Suchergebnisse

Die Herausforderungen in der mechanischen Vorreinigung lassen sich mit dem innovativen Digitalisierungsbaustein für den Harken-Umlaufrechen RakeMax* meistern.

AbstractWhy would incumbents undertake institutional reforms that constrain their discretion over state resources? Many studies point to electoral competition in response. They argue that incumbents who risk exit from office undertake reform to insure themselves against potentially hostile successors. This paper challenges this line of reasoning, arguing that it confounds two potential implications of electoral competition – potential and certain electoral losses – which yield contrary reform incentives. Certain exits from office may well incentivize reforms as insurance. Where elections are contested, however, incumbents face incentives to resist reforms that constrain discretion over state resources that provide incumbents with electoral advantage. This argument is developed and assessed with an institutional reform the literature has so far neglected: job stability protections (tenure) in politicized bureaucracies. A case analysis of the Dominican Republic and suggestive cross‐country data confirm theoretical predictions: electoral uncertainty dis‐incentivizes tenure reform. Electoral competition may thus be a double‐edged sword for institutional reform.

Introducing merit recruitment of public servants is a central good governance reform. To move towards merit in practice, legislation which mandates merit recruitment is considered a necessary but insufficient first step by many scholars and practitioners. Merit‐based civil service legislation should thus be sought before reform in practice. This article challenges this reasoning. It argues that merit laws are neither sufficient nor necessary: they leave the incumbent's possibility frontier for patronage and meritocracy in practice unaffected. Large‐ and small‐n evidence supports this assertion. Analyses of an original dataset of coded civil service legislation in 117 countries from 1975 to 2015 suggest that countries can attain meritocratic recruitment with and without legal merit requirements. Subsequently, a comparison of Paraguay and the Dominican Republic provides micro‐evidence for the underlying mechanism. Conventional wisdom about the sequencing of governance reforms in developing countries may thus be misleading: legal reform need not come first.

Public employment in most developing countries is governed by political patronage. Patronage provides many incumbents with governability and electoral advantage. What causes governments to forsake patronage in favour of civil service reform? This article reviews scholarly explanations. It finds that studies usefully identify diverse socioeconomic and political‐institutional factors which can affect reform incentives. The causal effects of these factors – their weight, mechanisms and signs – are contested, however. This article partially resolves this contestation by considering which reform studies explain: different bureaucratic structures develop asynchronously and feature different determinants. To illustrate, political competition is argued to incentivize reform to 'blanket in' party appointees; or do the opposite by reducing expectations to reap longer‐term state capacity benefits. Yet, 'blanketing in' necessitates bureaucratic job stability, while state capacity requires merit recruitment of skilled bureaucrats – two poorly correlated reforms. The causes of patronage reform thus depend on the type of civil service reform.

Merit-based selection of bureaucrats is central to state capacity building, yet rare in developing countries. Most executives instead favor patronage -political discretion- in public employment. This paper proposes and tests an original theory to explain when executives forsake patronage for merit. The theory exploits exogenous variation in the institutional design of patronage states. In some, constitutions and budget laws monopolize patronage powers in the executive; in others, patronage benefits accrue to the legislature and public employees. When institutions fragment patronage powers and challengers control other government branches, merit becomes more incentive-compatible: it enables executives to deprive challengers of patronage while enhancing public goods provision to court electoral support. Drawing on 130 face-to-face elite interviews, a comparison of reforms in Paraguay, the Dominican Republic and the United States validates the theory. How patronage states are institutionally designed thus shapes their reform prospects: fragmented control over bad government can incentivize good government reforms.