Suchergebnisse

I analyze a model of interest group influence on legislative voting through information transmission. The model shows how interest groups may craft different messages to target different winning coalitions in order to influence the outcome. If access to legislators is costly, then interest groups prefer to coordinate with allied legislators by providing them with information that helps them to persuade less sympathetic legislators. The model reconciles informational theories of lobbying with empirical evidence suggesting that interest groups predominantly lobby those who already agree with them. The model also makes new predictions about the welfare effects of interest group influence: From an ex ante perspective, informational lobbying negatively affects the welfare of legislators. The results highlight the need for more theories of persuasion that take collective choice institutions into account.

Abstract
In Global Environmental Politics ("Prisoners of the Wrong Dilemma: Why Distributive Conflict, Not Collective Action, Characterizes the Politics of Climate Change," 20 (4): 4–27), Michaël Aklin and Matto Mildenberger argue against the prevailing characterization of climate change cooperation as a problem of free riding or collective action. The authors argue that models of collective action imply, first, policy reciprocity and, second, inaction in the absence of formal agreements to limit free riding. They argue that neither empirical implication is supported by an review of states' climate policy to date. In this comment, we note that standard collective action models imply neither of the above hypotheses. As a result, the empirical tests advanced in the original article are uninformative as to the explanatory power of the collective action model for international climate politics.