States sanction legal persons for the crime of foreign bribery. However, the vast majority of corporate foreign bribery cases are 'settled' between governments and firms. Analysing key anticorruption instruments and treaty body reports, it appears there is a dearth of express rules on settlements in international law but a qualified implicit endorsement of domestic settlement laws and practices. The international regime is investigated in terms of its move towards common standards for the use of settlements, and whether recommendations are consistent with stated objectives. The analysis discloses an irony: States and international organisations fail to clearly articulate their expectations on settlements, while calling for transparent, effective and predictable domestic settlement rules.

Around the world, journalists uncover corruption, abuse of power, and financial misdealing – often at the risk of serious consequences or under financial constraints. These are also important issues in economic research. Economists address similar problems from a different perspective, and offer logical explanations for the factors that enable a risk of corruption, its harmful impact on society, and why governments fail to enforce their anti-corruption laws. Below we discuss some of the problems of corruption and how investigative journalism contributes to controlling it. We are interested in what the disciplines of journalism and economics can learn from each other. The more authoritarian leaders weaken integrity standards in governance, the more financial secrecy providers facilitate grand scale crime; and the more barriers there are for journalists who seek to disclose misdealing, the more important it is to join forces across countries and across disciplines. ; publishedVersion

Abstract: Around the world, journalists uncover corruption, abuse of power, and financial misdealing – often at the risk of serious consequences or under financial constraints. These are also important issues in economic research. Economists address similar problems from a different perspective, and offer logical explanations for the factors that enable a risk of corruption, its harmful impact on society, and why governments fail to enforce their anti-corruption laws. Below we discuss some of the problems of corruption and how investigative journalism contributes to controlling it. We are interested in what the disciplines of journalism and economics can learn from each other. The more authoritarian leaders weaken integrity standards in governance, the more financial secrecy providers facilitate grand scale crime; and the more barriers there are for journalists who seek to disclose misdealing, the more important it is to join forces across countries and across disciplines.

Multi‐stakeholder groups – involving representatives from civil society, government and the private sector — are increasingly seen as a means of promoting improved service delivery and operational performance in natural‐resource sectors. Although the intention is to promote dialogue, learning and collaboration towards agreed goals and the implementation of standards for better sector governance and performance, the impact of these initiatives will be shaped by members' incentives and external constraints. This article describes how incentive incompatibilities will prevent the group from effectively addressing fundamental problems in the sectors, such as corruption. Multi‐stakeholder groups can be a viable forum for debate, but should not be expected to perform a role in fighting corruption in natural‐resource management.

Internationally, there is a trend toward a regulatory regime for corporate bribery with more emphasis on ex ante oversight and preventive systems, and less emphasis on investigations driven by suspected crime. Governments want the benefits associated with civil law regulation – including corporate self-regulation and the flexibility associated with non-trial resolutions, although such tools compromise values of criminal justice. In this article, we describe current legislative patterns and developments, and explain why governments need to learn from other areas of risk-based regulation, and establish a two-track regulatory regime consisting of a forward-looking administrative/civil law system with a focus on crime prevention and a backward-looking criminal law process for investigation of criminal incidents. A clearer institutional distinction between intrinsically different regulatory tasks will secure a more efficient regulation of corporate bribery and other forms of corporate misconduct.