Green bonds as an instrument to finance low carbon transition
In: Economic change & restructuring, Band 54, Heft 3, S. 755-779
ISSN: 1574-0277
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In: Economic change & restructuring, Band 54, Heft 3, S. 755-779
ISSN: 1574-0277
In: Environmental and resource economics, Band 71, Heft 1, S. 241-257
ISSN: 1573-1502
In: Environmental and resource economics, Band 60, Heft 3, S. 349-370
ISSN: 1573-1502
In this paper we examine the formation of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs). We provide an analytical treatment of the main model used in the literature and offer a formal solution of it (which has not been available so far), while we clarify some misconceptions that exist in the literature. We find that the unique stable IEAs consist of either two, three or four signatories if the number of countries is greater than or equal to 5. Furthermore, we show that the welfare of the signatories of a stable IEA is very close to its lowest level vs the welfare of signatories of other non-stable IEAs. While in our model countries' choice variable is emissions, we extend our results to the case where the choice variable is abatement efforts.
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In: Environment and development economics, Band 14, Heft 5, S. 565-585
ISSN: 1469-4395
ABSTRACTThis paper examines the double dividend hypothesis in the presence of labour income uncertainty. Empirical evidence shows that uncertainty over labour income is particularly significant in developing, while not negligible in developed countries. Under uncertainty, and assuming incomplete capital markets, the tax system plays a role in providing social insurance, and a green tax reform influences its effectiveness. We show that the increase in environmental tax reduces consumption risk, while the balanced budget decrease in labour income tax increases income risk. We find that the total welfare effect of a green tax reform differs substantially from the case of certainty. The critical parameters determining the existence of a second dividend are the lump-sum transfers, the relative substitutability of the two goods for leisure, and the initial tax rates relative to their optimal that determine also the response of labour supply to a change in the tax mix.
In: FEEM Working Paper No. 23.2018
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Working paper
In: FEEM Working Paper No. 034.2015
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Working paper
In: Environmental and resource economics, Band 52, Heft 3, S. 347-368
ISSN: 1573-1502
We construct an overlapping generations model in which agents live through two periods; childhood and adulthood. Each agent makes choices only as an adult, based on her utility that depends on her own consumption and the human capital and environmental quality endowed to her offspring. Entering adulthood, agents choose randomly between two occupations: citizens and politicians. Citizens are the only producers of a single good and choose the proportion of their income to declare to the tax authorities. Politicians decide upon the allocation of the tax revenue between environmental protection and education activities, taking as given the rates of peculation in each activity. In this context, two self-fulfilling stable equilibria can emerge, one associated with high and another with low corruption. Corrupted politicians induce high levels of tax evasion, reducing total public funds and thus environmental protection activities. This result is in accordance with existing empirical evidence and implies that environmental policies may fail in corrupt countries where they are used as means of supporting rent seeking activities instead of protecting the environment. A higher level political authority could intervene and force the low corruption equilibrium by choosing the appropriate tax rate and, through institutional changes, the rates of peculation.
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In: FEEM Working Paper No. 46.2009
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