Suchergebnisse

Emissions trading is becoming increasingly popular in environmental law. Allowances to trade emissions can either be auctioned off or handed out free of charge by means of grandfathering. Although grandfathering is frequently used in emissions trading schemes, it is a popular view in the economic and legal literature that grandfathering is inconsistent with the polluter-pays principle. We come to a different, more nuanced view. The question of whether polluters pay under grandfathering depends on how the polluter-pays principle is interpreted. We present a taxonomy of interpretations. Based on an efficiency interpretation of the principle, consistency is demonstrated by emphasizing the economic impact of the opportunity costs of gratis allowances and the lump sum nature of the subsidy that is inherent to grandfathering. Inconsistency can only be claimed based on an equity interpretation of the polluter-pays principle. Allocating allowances free of charge means that polluting firms receive a capital gift making their shareholders richer, which may be perceived as unfair. We draw two conclusions. First, contrary to what some have claimed, grandfathering is compatible with an efficiency interpretation of the polluter-pays principle. Second, only auctioning is consistent with an extended form of this principle. Auctioning ensures not only that pollution costs are internalized (efficiency), but also that producers buy their allowances before they pass on those costs to consumers (equity).

The chapter focuses on development financial institutions (DFIs) in Europe, that is public sector or government-invested legal entities with an explicit policy mandate to promote the socio-economic goals in a region, sector or specific market segment. DFIs play a relevant role in the economy, since they provide financial services to strategic sectors, sustain growth during period of recession, invest in physical and technological infrastructures. Besides, more recently, they are increasingly addressing their activity to yield social payoffs and positive externalities for society as a whole, such as stimulating technology innovation and channelling funds to long-term global societal challenges such as climate change, renewable and environmental-friendly energy, food security. In spite of their role in the economy, DFIs have not deserved a proper attention in the academic literature and they remain a quite under-analysed phenomenon. This chapter aims to fill this gap with a detailed analysis of firm-level characteristics and activities of contemporary European DFIs. Specifically, Section 2 introduces the phenomenon of development banks, explains the traditional theoretical framework where the existence of DFIs is discussed and why they represent a rising and important component of State Capitalism. Section 3 describes the characteristics of contemporary DFIs in Europe and discuss their growing role in funding innovation and supporting a response to global and new societal challenges. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis, which aims at discussing the role of DFIs as vehicles for state intervention in several sectors, with a specific focus on their strategic support to innovation. The dataset includes 132 entities, that is all the DFIs headquartered in Europe. Among them, 8 are sovranational, like the European Investment Banks, while the others are ultimately controlled by national (or even regional or local) governments. Economic and financial indicators are from Orbis, while information on DFIs mission, lending and funding activities, target industries and markets are collected case-by-case from annual reports, web sites and all public available information.

This paper explores the role of Development Financial Institutions (DFIs) in supporting innovation by facilitating the access to finance for start-ups and high-growth small and medium enterprises. After having mapped the population of DFIs in Europe, we benchmark their portfolio of equity deals to those of other European financial institutions (venture capital and private equity). We build a unique sample of European 12,437 M&As within the 2008–2017 period and for each target company we match the related patenting and economic data. We obtain a dataset of 80,713 yearly observations which allows us to empirically analyse the pre and post-deal patenting activity of companies targeted by both DFIs and other financial institutions. Our findings show that the target company patenting performance improves after receiving the support of financial institutions, and this effect is on average higher when DFIs participate to the equity deal. We also find that partnerships among DFIs and other financial institutions are associated with the best patenting performance of the target companies. These results are confirmed when a propensity score matching technique is adopted to address biases associated to the potential endogenous selection of the target company.

Italian State-owned enterprises (SOEs) continue to occupy a strategic position in the national economy. In 2013, their aggregate value added was equal to 17% of the Italian national GDP, and they counted for around 40% of the total Italian stock market capitalization. The present paper focuses on the top ten Italian SOEs over the period 2004-2013. A first overview of the changes in their internal and external environment suggests the crucial importance of institutional conditions and the lack of a coherent policy design for privatisation and regulation, as the timing and the intensity of the reforms has varied deeply among sectors. Nevertheless, contemporary Italian SOEs have been increasingly exposed to market incentives, and they seem nowadays more oriented to markets than to public values, with some remarkable divergences depending on the degree of public control and market liberalization. Our textual analysis of the SOEs' statutes reveals a total absence of direct references to a formal public mission. Social goals have been increasingly addressed by means of regulation, while only Ferrovie dello Stato and Poste Italiane are formally subject to the Universal Service Obligation. We also find that, on average, the management and performance of the Italian SOEs has improved and it holds the comparison with private and public European industry peers. Still, remarkable differences across markets and across sectors persist. Listed SOEs are largely profitable and distribute positive dividends to their shareholders. Among them, Eni, Enel and Finmeccanica have expanded their business internationally, though cross-border M&As. As a result, a high share of their revenues and employees originates out of Italy. This suggests that their strategies are no more committed to political goals, such as employment protection. Conversely, other SOEs are somehow compelled to maintain an informal public mission. Unlisted SOEs that provide universal services often incur in economic losses which are partly covered by public subsidies or by taxpayers.Nevertheless they also have modernized their management and expanded into new profitable markets, such as high speed train (FS) and financial and insurance services (Poste Italiane). SOEs managing networks have invested in national strategic infrastructures and their employees and revenues are largely domestic-based. Finally, aggregate data do not reveal strong divergences among the Italian SOEs and their industry peers in terms of employment policies and labor productivity, with some important divergences among SOEs operating in labor-intensive and capital-intensive sectors. In terms of investments in fixed assets we observe divergences among SOEs and private ones. The former have increased their investments in tangible assets over time, while investments by private industry peers have been negatively affected by the financial crisis.