Suchergebnisse

Contents -- List of Acronyms -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Chapter 1: Introduction -- References -- Part I: Origins of Globalization -- Chapter 2: Globalization Revisited -- Recent (and Not So Recent) Roots of Globalization -- Redefining Globalization -- Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 3: Protectionism and Global Production Networks -- Revisionists and Results-Oriented Trade -- Japanese FDI and Origins of Economic Globalization -- Globalizing the Production Networks: The Plaza Accord -- Conclusion -- References -- Part II: Consequences of Globalization -- Chapter 4: Globalization and Trade Stability -- Postwar Liberal Trade -- Explaining Protectionism and Liberal Trade -- Globalized Production and Trade Stability -- The Bizarre World of Sino-Japanese Relations -- Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 5: Globalization and Development -- The Demise of Heterodox Development Theories -- Globalization and Development -- Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 6: Globalization Under Siege: Inequality, Democracy, and Sovereignty -- Globalization Versus Sovereignty and Democracy -- Growth and Equity -- Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 7: Conclusion -- References -- References -- Index

It is a curious reality that despite being the second largest economic power, Japan has not cast a large shadow on issues of international politics. Instead, the Japanese government has been largely content to remain on the sidelines & play a reactive role. This broad depiction of Japanese foreign policy however obscures recent attempts by the Japanese government to pursue its own agenda on the international stage. This paper looks at Japanese dealings within the International Whaling Commission & in the field of regional finance to highlight a more activist foreign policy posture. In the end the picture that emerges is of a Japan that is prepared to vigorously articulate & defend a position that is of somewhat 'marginal' interest to its key international allies but unprepared to venture out on other critical issue areas. 26 References. Adapted from the source document.

The World Heritage Committee (WHC) works to protect sites of significant cultural & natural heritage. A strict selection process is followed to ensure that only universally significant sites are recognized in the WHC listing. Neutral scientific evidence is often employed to discourage the politicization of the decision-making process. In 1998, it was suggested that the WHC place Australia's Kakadu National Park on its list of endangered sites. However, the WHC decided to ignore scientific advice & Kakadu was not listed. This paper contends that neutral scientific evidence alone is insufficient, particularly when influential public interest groups from the site's home country are absent. Although in this particular situation, it is evident that the WHC took the easy path out of a potentially conflict-ridden situation, it is also obvious that the WHC made a decision to protect its own interests. It is likely that, in this case, the Australian government would have fought any decision by the WHC to place Kakadu on its list of endangered sites. Because of its decision, the WHC protected itself from the Australian government's noncompliance, an action that had the potential to be quite damaging to the worldwide heritage establishment. The Kakadu case is compared to that of Yellowstone National Park in the US. 24 References. K. A. Larsen

The author considers the impact of the East European democracy movement on some Asian countries and the possible impact of German reunification on Japan's domestic political structures. He suggests that recent events in Eastern Europe have had only a limited impact on democracy movements in China, Taiwan and South Korea. By contrast, and paradoxically, the future shape of the German political structure could have a much more significant impact on Japan's own political structures. (DÜI-Sen)